

T H E F U N D F O R P E A C E

FROM FAILED STATE TO CIVIL WAR: THE LEBANIZATION OF IRAQ 2003-2006



Iraq as a Failed State
Report #5



Pauline H. Baker

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Pauline H. Baker
The Fund for Peace
1701 K Street, NW
Eleventh Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 223-7940 (phone)
(202) 223-7947 (fax)
www.fundforpeace.org



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TO CIVIL WAR: THE
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Contents

PREFACE	i
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	1
INDICATOR TRENDLINE GRAPHS	5
<i>Graph 1: Iraq Indicator Totals</i>	
<i>Graph 2: Iraq Three-Year Trendline</i>	
<i>Table 1: Iraq: Summary Indicator Ratings</i>	
INDICATOR SUMMARIES	8
CORE 5 OF STATE INSTITUTIONS	55
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE	57

Preface

Although there have been many reports on Iraq, the Fund for Peace (FfP) is contributing to post-conflict Iraq analysis by providing a systematic evaluation of Iraqi progress, using specific metrics for measuring social, economic and political stabilization since the invasion in April 2003. Applying CAST (the Conflict Analysis System Tool), the analytical framework developed by the FfP to assess societies at risk of internal conflict and state collapse, this series of reports evaluates Iraq's progress toward sustainable security – the stage at which the country is largely peaceful and capable of governing itself without external military or administrative oversight.¹

The methodology employed is detailed in the Methodological Note at the end of this report. Briefly, it is based on independent ratings of twelve top conflict indicators enumerated in the attached charts, five core political institutions, and “stings” or unanticipated events and factors. The purpose of the ratings is to discover patterns and trends over time; a particular rating in one indicator at one point in time is less significant than changes over time. Ratings are reviewed carefully, based on information gleaned from open-source English and Arabic language sources, government reports, studies by diverse organizations and groups that had conducted site visits in Iraq, and various scholars and journalists. Detailed narratives describing the indicator trends are contained in the Appendices of this report.

Although research assistants and other staff at the FfP have contributed to the report, the conclusions are entirely the responsibility of the author, who has conducted years of research into failing states and internal war. She has been ably assisted in these reports by outstanding students who have brought creative skills, thoughtful insights, and critical minds to a topic that is highly complex and controversial. For this report, special thanks go to Tim Newcomb and Suzie Clarke for their research assistance.

Pauline H. Baker
April 2006

¹ For another application of the methodology, see the “Failed States Index” in *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2005 and in the forthcoming May/June 2006 issue. Additional details can be obtained on the Fund for Peace website: www.fundforpeace.org, including indicator ratings for 148 states based on 2005 data.



Conclusions

DONALD H. RUMSFELD CLAIMED,
“THE TERRORISTS...MUST BE
WATCHING WITH FEAR THE
PROGRESS THAT IRAQ HAS
MADE OVER THE PAST THREE
YEARS... THE TERRORISTS SEEM
TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE
LOSING IN IRAQ.”

THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES THE
FINDINGS OF A SYSTEMATIC
REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE
U.S.-LED INVASION AND POST-
CONFLICT POLICIES ON
SUSTAINABLE SECURITY IN
IRAQ.

FOR THE INSURGENTS, SUCCESS
IS MUCH SIMPLER TO DEFINE.
THEIR SINGULAR OBJECTIVE IS
TO DEPRIVE THE U.S. AND IRAQI
FORCES OF ACHIEVING THEIR
STATED GOALS.

On the third anniversary of the war in Iraq, President George W. Bush restated his commitment to victory in Iraq.² In gauging progress toward this goal, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld claimed, “the terrorists ...must be watching with fear the progress that Iraq has made over the past three years.... The terrorists seem to recognize that they are losing in Iraq.”³

What, exactly, constitutes success in Iraq?

This report summarizes the findings of a systematic review of the impact of the U.S.-led invasion and post-conflict policies on sustainable security in Iraq, a condition in which the country would be able to solve its own internal problems peacefully without outside military or administration assistance. The report covers the period from pre-invasion Iraq until February 2006.

The analysis is based on the FfP methodology known as CAST (the Conflict Assessment System Tool). Details of the methodology are explained in the methodological note. Our analysis focuses on month-by-month, and indicator-by-indicator trends, using twelve social, economic and military drivers of conflict and five core state institutions.⁴

The U.S. administration defined success in Iraq in the “National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq” published in November 2005. It stated that the occupation is supposed to accomplish three basic objectives:

- Militarily defeating or neutralizing the insurgency
- Installing a democratic government with the institutional capacity to support an economy and govern justly, and
- Making Iraq a model of democracy for the Middle East region and a strategic security partner in the global war on terror and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

For the insurgents, success is much simpler to define. Their singular objective is to deprive the U.S. and Iraqi forces of achieving their stated goals. They do not need to acquire and hold territory, decisively defeat U.S. and Iraqi forces, set up a

² President Bush asserted this in several speeches and in the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” issued by the National Security Council, November 2005.

³ “What we’ve gained in 3 years in Iraq,” *The Washington Post*, 3/19/06.

⁴ For more details on the CAST methodology, consult the Fund for Peace website: www.fundforpeace.org.

IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE
INSURGENTS BELIEVE THEY ARE
LOSING.

government or provide public services. To “win,” they only need not to lose; their measures of effectiveness boil down to one variable: the extent to which they are capable of denying their adversaries success.

By this definition, it is unlikely that the insurgents believe they are losing. Indeed, they confirm the axiom of counter-insurgency warfare that victory does not necessarily go to the side that is militarily superior.

OUR FINDINGS SHOW THAT
THERE WAS A SHORT WINDOW
OF OPPORTUNITY...WHEN THIS
WINDOW CLOSED, THE TREND
LINES WORSENED STEADILY.

Our findings show that there was a short window of opportunity, lasting approximately three months following the invasion, when the internal situation began to improve. The coalition forces could have laid down the basis for the rule of law by crushing the looting and mob violence that erupted, by launching a public debate on the new constitution, by rebuilding the armed forces and police, and by initiating a reconstruction process that aimed at grass-roots employment, provision of public services and restoring state institutions. When that window closed, the trend lines worsened steadily. By September 2005, after sovereignty was passed to an interim Iraqi government and a new transitional parliament, all the indicators had risen into alert zone; on a one to ten scale, in which one is the most stable and ten is the least stable, all twelve indicators were a seven or higher and they stayed there ever since. The cumulative score, based on a scale in which the worst is 120, Iraq rated an aggregate score of 112 by February 2006. These trends show that Iraq’s decline is steady and comprehensive, affecting all social, economic and political/military drivers of conflict.

FACTIONALIZATION HAS BEEN
PERSISTENT, BASICALLY
TRANSFORMING A FAILED STATE
INTO A LEBANON-TYPE
BATTLEFIELD OF ALL AGAINST
ALL.

The nature of the war has evolved over time, with a shifting number of factions, changing tactics, and a shadowy “enemy.” However, factionalization has been persistent, basically transforming a failed state into a Lebanon-type battlefield of all against all, including within the main ethnic and religious groups.

THE POWER VACUUM INSPIRED
A STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
THE CENTER...BASED LARGELY
ALONG ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS
LINES.

Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, violence in Iraq was diffuse and disorganized, with looting and mob rule of the type that often flares after states collapse. Coalition forces did not repress this violence immediately, as they could have, missing an opportunity to set the stage for a state based on the rule of law. The power vacuum inspired a struggle for control of the center among competing groups and leaders, based largely along ethnic and religious lines. U.S. and coalition forces tilted in favor of the Shiites, who represented the overwhelming majority of the population and the heart of the resistance to Saddam Hussein. That tilt encouraged a Shiite-

THREE YEARS AFTER THE
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THE HALLMARKS OF A GROWING
CIVIL WAR.

Kurdish political alliance and marginalization of the Sunnis, in whose territory a nascent insurgency emerged. That, too, was not repressed, in part because of too few troops. Party and factional leaders continued to create militias in a country that is awash with arms, locked into vengeance and without a structure of governance.

Neither the training of local security forces nor the rushed electoral political process have succeeded in reversing these trends. To the contrary, both policies – which are the pillars of the U.S exit strategy – reinforced sectarian divisions because they institutionalized group competition and permitted ethnic factions to take over important institutions, such as the Interior Ministry and police.

These trends document the Lebanization of Iraq, as forecast in earlier Fund for Peace reports. Three years after the invasion, no-go zones, death squads and enforced segregation of ethnic groups are creating de facto partition. Iraq has descended into entrenched sectarian conflict, with all the hallmarks of a growing civil war.

Recommendations

NOR IS HOPE IN A NEW
NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT
WELL-FOUNDED.

Although the withdrawal of occupation forces might remove a rationale for the insurgency, it is likely that the descent into a wider war will accelerate if U.S. and coalition forces are withdrawn suddenly. While the injection of more troops might have worked earlier in the conflict, it is probably too late for that option to work, even if it were politically acceptable, which is doubtful. Nor is hope in a new national unity government well-founded. Political coalitions in Iraq have proven to be tenuous and the new government, when and if it is formed, will continue to be fractionalized, with ministries becoming political fiefdoms of ethnic and sectarian interests, not national institutions. The armed forces, infiltrated with militias, are also part of the problem rather than the solution.

THE BEST CHANCE FOR A
REVERSAL OF TRENDS LIE... IN
ONE APPROACH THAT HAS NOT
YET BEEN TRIED: A REGIONAL
SETTLEMENT INVOLVING IRAQ'S
NEIGHBORS AND OTHER ARAB
STATES.

Under current circumstances, the main questions are not whether the U.S. or the insurgents are “winning” or “losing,” as most commentators have argued, but whether national disintegration can be reversed, how fast the disintegration will occur if it is not, and whether a “soft-landing” with minimal bloodshed can be managed.

The best chance for a reversal of trends lie not in greater militarization of the conflict but in one approach that has not yet been tried: a regional settlement involving Iraq’s neighbors and other Arab states, all of whom want Iraq to remain whole

and stable. Iraq and the UN should seek the convening of an international conference that will examine such a solution together with internal parties.

THE CHANCES FOR REVERSAL OF
THE TRENDS ARE NOT GOOD.
HOWEVER, THE ALTERNATIVE IS
SO FRIGHTENING...THAT IT
COULD POSSIBLY PROMOTE
COOPERATION.

Admittedly, the chances for a reversal of the trends are not good, and this strategy would be a long shot. However, the alternative is so frightening – a full-blown civil war that could last for years – that it could possibly promote cooperation among relevant and antagonistic parties long enough to calm the internal furies driving Iraq toward break-up and introduce fresh political solutions in a region desperately in need of creative ideas.


IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF
A DECENTRALIZED IRAQ.
ANOTHER VARIANT OF THIS
APPROACH IS A NEGOTIATED
BREAK-UP.

It is possible, for example, to conceive of a decentralized Iraq, an outcome that could permit the country to function as a common market with shared economic assets and perhaps even a single national identity, facilitated through a pre-agreed revenue allocation formula for distributing oil revenues among autonomous regions that have their own governments, police, army, civil service and systems of justice. Another variant of this approach is a negotiated break-up that would include regional or international guarantees for marginalized groups and disputed territories. Both contain the seeds of a “soft-landing” outcome that would be the only way to stem the rapid descent into full-scale civil war.

FAILING THESE KINDS OF
SOLUTIONS, IRAQ IS LIKELY TO
FRAGMENT VIOLENTLY.

Failing these kinds of solutions, Iraq is likely to fragment violently. Existing trends point to the Lebanization of Iraq that could suck in other outside powers, enflame the Sunni/Shia conflict in the region, impede a larger Middle East peace, and result in a pull-out of coalition forces that would leave behind a legacy of continuing upheaval and political unrest.

Iraq Indicator Totals (Pre-war through February 2006) *




Legend

91-120	Alert
61-90	Warning
31-60	Monitoring
1-30	Sustainable

*Enlargement of these Indicator Totals, with selected key events, is shown on page 10

IRAQ THREE-YEAR TREND LINE PRE-WAR - FEBRUARY 2006



*This graph is an enlargement of Iraq Indicator Totals (Pre-war through February 2006)


IRAQ: SUMMARY INDICATOR RATINGS

Pre-war through February 2006

Indicator

Indicator	Timeline (1991-2006)																																				
	Pre-war	April-03	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January-04	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January-05	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January-06	February	
1. Mounting Demographic Pressures	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons	8	8	6	6	6	5	9	9	8	7	9	9	9	9	8	8	7	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	9	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia	9	6	6	8	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	9	8	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	10	10
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight	7	7	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines	7	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline	9	10	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	10	9	7	7	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	10	10	9	10	10
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services	7	9	8	8	7	8	8	7	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	9	8	8	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of Human Rights	10	5	5	6	6	6	6	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"	10	8	5	6	7	9	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	10	10	10	10	9	9	10	9	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	7	7	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors	8	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Totals:	101	97	88	92	92	94	98	100	101	98	101	102	102	106	104	100	98	104	108	108	106	104	106	103	104	106	106	109	110	111	111	112	112	110	112	112	112

1 Mounting Demographic Pressures⁵



After Saddam's regime was toppled, U.S. and UN officials anticipated a massive influx of refugees who had been living outside of Iraq for years or an outpouring of civilians fleeing the war. However, there was no sudden refugee return or exodus. Instead, demographic pressures increased months later as a result of the insurgency and widespread violence. The fighting uprooted thousands (see indicators 2 and 4), which created pockets of displaced persons. Reconstruction efforts to restore services that would ease demographic pressures, such as water, sanitation, and electricity, were erratic. Iraqis were unable to receive adequate health services. As a result, there was poor sanitation and many children remained malnourished. Persistent violence and lack of reconstruction meant that demographic pressures remained high over the past three years (see indicator 2 for further details).

⁵ Data in graph regarding the number of Iraqi civilians killed because of the war was found in "Iraq index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq," *The Brookings Institution*, 11/26/05.

Before the U.S.-led invasion, there were significant demographic pressures associated with providing reliable and steady access to water, electricity, health services, and sanitation systems. The biggest anticipated problem after the fall of Saddam's regime was that refugees would be unmanageable. It was feared that a humanitarian crisis would develop without the proper infrastructure to handle basic necessities. However, most Iraqi refugees had fled the country prior to the invasion and were slow to return. Throughout the fall of 2003, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) encouraged Iraqis not to return until the distribution systems of humanitarian aid were properly put into place.⁶

Violence and insecurity were the driver of demographic pressure. Throughout 2004, it became apparent that the increasing amount of violence associated with the growing insurgency and the counter attacks by U.S. forces was only decreasing reliable access to basic necessities. In the spring of 2004, U.S. forces began a massive attack against insurgents in Fallujah and Najaf causing thousands of families to flee to surrounding farmlands, the outskirts of Baghdad, and to as far north as Kirkuk.⁷ While the rate of those fleeing went down in the summer of 2004, by August, fighting in Najaf had displaced at least 10,000 families, forcing them to live in refugee tent camps, public buildings, and religious sites.⁸ Fighting between U.S. forces and insurgents in the western Anbar and Ninawa provinces, beginning in the summer of 2005, created more displaced persons (see indicator 2) resulting in a humanitarian crisis. Military operations, including aerial bombardment, resulted in the displacement of another 10,000 families.⁹

Kirkuk became a flashpoint for conflict and remained an area of contention between the Kurds and Arabs. In February 2004, Kurds began returning to Kirkuk demanding restitution after being forcibly displaced in the 1990s by Saddam as part of his Arabization campaign, in which he gave Kurdish property to settling Arabs.¹⁰ As a result, tensions over the rightful ownership of the properties were particularly high. In 2004, Kurdish parties attempted to gain legal control of the oil-rich city by negotiating for provisions in the interim constitution that stipulated that Kirkuk would be under the autonomous control of the regional Kurdish government to the north. In 2005, Kurdish political parties began to provide money, building materials, and schematic plans to Kurdish refugees to erect settlements in Kirkuk, effectively giving the Kurds *de facto* control over the area. Violence between Kurds and Arabs has resulted.¹¹

Supplies of water, food, and electricity, as well as the operation of sewage treatment plants were insufficient (see indicator 8).¹² For example, in Basra, an oil-rich Shiite city with relatively good security, sewage ran in the streets in the fall of 2005.¹³ Progress was made to refurbish and rebuild Iraq's water treatment system, which had been in shambles after two decades of war, however, as of October 2005, only around half of Iraq's water treatment plants were operational, leaving many of Iraq's citizens living in unsanitary conditions.¹⁴ As of February 2006, electricity, water, sewage, and oil production all were below pre-war levels.

The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated that in 2005, around 1.7 to three million Iraqis were in desperate need of food. In May of 2005, the Iraqi Minister of Planning and Development stated that 25

⁶ "Why Iraqis abroad are reluctant to return," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10/17/05.

⁷ "Iraqi Red Crescent prepares camp for thousands displaced from Fallujah," *Agence France-Presse*, 4/13/04. "Kurds flee Fallujah in fear," *KurdishMedia.com*, 5/7/04.

⁸ "Those who fled Najaf, Kufa fighting want to go home," *UNAMI*, 8/24/04.

⁹ "Human rights report," *UNAMI*, 1 September – 31 October 2005.

¹⁰ "Rumsfeld praises new Iraqi forces," *The Washington Post*, 2/24/04. "Ethnic violence may explode in Baghdad," *The Guardian*, 8/4/04.

¹¹ "Kurds reclaiming prized territory in northern Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 10/30/05.

¹² "Baghdad says Iraqi living standards gravely deteriorated," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 5/12/05.

¹³ "Basra—city of wealth and woe," *Newsday*, 8/26/05.

¹⁴ "Reconstructing Iraq", *Water Environment and Technology*, 10/1/05.

percent of Iraq's children were malnourished, which was close to what the UN World Food Programme had found in 2004 when they estimated that 27 percent of children were chronically malnourished, even as the Iraqi government's Public Distribution System (PDS), which provides food to those who need it, was operating. Officials noted that if the government could not provide food through the PDS, the number of chronically malnourished children would dramatically increase, potentially making conditions even worse than they were with the government's budget problems.¹⁵ The WFP said in September 2005 that it had only received \$29 million of the \$66 million from international donors that it estimated would be needed to provide around 67,000 metric tons of food to the three million Iraqis, around half of them children, that are most vulnerable to any food shortage.¹⁶

Since April 2003, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) helped set up 77,000 public works jobs through the National Employment Program. Since the country's employment was heavily related to agriculture, USAID also rehabilitated 51 veterinary clinics, servicing some 131,000 farmers across the country.¹⁷ Nonetheless, unemployment remained very high (see indicators 5 and 6) and has added to the demographic pressures. A survey published by the UN in May of 2005 found that around 37 percent of men with secondary education or higher were unemployed.¹⁸

Iraq's health care system also contributed to demographic pressures, as medical supplies have been sporadic, blood supplies have run short, and many doctors have fled the country for economic and security reasons (see indicators 4 and 8). However, in the first eight months of 2005, only 29 cases of malaria were reported, a decrease when compared to the same period of time in 2004, which had 84 cases of malaria reported.¹⁹

¹⁵ "Baghdad says Iraqi living standards gravely deteriorated," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 5/12/05. "'Dismal shortage of cash threatens hungry Iraqis," *World Food Programme*, 9/21/05.


¹⁶ "World food programme warns of food shortage in Iraq," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 9/21/05.

¹⁷ "Iraq: Reconstruction weekly updates," *USAID*, 1/6/06.

¹⁸ "Baghdad says Iraqi living standards gravely deteriorated," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 5/12/05.

¹⁹ "UN-Iraq reconstruction and development update," *UNAMI*, September 2005.

2 Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons Creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies



Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees were poised to return in the post-Saddam era. UNHCR facilitated the return of some, but discouraged a mass return due to the economic and security situation. Iraqi officials requested that foreign countries not deport Iraqi refugees until the security, economic, and public services situation improved for fear of a humanitarian crisis. Those who returned on their own found themselves living in impoverished conditions, as housing, food, and employment were scarce. By the end of 2003, it was apparent that the lack of security was discouraging repatriation. Further, the greatest humanitarian problems came from large groups of internally displaced persons (IDPs) caused by the fighting, with many unable to return to their destroyed homes. The number of IDPs increased as sectarian violence worsened. In Kirkuk there was forced resettlement of the Arab population by the Kurdish provincial authority to reclaim the city as part of the province. By the end of 2005, Shiite and Sunni populations, due to intimidation and insecurity, sought refuge in ethnically segregated communities where they would not be targeted by insurgents or persecuted by ethnic rivals.

Anticipating the fall of Saddam's regime, U.S. and UN officials, in late spring 2003, were initially concerned that there would be a massive influx of refugees into neighboring Iran, as had resulted from the Gulf War in 1992. In 2003, an estimated 30,000 Baghdad residents did end up fleeing violence after the U.S. invasion, as looting and lawlessness spread in the city.²⁰ The families made their way for the Iraqi-Iranian border, but despite the fear from officials of a massive outflow of refugees, most of the initial wave of refugees returned to Baghdad within weeks.²¹ In the fall of 2003, UN officials had the opposite fear, that Iraqis who had fled the country in previous decades would begin to return in large droves at unsustainable rates, causing complications with humanitarian aid for them (see indicator 1).

Since 2003, Iraqi refugees who had left Iraq in previous conflicts to live in other countries were repatriated in small numbers by the UNHCR. Conditions worsened for refugees returning across Iraq's southern borders with Saudi Arabia and Iran, as 122,000 refugees returned in the twelve months following the downfall of Saddam's regime to face severe economic and social hardship in Iraq.²²

Ethnic tension between major groups in Iraq (see indicator 3) had led to the voluntary displacement within the country of many Iraqis seeking safety from violence or threats of violence directed against them as a group. This was particularly evident in the highly contested city of Kirkuk and surrounding areas. Kirkuk was a very important city to many groups, mainly because of its large supply of oil reserves, but also because of its cultural significance. Kurds had been attempting to regain control of the city and the surrounding areas since they were forced from the area during Saddam's Arabization campaign, when Kurds were driven out and Arabs were brought in to populate the city. In an attempt to undo the Arabization process, Kurds were actively trying to take back the city that was traditionally been under Kurdish control, and which they saw as rightfully theirs. They used intimidation and violence, which led to the displacement of an estimated 100,000 Arabs in north-central Iraq by June 2004.²³

Around a third of all Iraqi Kurds lived outside of the Kurdish autonomously controlled region of northern Iraq. Since the 2003 invasion, many of these Kurds fled back to the Kurdish zone to live in refugee camps that surround major Kurdish cities, such as Erbil where the outskirts are swollen with makeshift camps.²⁴ Although it is not apparent that this was directly a result of intimidation or violence against these Kurds, it is a sign that the country is increasingly divided along group lines, as these Kurds chose to live in refugee camps in the Kurdish controlled area rather than in areas populated by Shiite and Sunni Arabs, where they may become victims of targeted violence.

Smaller groups of Iraqis were also affected by rising sectarian tensions. In early 2004, 2,000 Iraqi Christian families left the southern city of Basra for Baghdad and Mosul, where fundamentalist Shiite religious groups had increased their power. Leaflets had been tacked up in Christian neighborhoods demanding women wear headscarves and advising that those seen in public with a cross would be shot.²⁵ In February 2006 it was reported that an estimated 800,000 Christians remained in Iraq. It was believed that 1.4 million Christians lived in Iraq a decade ago.²⁶

²⁰ Available online at: <http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/iraq041503.htm>, *Human Rights Watch*, 4/15/03.

²¹ Available online at: http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=33531&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAN, UNHCR, 4/16/03.

²² "UN team visits southern Iraq, warns of mass refugee returns," *UN Wire*, 3/10/04.

²³ "Kurds advancing to reclaim land in northern Iraq," *The New York Times*, 6/20/04.

²⁴ "The Kurds in control," *National Geographic*, January 2006.

²⁵ "War for souls," *Alternet.org*, 2/20/04.

²⁶ "The exodus," *Jerusalem Report*, 2/20/06.

The fighting that broke out in mid-2004 between insurgent and U.S. forces in Fallujah forced many Iraqis to flee their homes to live in different areas of Iraq. This increase in the number of internally displaced persons hindered relief operations in Iraq, creating humanitarian emergencies.²⁷ The fighting continued throughout the fall and caused at least 80 percent of Fallujah's 250,000 to 300,000 residents to flee to other regions of Iraq or to neighboring countries.²⁸ As the winter of 2004/2005 came, these refugees and IDPs faced many hardships associated with their displacement, including shortages of food and materials.²⁹ By early 2005, only an estimated 60,000 had returned to their homes, the rest living in hotels, with relatives, or outside Iraqi borders.³⁰

Tensions between Iraq's Sunni Arab and Shiite Arab populations also led to the creation of IDPs. In May of 2005, it was reported that, because of a rise in sectarian violence, hundreds of Shiite families were leaving the Sunni Triangle, the area of Iraq roughly between, the cities of Baghdad, Ramadi, and Tikrit.³¹ Many Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs moved to polarized enclaves in and around Baghdad where they felt they would not automatically be targets.³² UNAMI reported that during the months of September and October 2005, ongoing violence in Baghdad's neighborhoods resulted in large displacements of families and individuals, both Sunnis and Shiites, following threats of violence and killings. Similar situations have developed resulting in the moving to and from the Anbar, Baghdad, Ninewa, and Basra provinces. In Samarra, where heavy fighting occurred between U.S. and insurgent forces, it was estimated that approximately half of the city's 200,000 residents left in the past 2 years.³³

In May of 2005, U.S. Marines and Iraqi soldiers launched a series of several major offensives throughout the Sunni Anbar and Ninawa provinces. The operations, which were designed to attack insurgent strongholds west of Baghdad as well as near the Syrian border, included a ground assault of thousands of American and Iraqi troops and many air strikes in the urban centers of these provinces, continuing periodically throughout the rest of the year. The fighting between U.S./Iraqi forces and insurgents caused a large amount of destruction, leading to a humanitarian crisis with many families of the predominantly Sunni provinces seeking refuge in other parts of the provinces and in other parts of the country.

Families were displaced to over 30 locations in Anbar province as a result of military operations. Most moved to stay with relatives and clan members, but it was estimated that as many as 200 families fled into desert areas, complicating humanitarian efforts.³⁴ During the month of August 2005, sustained military operations in the Ninawa province town of Tal Afar resulted in the displacement of 5,000 to 7,000 families to surrounding locations.³⁵ In Tal Afar, the number of displaced families was increased to 2,700 towards the end of the October 2005 from 1,100 families earlier in the month.³⁶ Military operations in November 2005 in and around the Anbar province city of Qaim led to the displacement of around 7,000 families, many housed in tented camps and public buildings in neighboring locations. After November,

²⁷ "Insecurity hinders relief operations in Iraq," *UNHCR*, 4/28/04.

²⁸ "Fallujans flee from U.S., Zarqawi fight," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10/19/04.

²⁹ "Iraq humanitarian assistance report," *Pacific Disaster Management Information Network*, 12/13/04. "In Fallujah's ruins, big plans and a risk of chaos," *The New York Times*, 12/1/04.

³⁰ "A return to Fallujah to see what remains," *The Washington Post*, 2/14/05. "Iraq humanitarian assistance report," *Pacific Disaster Management Information Network*, 12/13/04. "In Fallujah's ruins, big plans and a risk of chaos," *The New York Times*, 12/1/04.

³¹ *Agence France Presse*, 5/20/05.

³² "Shiites flee after Sunni threats," *The Seattle Times*, 9/25/05.

³³ "Attacks deepen Iraq's divide," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2/23/06.

³⁴ "UN-Iraq humanitarian update," *UNAMI*, July 2005.

³⁵ "UN-Iraq humanitarian update," *UNAMI*, August 2005.


³⁶ "UN-Iraq humanitarian update," *UNAMI*, October 2005.

the estimated number of displaced families in Anbar province exceeded 11,000.³⁷ As a result of the fighting, a large number of houses were destroyed or severely damaged in the families' absences, as were medical facilities.³⁸

³⁷ "UN-Iraq humanitarian update," *UNAMI*, November 2005.

³⁸ "Human rights report," *UNAMI*, 1 November—31 December 2005.

3 Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia



Group grievance and factionalized elites (indicator 11) are particularly important to understanding the conflict in Iraq because of the deep sectarian divisions that have brought this country to the brink of full civil war. Since the invasion, little attention was given to integrating Iraq's civilian institutions to overcome the deep ethnic divisions entrenched in society. Most political processes were conducted along ethnic lines. The Governing Council seats were initially allocated according to ethnic identity and the composition of the interim government, transitional government, and first elected government, were decided according to ethnicity. Voting also was along sectarian lines. Ethnicity thus became institutionalized as a medium for seeking power. From April 2003 to February 2006, group grievance was expressed violently, first through assassinations of religious and political figures, then through attacks on places of worship, then through killing of local leaders. It progressively got to the point of large-scale revenge killings of members of rival ethnic populations, targeted assassinations of Iraqi government authorities, death squads, secret prisons, and the proliferation of self-defense private militias, all linked to sectarian retaliation and intimidation.

Hostility existed between the Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish communities before the U.S.-led invasion, but the dictatorial control of Saddam's regime suppressed this hostility. When Saddam fell, grievances among the groups surfaced with ferocity and violence. These grievances have had a debilitating effect on the democratization process, reflected in the highly contentious negotiations between the factional political leaders and violence carried out daily.

Tensions aggravated before the war were due to the ethnic-based actions of Saddam. Kurds faced ethnic cleansing during the 1980s and forced relocation from Kirkuk in the 1990s with Sunni Arabs moving in. Marsh Arabs lost their lands and livelihoods when the marshes of Iraq were drained. Even Sunni tribes, Saddam's own religious group, had faced draconian measures, as Saddam attempted to pit tribe against tribe.

U.S. officials anticipated a surge in revenge killings between the groups in the absence of Saddam's regime, but there was relative calm in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. The U.S. failed to utilize this time to fill the security vacuum and begin reconstruction that met public demand and therefore the relative calm did not last long. During the summer of 2003, sectarian violence began to emerge among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and other smaller groups, in vengeance-seeking attacks. Important local leaders and officials from every group were assassinated, and former members of the ruling regime and Ba'athists were attacked. American presence showed signs of being a divisive and deadly issue, especially among Shiite religious leaders. In the fall of 2003, Iraqis recruited by the U.S. to become a part of police and army forces began to be targeted in attacks.

When Saddam was captured in December 2003, many thought that the cycle of killings would end, but in fact there was a sharp increase in the violence, an indication that perpetrators no longer needed to fear government retaliation for settling old scores. Fear within the sectarian groups of the "others" grew in the political vacuum. Not only did attacks of religious and political leaders continue, but attacks at Sunni and Shiite places of worship increased.

By 2004, many Iraqis saw the U.S. as occupiers of their country and demanded that they leave. This was one issue that reached across ethnic lines. No group had complete internal unity of views for or against the U.S. though. Generally, Sunnis saw U.S. forces as favoring the Shiites and the Kurds; not surprisingly, the number of attacks by the Sunni-led insurgency against U.S. forces, as well as the Shiite and Kurdish publics, increased. Among the Shiites, Muqtada al-Sadr called for a unified Iraq and the immediate expulsion of the American troops, rhetoric that was often the opposite of other Shiite groups, particularly Sciri, that had been working with the U.S. In April 2004, there was a brief period of unity between Shiite and Sunni Arabs against the U.S. forces, as pictures of Muqtada al-Sadr were hung in Sunni mosques and 200,000 Shiites and Sunnis gathered at the largest Sunni mosque in Baghdad to protest the occupation, but the unity proved to be short-lived. Tensions flared in June 2004 when six Shiite truck drivers were attacked and killed in Sunni-dominated Fallujah.³⁹

Throughout 2004, smaller groups were also the target of increasing violence from Sunni, Kurdish and Shiite groups. Christian churches were bombed, and in the southern province of Basra, controlled by religious Shiite groups, many Christian Iraqis received death threats demanding that they convert to Islam, adhere to Islamic law, or leave Iraq. Turkmen were also intimidated and targeted, especially in the northern Kurdish areas.

³⁹ "Revolts in Iraq deepen crisis in occupation," *The Washington Post*, 4/18/04. "2 pipeline blasts halt oil exports at top Iraq port," *The New York Times*, 6/16/04.

Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 transitional national assembly election. Although there was little violence on the day of the election, there was an increase in the number of insurgent attacks in the weeks before and after election day. Throughout spring 2004, as the new government formed, Sunnis were further alienated from the political process as the victorious Shiite and Kurdish leaders made little effort to include proportionate Sunni representation in the government or on the important constitutional drafting committee (15 of 55 seats were given to Sunnis, two of whom were dead).

May 2005 through February 2006 was a period of several negotiations on the formation of the constitutional drafting committee, a referendum on the constitution, and an election for the first full-term government of Iraq. Concurrently, there was an increase in the amount of sectarian hostility between the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish groups, manifested in divisive government jockeying for power, and in the level, frequency, and types of violence used by all three major groups. This led to an increase in this indicator's rating from a 9 to a 10.

Throughout 2005, the sophistication and coordination of the violence also increased. The Sunni insurgency seemed to have an endless pool of recruits willing to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) where U.S. and Iraqi convoys passed by, and to carry out suicide bombings and car bombings in crowded, Shiite-dominated areas. Shiites flooded the ranks of government security forces with militia members who abducted large groups of Sunni men from the neighborhoods surrounding Baghdad and took them to secret Interior Ministry prisons where they were, starved, tortured, and, in some cases, killed. Kurds took action similar to the Shiites, but with different aims. Large groups of the Peshmerga, the Kurdish militia, have joined the regional government's security forces and intimidated Arabs to leave Kurdish areas, especially in the highly contentious and oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

Sunni group fears were heightened in June 2005, when government leaders of the ruling Shiite and Kurdish parties openly endorsed the national government's use of ethnic and sectarian militias, particularly the Shiite controlled Badr Organization and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Many Sunnis feared these militias would use government uniforms to mask their true identities and intentions (see indicators 10 and 11).⁴⁰

By late 2005, in the neighborhoods of Baghdad and the surrounding towns, violence against both Sunnis and Shiites caused as many as 20 towns that once consisted of a mixed population to segregate sharply down sectarian lines. Sunnis and Shiites moved to polarized enclaves where they would not automatically be targeted. Many were defended by, or forming their own, self-defense units and militias. Particularly in the newer parts of Western Baghdad that were under the control of Sunni insurgents, Shiites were told to leave the proclaimed Sunni towns in anonymous leaflets and letters.⁴¹ On the other hand, Iraqi security forces, largely made up of Shiites, disproportionately targeted Sunnis in large-scale arrests. Many Sunnis reported torture and death in police custody.⁴²

Kirkuk became a flashpoint for tensions between Kurds and Arabs, where hostilities have rose to crisis levels. In the 1990s, Kurds were forcibly removed from Kirkuk and replaced by Arabs as part of Saddam's Arabization campaign. After Hussein lost power, Kurds believed Kirkuk, which had historically been a culturally important city of Kurdistan and has enormous economic potential, should return to Kurdish control. Many among the Kurdish security apparatus took this notion of 'Kurdish Kirkuk' to another level, acting on the idea that "every Arab who was moved to Kirkuk during

⁴⁰ "Iraqi leaders back militias, widening rift with Sunnis," *The New York Times*, 6/9/05.

⁴¹ "Shiites flee after Sunni threats", *The Seattle Times*, 9/25/05.

⁴² "Sectarian hatred pulls apart Iraq's mixed towns," *The New York Times*, 11/20/05.

Arabization should be kicked out” (see indicator 9).⁴³ It was revealed in June 2005 that security units in Kirkuk, led by Kurdish political parties and backed by the U.S. military, abducted hundreds of minority Arabs and Turkmen, often with U.S. knowledge, and secretly transported them to prisons in the Kurdish controlled zone.⁴⁴ These abductions both exacerbated tensions along ethnic lines and further degraded U.S. credibility.

In mid-November 2005, an anonymous tip led U.S. forces to discover and raid a secret prison in an Interior Ministry building in Baghdad. The discovery reinforced Sunni fears that government security forces controlled by the Interior Ministry, which is headed by Bayan Jabr, a former Badr Organization commander and a Sciri political leader, were abducting, torturing, and executing Sunni men.⁴⁵ (See indicators 7, 8, 10 and 11). In December 2005, a similar secret prison run by Interior Ministry commandos was discovered with 625 Sunni men who bore signs of starvation and torture, a discovery that reinforced the Sunni fear that the secret prisons were a widespread phenomenon.⁴⁶

December 2005 elections brought a slight lull in the number of incidences of violence. The decrease in the violence brought the indicator’s rating of a 10 down to a 9. It was hoped that the election would be seen as a step forward in the political process and in forming a government of national unity, thereby reducing sectarian division. While there was a lull in violence surrounding the election, these hopes were shattered in the first week of 2006, when a series of bombs all around Iraq, apparently coordinated, killed around 50 people the first day and 110 people the day after, the single deadliest day in Iraq since September 14, 2005.⁴⁷

On February 22, 2006, the Askariya Shrine, one of the Shiites holiest sites, was bombed setting off a wave of sectarian violence. The Baghdad morgue has been cited as reporting more than 1,300 Iraqis killed in the wave of violence.⁴⁸ The Iraqi government and U.S. military denied that the number was this high.

⁴³ “The Kurds in control,” *National Geographic*, January 2006.

⁴⁴ “Kurdish officials sanction abductions in Kirkuk,” *The Washington Post*, 6/15/05.


⁴⁵ “Torture charges deepen rift between U.S. and Iraqi leader,” *The New York Times*, 11/17/05. “Iraqi rift grows as secret prison enrages Sunnis,” *The New York Times*, 11/17/05.

⁴⁶ “Human rights report,” *UNAMI*, 1 November—31 December 2005.

⁴⁷ “Iraq erupts again,” *The Wall Street Journal Online*, 1/5/06.

⁴⁸ “Toll in Iraq’s deadly surge: 1,300 morgue count eclipses other tallies since shrine attack,” *The Washington Post*, 2/28/06.

4 Sustained and Chronic Human Flight



Many professionals fled Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s due to the intimidation of Saddam's regime. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, a massive influx of the four million Iraqis living outside Iraq, half of which were professionals, was expected. The CPA was wary of a massive return that might create a humanitarian crisis, but it welcomed exiles who could be helpful in the reconstruction of the country. Throughout 2003, trends showed that professionals, intellectuals, and political dissidents were returning to Iraq, and that many more were interested in returning. It appeared as though the "brain drain" that had occurred under Saddam's regime might have been reversing. However, by 2004, the security vacuum had not been filled and the insurgency was in full swing. Professionals began to be targeted both for ransom and political reasons. As professionals and their families were increasingly targeted for assassination, many left Iraq for nearby countries. Those still outside were dissuaded from returning permanently.

During the summer of 2003, there were signs that some of these Iraqis living in exile were returning, some to help the CPA with reconstruction, bringing the indicator rating down to below alert level.⁴⁹ In December 2003, dozens of university professors came back to Iraq seeking the jobs they had left during the 1980s and 1990s. Many others who remained outside of Iraq were contacting the Ministry of Higher Education and inquiring about returning to their positions. Following the capture of Saddam, the “brain drain” trend that had persisted in Iraq seemed to be reversing.

Unfortunately this period of high hopes among returning exiles did not last. As the insurgency gained momentum in the spring of 2004, and shifted their focus from security and military targets to civilian targets, this promising homecoming trend was halted, and eventually even reversed once again. It was estimated that the number of Iraqis who left since the war was actually larger than the number of Iraqis who returned.⁵⁰ This indicator has sustained ratings above pre-war levels from mid-2004 through February 2006 due to sustained violent attacks against professionals and their families. Even those professionals who remained in Iraq under Saddam’s rule have had to leave due to the danger posed in a country threatened by civil war.

Professionals were murdered, abducted, faced death threats, and had family members kidnapped for ransom. Some perpetrators had criminal intent, knowing that professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and academics had more money and were more likely to be able to pay a high ransom. However, most abductions and assassinations of professionals were politically related, especially if they had expressed support or tolerance for the U.S. and coalition presence. From April 2003 to April 2004, around 1,000 Iraqi professionals and intellectuals were assassinated, according to Arab press reports, and medical doctors and academics were targeted more than any other professions.⁵¹ This trend continued from May 2005 to February 2006.⁵² A study published in January 2006 found that 40 percent of Iraq’s professionals fled since April 2003.⁵³

A lack of security perpetuated Iraq’s medical brain drain. Iraq’s Health Ministry estimated that up to 25 percent of the country’s physicians may have left since the start of the war, most likely due to violence deliberately aimed at doctors and the lack of security to protect them from it.⁵⁴ From April 2003 to April 2005, between 160 and 300 Iraqi doctors had been abducted by armed insurgent groups and 25 had been killed. According to the Iraqi Medical Association, at least 10 percent of Baghdad’s 32,000 registered doctors had left the country from June 2004 to June 2005.⁵⁵ Because of the growing threat of abduction and/or murder, the Iraqi government gave doctors the right in May 2005 to carry firearms while at work for self-defense.⁵⁶ Without the right equipment in emergency rooms, and with supplies frequently running short, maintaining a professional career as a doctor was especially challenging.

Since the Gulf War, approximately 10,000 professors left Iraq. Since 2003, at least another 2,000 left. As of October 2005, the rate leaving the country was about 30 per month.⁵⁷ In the year and a half after the war began, 200 university professors had either been killed or kidnapped. Many living in exile did not

⁴⁹ “Why Iraqis abroad are reluctant to return,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10/17/03.

⁵⁰ “Iraq: Professionals increasingly eye emigration as security problems continue,” *Radio Free Europe*, 8/3/04.

⁵¹ “Death to those who speak out,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4/30/04.

⁵² “Violence in Iraq leads to brain drain,” *Aljazeera.net*, 10/31/05.

⁵³ “Iraq: Higher education ministry tempts professionals with security, salaries,” *Reuters*, 1/31/06.

⁵⁴ “The conflict in Iraq; U.S. priorities set back its healthcare goals in Iraq,” *The Los Angeles Times*, 10/30/05.

⁵⁵ “Kidnappings and killings prompt an Iraq doctors’ exodus,” *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 6/20/05.

⁵⁶ “Iraq’s ministries struggle to serve,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5/13/05 found in “A face and a name: Civilian victims of insurgent groups in Iraq,” *Human Rights Watch*, October 2005.

⁵⁷ “A face and a name: Civilian victims of insurgent groups in Iraq,” *Human Rights Watch*, October 2005. “Iraq losing its best and brightest,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9/21/04.

return because of the poor conditions of higher education facilities due to looting. Of the 144 higher education facilities, only 21 escaped lootings, bombings, and arson.⁵⁸ As mentioned above, in December 2003, many universities were reporting a return of professors, but they were discouraged by the looted educational facilities. In an effort to stem an exodus of the country's academia, the national government doubled the pay of university professors in June of 2005.⁵⁹ While statistical measures were not available on the impact of this pay increase, trends throughout the remainder of 2005 showed that targeted violence caused a reversal in academics returning and remaining at universities.

Rising insecurity has caused many key Iraqi officials who form integral parts of the country's infrastructure to be killed, driven away from their jobs under threat of violence, or to voluntarily leave the country. During December 2004, Iraq's director of the state-run telecommunications system was shot dead in Baghdad.⁶⁰ Around 700 election commissioners around the country resigned because of an increase in the number of threats against them by militant groups leading up to the January elections of 2005.⁶¹ Many neighborhood councils, introduced as a way to have more local governance and democracy, disappeared in 2005, as members of these councils were going into hiding to evade insurgents.⁶² The country's security forces took heavy voluntary losses during 2004, including police officers, highway patrol officers, and border patrol officers, who resigned or abandoned their posts.⁶³

Besides doctors and professors, Iraqi engineers, scientists and other highly trained professionals felt that they would have better business opportunities, in addition to a higher level of safety, in nearby Middle East countries.⁶⁴ The well-educated and skilled workers in Iraq lacked the logistical, security, financial, and technological resources necessary for success in their various professional fields. There was not enough capital, books, computers, advanced equipment, and other supplies.⁶⁵

Even as this brain drain persisted, there have been small successes at bringing Iraqis living in exile in surrounding countries back to resettle. UNHCR has assisted in the repatriation of thousands of Iraqis, providing means of transportation convoys and legal information centers in Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The total number of individuals repatriated since 2003 was 16,288.⁶⁶ However, these figures do not show if there has been a strong return of professionals.

⁵⁸ "Iraqi education minister says schools must rebuild and revolt," *Agence France Presse*, 6/14/05.

⁵⁹ "Iraq: Doctors' salaries set to improve," *IRIN*, 6/29/05.

⁶⁰ "Iraq's state-run telecommunications chief shot dead as Bush warns Iran, Syria," *Al-Bawaba*, 12/16/04.

⁶¹ "Militant groups warn Iraqis not to participate in Jan. 30 vote; Mosul election workers resign after threat," *The Associated Press*, 12/30/05.

⁶² "Iraq's neighborhood councils are vanishing," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2/25/05.


⁶³ "Report paints bleak picture of Iraqi forces; U.S. forces see urgent need for better training," *The Boston Globe*, 1/8/05.

⁶⁴ "Brain drain puts new strain on Iraq," *BBC News*, 7/28/05.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ "UN-Iraq humanitarian update," *UNAMI*, November 2005.

5 Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines



Economic inequality along group lines that existed under Saddam persisted over the past three years, reinforced by security conditions. The Kurdish region in the north was secure following the invasion. There was already a humanitarian presence there and reconstruction efforts were started immediately. The Shiite region to the south, which had been repressed under Saddam's regime, also received reconstruction aid. In contrast, the Sunni triangle, including cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi which bracketed the heart of the insurgency, became too unstable for reconstruction goals to be fulfilled. Even as some projects were started, the spread of violence across the region caused many companies and relief agencies to withdraw their foreign workers or suspend operations altogether. Sunnis had been accustomed to privileged status under Saddam and their discontent grew as reconstruction projects were completed in Kurdish and Shiite regions, but not in theirs. The disparity along ethnic lines in reconstruction continued through February 2006.

Inequalities along group lines were evident under Saddam's regime. Sunnis were favored, thus exacerbating tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. He would pit Sunni tribes against one another though in order to maintain power over the group. Baghdad received the highest distribution of resources, to the detriment of other cities. The government's persecution and campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kurds also led to deep mistrust between the Kurds and Arabs.

Following the fall of Saddam and the Ba'ath party, Sunnis found that their once privileged status no longer existed. They were excluded from government and security force positions. Kurds and Shiites had more economic and educational opportunities. Sunnis found that they were not receiving comparable reconstruction aid, had higher unemployment rates, and had inadequate access to health care and other public services. Their exclusion was underscored by the economic decline experienced throughout the Sunni region. Fallujah and Ramadi were devastated by clashes between insurgents and coalition and Iraqi security forces. Fallujah only began to see some improvements to electricity, hospitals, police stations, and schools in December 2005.⁶⁷

Kurds had thrived under U.S. protection following the Gulf War, and were protective of their economic status and relative security. Reconstruction projects began immediately in the Kurdish region to the north due to the relative security. However, the U.S. shifted billions of dollars designated for reconstruction projects in those regions for use in other regions. This resulted in more than 90 projects being cancelled in April 2005.⁶⁸ Further, while Kurdish controlled areas were prospering economically, especially as many construction projects got underway, in actuality, the Kurds had almost no industry. They were attempting on many fronts to gain control of Kirkuk, and focus mostly on oil revenues for development. With a nearly 9 billion-barrel oil field amounting to around \$500 million in value, the area was believed to have reserves of 40 billion barrels of crude oil.⁶⁹

Shiites gained power after Saddam and the Ba'ath party fell from power. They have found more opportunities in government, jobs, and education. Access to health care and other public services was more readily available. Additionally, there were more secure areas in the Shiite dominated south, which allowed reconstruction projects to begin or be completed. Plans to build an international airport in Najaf were underway. As an alternative to Baghdad, the Imam Ali International Airport was expected to bring in \$500 million per year. Some investors were hesitant to sign on, while others already had plans to build. The city's religious leaders hoped to construct a memorial on behalf of a Shiite cleric who was killed, complete with an Islamic university and library. Najaf was viewed as one of Iraq's most potential attractive cities for investment. Security was relatively good compared to other parts of Iraq and there were plans for another airport north of Najaf.⁷⁰ Basra had its blood bank refurbished, which allowed blood to be screened and helped to improve hospital services in the city.⁷¹ However, as of August 2005, sewage was still running in the streets and most residents were living in poverty, although some professions, such as civil servants and oil smugglers, had seen their salaries triple since the fall of Saddam.⁷² British soldiers stationed in Basra completed small reconstruction projects, but were unable to make real progress due to insurgents who continuously attacked the power grid and anyone who tried to fix it. It should also be noted that the power grid was unable to meet public demand even when not under attack.⁷³ As of February 2006, more than 250,000 families were in need of homes in Basra.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ "One year after Fajr, Fallujah continues to rebuild," *States News Service*, 12/27/05.

⁶⁸ "Security vs. rebuilding: Kurdish town loses out," *The New York Times*, 4/16/05.

⁶⁹ "The Kurds in control," *National Geographic*, January 2006.

⁷⁰ "With promise of airport, investment in Najaf takes off," *The Washington Post*, 1/7/06.

⁷¹ "Life blood for Basra hospitals," *BBC News*, 7/22/05.

⁷² "Basra—city of wealth and woe," *Newsday*, 8/26/05.

⁷³ "Security key to Basra's progress," *BBC News*, 8/31/05.


Baghdad, which had received 12-24 hours of electricity per day under Saddam, was receiving an average of four hours per day in February 2006. While this meant that some regions were receiving more electricity per day than they had received under Saddam, electricity remained unevenly distributed, as particular regions were still suffering to the detriment of other regions.⁷⁵ Baghdad also experienced a water shortage due to poor infrastructure, leaky pipes, and wastefulness.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ "250,000 families in Basra have no homes, official," *Azzaman.com*, 2/20/06.

⁷⁵ "Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. achievements through Iraq relief and reconstruction fund," *States News Service*, 2/9/06. "Iraqis cope with life without lights," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2/10/06.

⁷⁶ "Iraq: Severe water shortage hits Baghdad suburbs," *IRIN*, 2/6/06.

6 Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline



Sabotage and insecurity impacted economic development significantly. The CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council began reconstruction efforts shortly after the invasion, but focused on large infrastructure, rather than projects aimed at improving the day-to-day lives of civilians. Opportunities were missed to create public works programs that would have produced employment for Iraqis. Insurgent attacks on oil pipelines and other infrastructure cost Iraq billions of dollars, while widespread violence caused many companies and relief agencies to withdraw their foreign workers or suspend operations altogether, impeding economic recovery. Oil production and revenues were unable to reach sustainable pre-war levels and growth in GDP has not been as strong as anticipated. Iraq was granted a loan reconstruction package by the IMF and World Bank and Iraqi debts were forgiven by many countries. While official unemployment rates were difficult to determine, there was widespread unemployment. However, Iraqis purchased more consumer goods, which could be a sign of growing economic confidence. The dinar was introduced between October 2003 and January 2004 and held steady.

Attacks on Iraq's oil infrastructure and the inability of contractors to complete reconstruction projects has meant that the country has been unable to utilize their oil reserves for economic growth. Iraq's Oil Ministry said that in 2004 there were 642 attacks on the oil production infrastructure, which cost the country \$10 billion.⁷⁷ In 2005 there were 186 attacks on oil sites costing \$6.25 billion.⁷⁸ By October 2004 Iraq had to begin importing fuel due to sustained sabotage and damage to infrastructure.⁷⁹ With 95-98 percent of the national budget dependent upon oil revenue, sabotage led to the government's inability to meet its budget for 2004. The government was even further behind in its 2005 budget.⁸⁰ Oil revenues in June 2005 were \$2.03 billion at 1.44 million barrels per day.⁸¹ This was the first time since the invasion when monthly revenues for oil were above \$2 billion. Due to the high cost of oil worldwide, oil revenues continued rising each month through September 2005, the month with the highest oil revenues at \$2.74 billion. October, November, and December 2005, and January and February 2006 saw rapid decreases in the monthly oil revenues. In November, Iraq's oil exports fell to a two-year low of 1.65 million barrels per day because of power outages and problems with weather.⁸² In December 2005, oil exports were 1.1 million barrels per day, which was the lowest since the occupation began.⁸³ December also saw the Iraqi government triple the price of gasoline being sold to Iraqis in an effort to limit the importation of gasoline from the neighboring countries of Jordan, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey. The hike was designed to cut back on subsidies in order to meet conditions laid out by the IMF and several donor countries that provided aid and loans. The price increase was met with mass disapproval among Iraqis.⁸⁴

Fuel smuggling, especially from the port of Basra, became a consistent problem adding to Iraq's economic problems. Since the fall of Saddam's regime, oil smugglers have seen their profits triple by sneaking oil out of the southern port to be sold in other Middle East countries at better prices than in Iraq.⁸⁵

In April 2004 contractors began withdrawing from the country due to security concerns.⁸⁶ As the situation grew worse, money for reconstruction began was shifted to security.⁸⁷ Billions of dollars earmarked for economic development was funneled for use in ending the insurgency.⁸⁸ International investment remained a top priority in order to stimulate the economy. However, investors were slow to come due to the security situation.⁸⁹

The unemployment rate was estimated to be as high as 70 percent by Iraq's Labor Ministry in late 2003. U.S. officials countered with a figure between 20 and 30 percent.⁹⁰ As the country grew more dangerous, private firms were less willing to enter Iraq to fulfill reconstruction projects, and therefore Iraqis were filling positions.⁹¹ In March 2004, Paul Bremer announced that more jobs would be created as projects continued.⁹² By June 2004 it became apparent that while some jobs had been created, the security

⁷⁷ "The Kurds in control," *National Geographic*, January 2006.

⁷⁸ "Oil attacks costing Iraq \$6.25bn," *BBC News*, 2/19/06.

⁷⁹ "Fuel shortages worsen as winter approaches," *Azzaman*, 10/18/04.

⁸⁰ "Iraq considers slashing government budget, jobs," *The Contra Costa Times (CA)*, 6/7/05.

⁸¹ "Iraq increases southern oil production to 2.3 mln brd," *AFX Asia Focus*, 8/15/05.

⁸² "OPEC November oil output dips on Iraq, Iran cuts," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 12/12/05.

⁸³ "Unbuilding a nation," *Petroleum Economist*, 2/8/06.

⁸⁴ "Iraqi customs seize fuel ship to be smuggled out of Iraq," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 12/26/05.

⁸⁵ "Basra—city of wealth and woe," *Newsday*, 8/26/05.

⁸⁶ "Work restarts on projects hurt by strife, officials say," *The New York Times*, 4/23/04.

⁸⁷ "Too violent to rebuild?" *ABC News*, 5/16/04.

⁸⁸ "2 years later, U.S. can't keep lights on or water running," *Inter Press Service*, 10/21/05.

⁸⁹ "Iraqis look to raise oil output next year," *Financial Times*, 12/29/05.

⁹⁰ "Reform concerns; change have Iraqi workers nervous," *Newsday*, 12/14/03.

⁹¹ "Factory's reopening typifies effort to use work to defuse insurgency," *The Washington Post*, 2/22/04.

⁹² "Available online at: <http://usinfo.state.gov>, U.S. Department of State, 3/29/04.

situation prevented the creation of many more.⁹³ By July 2004, only 15,000-20,000 of the 250,000 promised jobs had been created due to the slow movement of funds from the U.S. \$18.4 billion aid package.⁹⁴ In a survey published by the UN in May 2005, around 37 percent of young men with secondary or higher education were unemployed (see indicator 1).⁹⁵ The official unemployment rate was listed at approximately 28 percent in December 2005. However, some estimated that the actual rate could be twice that.⁹⁶ While employment figures were not precise, with more than a quarter of Iraqis unemployed, many turned to the insurgency as a means of employment. Many Iraqis were ex-military that had been purged from the army by the CPA. With no other skills, and no opportunities, such as public works programs, they had nowhere to turn, but to the insurgency in order to earn an income.

The IMF predicted a 52 percent increase in GDP for 2004, 17 percent for 2005, and 10 percent for each subsequent year until 2009.⁹⁷ The Fund cautioned though that these figures were dependent on security and debt relief.⁹⁸ GDP grew 46.5 percent in 2004. With continuing sabotage, the IMF reduced its 2005 GDP prediction to 4 percent growth.⁹⁹ GDP was \$33.1 billion in 2005.¹⁰⁰ The IMF expected 2.6 percent economic growth for 2006.¹⁰¹ Per capita income was up to \$928 as of March 2005, which was higher than the previous year of \$832, and higher than when Saddam was in power.¹⁰² In July 2005 inflation was as high as 37 percent.¹⁰³

In October 2003, the World Bank and IMF introduced a loan reconstruction package worth over \$9.25 billion.¹⁰⁴ In January 2004, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait forgave most of Iraq's debt.¹⁰⁵ Germany forgave \$5.6 billion in debt to Iraq in late December 2005.¹⁰⁶ The IMF granted Iraq the first-ever Stand-By Arrangement in December 2005. Mr. Takatoshi Kato, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, said, "[t]he Iraqi authorities were successful in promoting macroeconomic stability in 2005."¹⁰⁷ This loan was viewed as a positive reflection on the economic state of Iraq and it was hoped that it would help to attract investors and facilitate further debt relief.

Iraq operated under a cash-only system. Banks did not offer credit or loans. Without a modern banking system, Iraq's economy has lagged, as it has been difficult to finance major development projects. Effort has been made to open a modernized banking system, however, this will not happen until the country is more secure.¹⁰⁸

⁹³ "Reality intrudes on promises in rebuilding of Iraq," *The New York Times*, 6/30/04.

⁹⁴ "U.S. funds for Iraq are largely unspent," *The Washington Post*, 7/4/04.

⁹⁵ "Baghdad says Iraqi living standards gravely deteriorated," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 5/12/05.

⁹⁶ "Next year could see Iraq economic revival," *Agence France-Presse*, 12/28/05.

⁹⁷ "Iraq's set for 50% growth in 2004," *BBC News*, 10/19/04.

⁹⁸ "IMF predicts post-war boom in Iraq," *Trade Arabia*, 10/19/04.

⁹⁹ "IMF cuts Iraq GDP growth estimate," *Financial Times*, 8/17/05.

¹⁰⁰ "Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. achievements through Iraq relief and reconstruction fund," *States News Service*, 2/9/06.

¹⁰¹ "IMF executive board approves first ever stand-by arrangement for Iraq," Available online at:

<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05307.htm>, IMF, 12/23/05.

¹⁰² "Key economic indicators for Iraq," *The Associated Press*, 3/15/05.

¹⁰³ "IMF says Iraq's embattled economy needs new constitution," *Agence France Presse*, 8/16/05.

¹⁰⁴ "World Bank, IMF unveil 9.25 billion dollar loan package for Iraq," *Agence France Presse*, 10/24/03.

¹⁰⁵ "Iraq report," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 1/23/04.

¹⁰⁶ "IMF deems Iraq stable, grants \$685 million loan," *The Washington Times*, 12/24/05.

¹⁰⁷ "IMF executive board approves first ever stand-by arrangement for Iraq," Available online at:

<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05307.htm>, IMF, 12/23/05.

¹⁰⁸ "All things considered, Iraqi bank undertakes ambitious modernization," *National Public Radio*, 1/30/06.

The Iraqi dinar was introduced between October 2003 and January 2004.¹⁰⁹ It remained steady as of June 2004 at 1,450 to one U.S. dollar.¹¹⁰ In October 2005, Iraqi contractors were beginning to be paid in the Iraqi dinar, instead of the U.S. dollar.¹¹¹ In addition to developing their new currency, the coalition assisted Iraq in reopening its stock exchange. Iraqis have received \$21 million in credit and loans for their small businesses. Furthermore, there were more satellite dishes, cars, and cellular phones purchased.¹¹² There were 5 million cellular phone subscribers and 2000 Internet cafes.¹¹³ General William Webster, Jr. noted the new houses and additions built in and around cities.¹¹⁴

In September 2004 it was reported that infections caused by poor sanitation and malnutrition were the leading causes of child mortality.¹¹⁵ The child mortality rate remained high through 2005 according to UNICEF. They attributed this to instability in the country and lack of adequate health care.¹¹⁶ By February 2006 electricity, water, sewage, and oil production all remained below pre-war levels.¹¹⁷

Many Iraqis remained dependent on government food rations. In February 2006, the government cut the food ration allocation budget from \$4 billion to \$3 billion. This ration system was the only source of food for millions of Iraqis.¹¹⁸

Kurdish controlled areas were still in drastic need of economic investors for development. While there was relative security in their region, they had almost no industry. In late 2005, it was extremely difficult and dangerous for foreigner investors to enter northern Iraq. They either had to take a taxi across the dangerous Turkish border or take a taxi across the even more dangerous Iranian border, all the while carrying large amounts of cash. In late 2005, nominal steps were taken to change this obstacle to investment, as Kurdistan Airlines was launched and introduced twice weekly flights between Erbil and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and a weekly flight from Erbil to Frankfurt, Germany.¹¹⁹

Reconstruction in Fallujah continued. Hospitals and schools opened. New police stations were planned. Of the 532 reconstruction projects that had been planned for Fallujah, 382 had been completed by the end of 2005.¹²⁰ In Najaf, plans for the Imam Ali International Airport had spawned investment. The airport was expected to bring in \$500 million per year as it provides visitors with an alternative to Baghdad.¹²¹

In January 2006, a leaked report from an inspector general looking into how reconstruction money was spent, indicated that Iraqi money that could have helped stimulate the economy was wasted by U.S. officials.¹²² In February 2006, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and confirmed that Iraqi reconstruction funds were mismanaged and that corruption permeated the system.¹²³

¹⁰⁹ Available online at: <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/29288.htm>, U.S. Department of State.

¹¹⁰ "Banking in Iraq: A tricky operation," *The Economist*, 6/24/04.

¹¹¹ "US forces begin paying Iraqis in dinars," *Agence France Presse*, 11/1/05.

¹¹² "Milestone 1,000th day approaches in Iraq; Bush gives speech on status of war - part 2," *CNN News*, 12/7/05.

¹¹³ "Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. achievements through Iraq relief and reconstruction fund," *States News Service*, 2/9/06.

¹¹⁴ "Major General William G. Webster Jr. holds Defense Department briefing on ongoing security operations in Baghdad," *eMediaMillWorks Political Transcripts*, 12/30/05.

¹¹⁵ "Focus on malnutrition," *IRIN*, 9/7/04.

¹¹⁶ "UNICEF: Instability in some Arab countries contributes to high child mortality," *The Associated Press*, 12/14/05.

¹¹⁷ "Iraqis cope with life without lights," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2/10/06.

¹¹⁸ "Government slashes food ration allocations," *Azzaman.com*, 2/28/06.

¹¹⁹ "The Kurds in control," *National Geographic*, January 2006.


¹²⁰ "One year after Fajr, Fallujah continues to rebuild," *States News Service*, 12/27/05.

¹²¹ "With promise of airport, investment in Najaf takes off," *The Washington Post*, 1/7/06.

¹²² "All things considered, report: U.S. reconstruction in Iraq poorly planned," *National Public Radio*, 1/25/06.

¹²³ "Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction," testimony by Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2/8/06.

7 Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State



The political process was intended to bring legitimacy to the state through several steps: the establishment of an Iraqi Governing Council in June 2003, the transfer of sovereignty to an interim government in June 2004, elections for an interim national assembly in January 2005, a referendum on the constitution in October 2005, and elections for a permanent national assembly and appointment of a government for a four-year term in December 2005. However, trends showed that following these political milestones, the legitimacy of the state did not significantly improve. Following the December 2005 elections, there was momentary renewed confidence in the elected government, but the continuing insurgency, widespread corruption, and alleged atrocities by security forces prevented the emergence of a legitimate national state acceptable to a majority of the people. By February 2006, two months after the election, parties were unable to form a government of national unity, with growing sectarian divisions evident. The attack on the Askariya Shrine in Samarra in February 2006, and sectarian violence that followed, led to a plummeting of public confidence.

Following decades of rule under Saddam's corrupt regime, when the coalition invaded, the state collapsed. Iraqis did not accept the CPA as a legitimate governing body. Iraqis saw the CPA as occupiers of their country. In the absence of a state, and as security conditions began to deteriorate, this indicator was rated a 10 throughout the first few months of the war. As U.S. forces incorporated Iraqi political and religious leaders into the political process, the indicator was brought down to a 9. The indicator remained consistently high however as the security situation grew continuously unstable and the UN, seen as possibly the only legitimate force in Iraq, withdrew.

Reports of corruption at the highest levels of Iraq's ministries and the discovery of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib delegitimized the Governing Council ahead of the anticipated June 30, 2004 sovereignty date and caused even further resentment of the CPA.

When sovereignty was transferred to the interim government in June 2004 it provided the existence of a state again within Iraq. There was renewed confidence that Iraqi leaders would regain stability and improve public services. Therefore, the indicator rating dropped significantly. Confidence in the interim government did not remain however as preparations for the January 2005 national assembly elections got underway. Various Sunni and Kurd parties threatened to boycott the elections. Many believed that the elections should have been postponed, as the country was not prepared to hold fair elections. Charges of corruption continued to surface against Iraqi officials. The interim government was seen as aligning with the coalition forces, rather than seeking to have them end the occupation. The security situation remained unstable. Ultimately, the Sunnis largely boycotted the January elections, which put into question the representativeness of the new assembly. By March 2005 the indicator was again at a 10 as crime and corruption were rampant. Criminals, who were not part of the insurgency, kidnapped foreigners for monetary and political purposes. Weapons were sold in the open market. Officials reported that corruption had increased since Saddam's regime. The interim government was unable to prevent the spread of crime or increase in corruption.

In May 2005, Iraq's new government, which had been elected in January, officially took office, and Sunnis found themselves largely excluded from the government. Despite apparent factionalizing of Sunni and Shiite leaders (see indicator 11), the parliament and the state gained a small amount of legitimacy by taking office in May as an elected group. The indicator remained high though as Sunnis were marginalized after having boycotted the January elections and therefore disputed the legitimacy of the new government.

The Sunnis remained marginalized throughout the summer as they felt they were being shut out from the constitutional drafting process and that the new document was not inclusive of Sunnis. On October 13, 2005, two days before the scheduled referendum, last minute changes and compromises were made to the final draft without a formal vote by Iraq's National Assembly.¹²⁴ When Iraqis did vote on October 15, many of them had not even had a chance to read the final draft. The Sunni opposition overwhelmingly achieved the necessary 2/3 'no' vote in two provinces but failed in a third province, which was necessary to defeat the referendum. Also in October 2005, arrest warrants were issued for Iraq's former Defense Minister and 22 others accused of embezzling more than \$1 billion from the Ministry of Defense's accounts, fueling beliefs that many of Iraq's senior government officials were more concerned with benefiting themselves rather than rebuilding the country.¹²⁵ Because of the strong showing of Sunni opposition and widespread corruption, the indicator was raised from a 9 to a 10.

¹²⁴ "Sunnis split over final draft of proposed Iraqi constitution," *The Washington Post*, 10/14/05.

¹²⁵ "Week of milestones fails to reassure frustrated Iraqis," *The Washington Post*, 10/22/05.

In November 2005, U.S. forces discovered and raided a secret prison run by the Interior Ministry, which had held over 170 detainees, mainly Sunnis, who were starved, beaten, and tortured.¹²⁶ This was a significant development as it was the first confirmed report of what many Sunnis had been accusing police forces of doing for several months. It reinforced many Sunnis' distrust of the government, particularly the police forces, which had been heavily infiltrated by Shiite and Kurdish militia members.¹²⁷

Following the passage of the constitution, parliamentary elections were held on December 15. While voter turnout was estimated to be 70 percent,¹²⁸ voting persisted along sectarian lines. Sunnis turned out in large numbers in an effort to prevent the Shiites and Kurds from controlling the new government. Following the election, Sunnis contested the results, lodging more than 1,000 complaints with the electoral commission and calling for a new vote.¹²⁹ Additionally, while violence subsided briefly during the election period, as news of the results started to be reported, widespread violence erupted once again.¹³⁰

Violence persisted throughout January 2006. Thirty-six bodies, many of who were Sunni police recruits, were found north of Baghdad shot execution-style.¹³¹ Suicide bombers killed nearly 200 people in the first couple of days of January.¹³² The Interior and Defense Ministry were lacking in their ability to support Iraqi security forces. Without capable ministries, the military and police will not be able to work independently of coalition forces.¹³³ The Sunnis reluctantly accepted the results of the parliamentary elections late in January, but leaders expressed that they expect to work with the Shiite and Kurdish blocs on amending the constitution.¹³⁴ Shiite leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, announced that the Shiites will not amend the basic principles of the constitution, which contradicts the original agreement made between the Shiite/Kurdish coalition and the Sunnis.¹³⁵ The U.S. military also announced in January that there were more than 34,000 insurgent attacks in 2005. This was a nearly 30 percent increase over 2004.¹³⁶ The ability of the insurgents to continue to mount attacks demonstrated that they were not a diminishing threat as the U.S. had indicated.

Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who was selected to continue as prime minister by a one-vote margin in February 2006, was criticized, as many do not feel he can form a national government and blame him for the widespread violence, high unemployment, poor services, and prisoner abuse.¹³⁷ There were signs of growing tension within the Shiite party and between the Shiite and Kurd alliance. Many within the Shiite party did not expect al-Jaafari to be selected and expressed worry over the influence exerted by al-Sadr in being the deciding vote.¹³⁸ President Jalal Talabani criticized al-Jaafari for not informing Talabani about his trip to Turkey. Talabani stated that no deals made during al-Jaafari's visit would be considered

¹²⁶ "Torture charges deepen rift between U.S. and Iraqi leader," *The New York Times*, 11/17/05. "Iraqi rift grows as secret prison enrages Sunnis," *The New York Times*, 11/17/05.

¹²⁷ Militiaman denies ties to secret Iraq prison," *The Washington Post*, 12/1/05.

¹²⁸ "Iraq vote 'met global standards,'" *BBC News*, 12/16/05

¹²⁹ "Baghdad official hurt in ambush," *BBC News*, 12/19/05. "Protesters call for Iraqi national unity government; Police say mass grave believed to have been uncovered," *The Associated Press*, 12/27/05.

¹³⁰ "Protesters call for Iraqi national unity government; Police say mass grave believed to have been uncovered," *The Associated Press*, 12/27/05.

¹³¹ "Police recruits among massacre victims found in Iraq," *The New York Times*, 1/19/06.

¹³² "Up to 130 killed in Iraq, drawing a Shiite warning," *The New York Times*, 1/6/06.

¹³³ "Iraq faces hurdles, U.S. general warns," *The New York Times*, 1/6/06.

¹³⁴ "Hussein trial to resume Sunni coalition grudgingly accepts vote tally," *The Washington Post*, 1/23/06.

¹³⁵ "Shiites keep control of Iraqi parliament," *The Washington Post*, 1/21/06.

¹³⁶ "New judge tapped for Hussein Trial," *The Washington Post*, 1/24/06.

¹³⁷ "Uphill struggle for Iraqi prime minister designate," *IWPR*, Iraqi Crisis Report No. 165, 2/22/06.

¹³⁸ "By one-vote margin, al-Jaafari selected to remain prime minister," *The New York Times*, 2/13/06.

valid.¹³⁹ Also in February, was the bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, one of the holiest Shiite symbols, which set off a wave of reprisal attacks throughout the country. According to a Baghdad morgue, the sectarian violence had caused more than 1300 Iraqi deaths.¹⁴⁰ It was reported that police forces participated in the violence, demonstrating that militias had been absorbed into the police and showing where their allegiances lie. Sunnis from west of Baghdad came into the city to protect fellow Sunnis. Both Sunnis and Shiites established watch groups to protect themselves from the other group and stocked up on ammunition.¹⁴¹ There was widespread loss in confidence in the government's ability to protect civilians and therefore armed groups were formed, which further delegitimized the newly formed state.

Iraq was ranked 137 out of 158 countries in Transparency International's 2005 corruption ranking.¹⁴²


¹³⁹ "Iraq's prime minister vows violence will not affect political process," *The Associated Press*, 2/28/06.

¹⁴⁰ "Toll in Iraq's deadly surge: 1,300 morgue count eclipses other tallies since shrine attack," *The Washington Post*, 2/28/06.

¹⁴¹ "Iraq-sectarian violence," *National Public Radio*, Talk of the Nation with Neal Conan, with guest Bobby Ghosh, 2/28/06.

¹⁴² "Unbuilding a nation," *Petroleum Economist*, 2/8/06.

8 Progressive Deterioration of Public Services



After the invasion, much of the focus of U.S. efforts was on building the country's infrastructure and strengthening the government's capability to provide security. The CPA and the Governing Council did not begin labor-intensive public works programs, which would have generated employment and brought basic services to Iraqis. Some smaller projects were completed in the relatively safe areas. However, poor decision-making and insecurity caused a progressive deterioration in public services generally, but especially in Baghdad, and funds had to be diverted from public services for security. Mismanagement and corruption set in and reconstruction became a patch-work effort with varied results and many setbacks. As of February 2006, electricity, water, sewage, and oil production all were below pre-war levels.

Prior to the invasion, public services were limited in Iraq. Ba'athist elites enjoyed better services, while those not favored by Saddam received little, if any, access to public services. Baghdad was favored to the detriment of the rest of the country. Iraq's wastewater infrastructure was barely functioning.¹⁴³ With the fall of Saddam came the collapse of almost all public services and institutions that did exist and the loss of service personnel to run them. Debaathification and postwar looting complicated the situation, and untreated wastewater flowed into the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers causing environmental degradation and waterborne disease.

A study commissioned by the CPA and State Department in early 2004 demonstrated the regional differences regarding the state of the economy. Respondents in Baghdad, Basra, Sulamaniyah, and Babylon all indicated that the economy was better than before the war. Respondents in the Sunni Triangle disagreed. Only five percent of the respondents in Tikrit, and less than that in Samarra, found the economy to be better than it was prior to the war.¹⁴⁴

Even as small gains were made, whether in education, health care, or small projects, such as restoring traffic signals, setbacks were always incurred due to sabotage and growing instability. Additionally, there was a lack of money to pay workers their salaries. Inadequate electricity and water and sewage treatment continuously plagued reconstruction. By April 2004, the security situation caused reconstruction efforts to virtually stop. Contractors and NGOs began pulling out of Iraq or retreating to the safety of their bases. Not only was violence preventing improvements to public services, but also it was damaging progress that had been made since the invasion. By July 2004 only two percent of the \$18.4 billion U.S. aid package had been dispersed.¹⁴⁵ Aid money was shifted from reconstruction projects to security.

Security was the single-most difficult public service to provide. From May 2005 through February 2006, more than 2,300 Iraqi soldiers and police officers were killed. From June 2003 – January 4, 2005 1,300 soldiers and police officers had been killed.¹⁴⁶ Multiple fatality bombings per month also increased. From May 2003 to April 2005, the monthly average was around 12 multiple fatality bombings. However, May 2005 through February of 2006 saw another sharp increase in the number of multiple fatality bombings. The average jumped from 12 to 34, the highest being 46 in September.¹⁴⁷ Also, the number of Iraqis kidnapped nationwide averaged around 30 per day in December of 2005. In December 2004, the average was 10 per day in Baghdad. Iraqi police believed however that many Iraqi kidnappings are not reported.¹⁴⁸ Independently there were ongoing regular attacks on police recruit stations from May 2005 to February 2006. In June 2005, members of Iraq's elite police commando units staged a protest just outside of the green zone, claiming they hadn't been paid in four months.¹⁴⁹

In January 2006, the U.S. military announced that more than 34,000 insurgent attacks occurred in 2005. This was a nearly 30 percent increase from 2004.¹⁵⁰ As coalition and Iraqi authorities maintained that Iraq's security forces were improving in strength and number, it was evident that the insurgency remained strong and was capable of carrying out attacks throughout Iraq.

¹⁴³ "Reconstructing Iraq," *Water Environment and Technology*, 10/1/05.

¹⁴⁴ "Economic policy and prospects in Iraq," *Federal Reserve Bank of Boston*, 5/4/04.

¹⁴⁵ "Iraq, not U.S., cash spent on rebuilding," *UNAMI*, 7/4/04.

¹⁴⁶ Available online at: www.icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx, found in "Iraq index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq," *The Brookings Institution*, 1/3/06.

¹⁴⁷ "Iraq index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq," *The Brookings Institution*, 1/3/06.

¹⁴⁸ "In Iraq, 425 foreigners estimated kidnapped since 2003," *The Washington Post*, 12/25/05 found in "Iraq index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq," *The Brookings Institution*, 1/3/06.

¹⁴⁹ "Iraq considers slashing government budget, jobs," *The Contra Costa Times (CA)*, 6/7/05.

¹⁵⁰ "New judge tapped for Hussein trial," *The Washington Post*, 1/24/06.

According to U.S. military leaders, only one of 115 police and army battalions was fully capable of planning, executing, and maintaining counterinsurgency operations with no help whatsoever. Only a little over a third of all Iraqi army units were able to fight insurgents with operational assistance from the U.S. The remaining two-thirds army units and half of the police units were able to fight alongside American units in operations planned, led, supplied, and supported by the U.S. The other half of all police units were deemed ‘incapable’ and of no help whatsoever in fighting the insurgency. This means that without U.S. support, Iraq would have few trained and capable security forces.¹⁵¹

Iraq’s health system has faced severe problems since 2003. Water-borne diseases became common throughout Iraq, particularly among children. Many facilities did not have the basic resources to treat illnesses that stemmed from the unsanitary conditions that persisted in Iraq. As the security situation remained unstable, money that had been earmarked for health care initiatives was funneled to security. The U.S. had been criticized for its overemphasis on constructing new facilities, rather than investing the money in basic needs or improving primary facilities. After nearly three years of U.S. efforts to improve the health care system, Iraqis saw few tangible results. Children were still severely malnourished in many parts of the country. A UN study conducted in 2005 concluded that one-third of children in southern and central Iraq were malnourished, the same figure as in 2003. Most children died from easily treatable illnesses, such as diarrhea. Receiving basic care was hard to come by because many hospitals, such as the one in Sadr City, were overwhelmed. Medical kits received by many clinics were not usable. The Basra Children’s Hospital, a project pushed by First Lady Laura Bush, was expected to open in September 2006. While this hospital will bring a modern health care facility to Iraq’s children, some have questioned whether the money spent on construction and security surrounding the facility could have been better spent to improve Iraq’s existing clinics.¹⁵²

The UN had successfully completed a campaign in which 98 percent of Iraqi children were vaccinated for polio.¹⁵³ In October 2005, 40 doctors and nurses completed USAID’s Training-of-Trainers of Service Providers programs. These physicians and nurses are to train their peers to work in 142 medical facilities being constructed.¹⁵⁴

Reliable, consistent access to clean water and to electricity has been elusive for most Iraqis. Electricity or water supplies have often been forestalled for days due to mechanical breakdowns of ill-maintained equipment or sabotage. In May 2005, it was reported that Iraqi anger was growing over a lack of progress in the rebuilding of the electrical grid. It simply was not capable of providing enough electricity, producing on average 4,000-4,200 mega watts per day, far short of the demand. Officials also doubted their abilities in reaching the expected 8,000 mega watts demand that was expected for the peak summer months.¹⁵⁵ In January 2006, it was reported that the electrical power production was at approximately 3,700 megawatts, below the level produced prior to the invasion. Iraq’s electricity minister advised that \$20 billion would be needed over the next five years in order to solve the electrical crisis that afflicts the country.¹⁵⁶ The Bush administration announced it would not be requesting further reconstruction aid, meaning Iraq will need to shoulder the burden of this cost and seek more assistance from other international donors.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵¹ “Why Iraq has no army,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 2005.

¹⁵² “The conflict in Iraq; U.S. priorities set back its healthcare goals in Iraq,” *The Los Angeles Times*, 10/30/05.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ “USAID trains Iraqi physician and nurse trainers,” *USAID*, 10/2/05.

¹⁵⁵ “Power grid in Iraq far from fixed,” *The Washington Post*, 5/1/05. “Sabotage and budgets hamstringing Iraqi power,” *United Press International*, 8/16/05.

¹⁵⁶ “Iraq needs 20 bln blrs to end electricity crisis; minister,” *Agence France-Presse*, 1/18/06.

¹⁵⁷ “Cash dwindles for rebuilding in Iraq,” *The Washington Post*, 1/31/06.

In June 2005, an electrical substation, which distributes electricity to other substations around Baghdad, was completed, using a workforce that was 99 percent Iraqi.¹⁵⁸ For a period of around three months, beginning in mid-June, Syria supplied Iraq with 670 million cubic meters of water per second from the Euphrates River, boosting Iraq's electrical supply generated at the Hdaytha Dam (see indicator 1).¹⁵⁹

UNAMI and USAID have had some success with water treatment system rehabilitation. From July-October 2005, UNAMI completed or rehabilitated water treatment plants and processing units in Diyala, Wasit, Tamim, Thi Qar, Najaf, and Karbala.¹⁶⁰ USAID refurbished a water treatment plant in Kirkuk in April 2005, boosting its treatment capacity from 22 million gallons of potable water per day to 95 million gallons of potable water per day.¹⁶¹

These accomplishments are commendable, but as of October 2005, only about half of Iraq's wastewater treatment plants were actually operational. About 132 million gallons a day of wastewater was still being discharged without proper treatment.¹⁶² By January 2006, 8.25 million Iraqis had access to potable water. Prior to the invasion, 12.9 million had access to potable water.¹⁶³

By the end of 2005, nearly 3,000 schools had been rehabilitated either in full or in part, up from just over 2,000 in December of 2004, and 55,000 public school teachers had been trained, up from 33,000 in December 2004.¹⁶⁴ In July 2005, it was reported that primary school enrolment had increased 19 percent from the time period prior to the invasion.¹⁶⁵ With these improvements to Iraq's educational system came setbacks. As with all reconstruction projects, money that would have been spent on education was shifted to fighting the insurgency, which delayed or halted many projects.

Three major bridges, Khazir, Tikrit, and Al Mat bridges, that are critical in the movement of people and goods throughout Iraq, were rebuilt since 2003.¹⁶⁶ Substantial portions of the Iraqi Republican Railroad has been repaired or rebuilt by USAID. It connects the city of Basra to the port of Umm Qasr, allowing incoming shipments of bulk cargo to be moved to Baghdad and throughout the country. The remainder of the work is to be completed by the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation.¹⁶⁷ In June 2005, Basra airport opened to Iraqi civilians, and regular flights between Baghdad and Erbil began for the first time, running three times a week.¹⁶⁸

Traffic continued to plague Baghdad, and as many as 30 to 40 percent of the city's major roads had been blocked for protection against car bombs and other attacks. Since the fall of Saddam, rising salaries had caused the number of registered cars to double to 3.1 million, clogging the streets and increasing demand for oil, which depended upon refineries. After the invasion, looting resulted in many vital components of the roadways being stolen, including metal guardrails and street signs. Three out of the city's eight major bridges and 77 major roads had been blocked. When bombings and kidnappings began to rise, people

¹⁵⁸ "Progress continues in Iraq," *Regulatory Intelligence Data*, 7/4/05.

¹⁵⁹ "Syria supplying extra water to Iraq," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 6/28/05.

¹⁶⁰ "UN-Iraq reconstruction and development update," *UNAMI*, July 2005, August 2005, September 2005, October 2005.

¹⁶¹ "Iraq: The US Agency for International Development (USAID) completed a US\$ 4.1 million refurbishment of the Kirkuk unified water treatment plant," *Water & Waste Water International*, April 2005.

¹⁶² "Reconstructing Iraq," *Water Environment and Technology*, 10/1/05.

¹⁶³ "Cash dwindles for rebuilding in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 1/31/06.

¹⁶⁴ "Iraq: Reconstruction weekly updates," *USAID*, 1/6/06. "Iraq humanitarian and reconstruction assistance updates: Weekly report #4," *USAID*, 12/22/04.

¹⁶⁵ "Top ten USAID strategic accomplishments in Iraq," *USAID*, 12/7/05.

¹⁶⁶ "Iraq: Reconstruction weekly updates," *USAID*, 1/6/06.


¹⁶⁷ "Iraq: Reconstruction weekly updates," *USAID*, 1/6/06.

¹⁶⁸ "Progress continues in Iraq," *Regulatory Intelligence Data*, 7/4/05.

seized large chunks of the roads, erecting barricades and posting guards to protect embassies, political parties, and other groups. Government officials have been assassinated while stuck in traffic.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ "Iraq's lethal traffic: Warning! anarchy ahead," *The New York Times*, 11/05/05.

9 Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights



While the invasion ended a brutal regime, widespread human rights abuses were also committed by coalition and Iraqi security forces. The discovery of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib by U.S. soldiers in April 2004 confirmed reports that had been circulating for months. The fallout from Abu Ghraib, and subsequent findings of prisoner abuse at the hands of coalition troops and Iraqi forces, demonstrated that international standards were not being adhered to and that the rule of law had not taken root. In 2005, militias had significantly infiltrated Iraqi police forces, were committing torture, and forming death squads. In June 2005, Shiite and Kurdish leaders endorsed the use of militias in Iraq's security forces, which was roundly criticized by Sunnis. The discovery of mostly Sunni detainees at Interior Ministry prisons, who had been beaten, starved, and tortured, reinforced the perception that human rights were worse than originally thought. The conduct of the trial of Saddam was also criticized and there were calls for it to be moved to an international court.

Saddam committed atrocious human rights violations against citizens of Iraq. As a dictator he used extrajudicial killings, torture, and attempted genocide. Immediately following the invasion, the country entered a temporary period of relative calmness. Human rights abuses were no longer carried out at the behest of Saddam. However, this phase was brief, as there was widespread reporting of abuse and violations of human rights by U.S. forces and decrepit prison conditions. Soldiers were charged with mistreating prisoners and the media and human rights groups charged that cultural norms were being violated. The discovery of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and other coalition prisons confirmed what had been reported for months. It was also learned that prisoners had been incarcerated without registering them on prison rolls¹⁷⁰ and that top military officials were informed about the abuses taking place as early as November 2003.¹⁷¹

Human rights groups also reported that the U.S. violated the Geneva Conventions through their brutal tactics used against relatives of suspected insurgents. Unarmed Iraqis were subjected to inhumane treatment at the hands of both the CPA and a growing insurgency. These reports and images shattered any semblance of confidence that some rule of law existed and served as a reinforcement that widespread human rights abuses were occurring.

After the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004, representatives from the Human Rights Ministry made weekly visits to prisoners. Prisoners were also allowed to see an attorney and their families. Hence, in July 2004 this indicator was rated an 8 due to some advancement in the treatment of prisoners. However, as more evidence about abuse and torture mounted, and the number of prisoners that were being hidden from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) surfaced, this indicator rating increased to a 9.

Violence and crime spread without a sufficient system to apprehend or punish the perpetrators. There was no law and order as civilians, journalists, Iraqi security forces, and coalition forces were kidnapped and killed. Following Prime Minister Allawi's reinstatement of the death penalty, immense confusion arose over how it was going to be used.¹⁷² Public figures were removed from office if they voiced opposition to the occupation. Women's issues were ignored and many women were scared to leave their house out of concern for their safety. A security lock-down was implemented for the January 2005 national assembly election, reinforcing the fact that the security situation in Iraq was unstable. UNAMI received numerous reports of campaign workers being assassinated and intimidated leading up to the December 2005 national assembly election in Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad.¹⁷³

In the summer of 2005, there were increasing reports that militias had infiltrated Iraqi police forces and that they were carrying out abductions, death squads, and torture. In November 2005, U.S. forces discovered an Interior Ministry prison, detaining mostly Sunnis who had been beaten, starved, and tortured. A similar discovery was made in December 2005 at another Interior Ministry prison, where 625 detainees had been found.¹⁷⁴ Soon thereafter, U.S. officials announced that they would not release the thousands of Iraqi prisoners in their custody until "such time as conditions of detention and treatment of detainees has significantly improved."¹⁷⁵ In January 2006, Interior Minister Bayan Jabr fired three top special police commanders in response to the discovery of the secret Interior Ministry prisons.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ "Rumsfeld says he issued an order to hide detainee," *The New York Times*, 6/17/04.

¹⁷¹ "Documents are said to show earlier abuse at Iraq prison," *The New York Times*, 6/19/04.

¹⁷² "Death penalty to be reinstated in Iraq," *Al-Jazeera*, 8/8/04.

¹⁷³ "Human rights report," *UNAMI*, 1 November—31 December 2005.

¹⁷⁴ "Human rights report," *UNAMI*, 1 November—31 December 2005.

¹⁷⁵ "Human rights report," *UNAMI*, 1 November—31 December 2005.

¹⁷⁶ "Iraq tackles police reform; Minister presses for respect of law, human rights," *The Washington Times*, 1/11/06.

Saddam's trial for crimes committed when he was in power has contributed to the arbitrary application of the rule of law. Human rights organizations and humanitarian law specialists repeatedly called for the trial to be moved outside of Iraq because they do not find that the Iraqi court system was prepared to try the former dictator according to fair international standards.¹⁷⁷ Since the start of the trial, two defense attorneys were murdered and one sought asylum in Qatar. Many Iraqis were growing frustrated with the trial, which they saw as more under the control of Saddam.¹⁷⁸ The trial had been delayed on several occasions and the chief judge resigned following criticism over his handling of the procedures. Human Rights Watch argued that government officials who had publicly criticized the handling of Saddam's trial were interfering with the judiciary system. They found that this was jeopardizing the proceedings.¹⁷⁹ In February 2006, five witnesses claimed that they did not want to testify against Saddam and that they were brought to do so against their will.¹⁸⁰

Iraqis found it impossible to file their compensation claims for wrongful deaths, injuries, or destruction to property. While journalists easily obtained the appropriate information on how to file a claim, Iraqis were denied the same courtesy. Claims required an excessive amount of paperwork, which often went missing in the hands of the CPA. Furthermore, the CPA did not recognize ownership certificates issued during Saddam's regime.

The CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council exerted control over the media by issuing guidelines for them to use, shutting down newspapers, and banning certain media coverage. The media was also encouraged to include the Iraqi government's position as part of their regular coverage. It was revealed in early December 2005 that the Pentagon had been buying space in various Iraqi media in order to disperse favorable stories about the coalition military presence and reconstruction efforts (see indicator 12).¹⁸¹

In the past two years, 20,000 Iraqi Christians fled to neighboring Syria. With 10 percent of its population being Christian, they found that they could worship freely. They were not allowed to practice their religion in Iraq without fear of death or abuse.¹⁸²

During military operations in Anbar province, (see indicator 2) medical doctors were detained and medical facilities were occupied by armed forces, actions that are in violation of human rights law and international law governing armed conflict.¹⁸³ In Tal Afar, a town in Anbar province, insurgent violence had become so bad that children were home-schooled because of the threat that insurgents would kill them at school. Kids could not play outside because standing out in the open was too dangerous.

The UN released a report in January 2006 stating that ongoing violence, arbitrary arrests, and prisoner abuse were evidence that widespread human rights violations were occurring throughout Iraq. The report noted the devastating toll this has taken on children who have lost parents and family members. It also raised a serious concern of children being used as combatants.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁷ "Roundup: Human rights groups call for fair trial for Saddam Hussein," *Deutsche Press-Agentur*, 10/18/05.

¹⁷⁸ "Stalled Saddam trial frustrates public," *IWPR*, Iraqi Crisis Report No. 161, 1/26/06.

¹⁷⁹ "Iraq: Saddam Hussein trial at risk; Government undermines independence of judges," *Human Rights Watch*, 1/27/06.

¹⁸⁰ "Documents boost case against Saddam," *The Washington Post*, 2/20/06.

¹⁸¹ "Pentagon describes Iraq propaganda plan," *The Miami Herald*, 12/2/05.

¹⁸² "Fleeing Iraq Christians on the road to Damascus," *The St. Petersburg Times*, 5/23/05.

¹⁸³ "Human rights report," *UNAMI*, September 1–October 31, 2005.


¹⁸⁴ "U.N. reports children used as combatants in Iraq," available online at: <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/18/iraq.rights/index.html>, 1/19/06.

During the wave of reprisal attacks that followed the bombing of the Askariya Shrine, Iraqi police were accused of participating in the violence, which reinforced that militias were absorbed into police forces and demonstrated that their allegiances fell along sectarian lines, rather than with a national government.¹⁸⁵ In order to quell the violence, the Iraqi government imposed a 20-hour per day curfew in four governorates. This curfew meant that government offices, hospitals, and schools were all closed except for four hours per day.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ "Iraq-sectarian violence," *National Public Radio*, Talk of the Nation with Neal Conan, with guest Bobby Ghosh, 2/28/06.

¹⁸⁶ "Iraq: Government defends use of curfew despite disruptions," *IRIN*, 2/27/06.

10 Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”



Before the invasion, five security and intelligence agencies loyal to Saddam quickly crushed anyone who voiced dissent. The U.S.-led invasion brought an end to this repression. However, coalition forces did not have enough manpower to provide security throughout Iraq and did not anticipate a resilient insurgency. In 2003 and 2004, lawlessness erupted in many parts of the country from rival militias loyal to personalities, parties, and elements involved in the insurgency, most of who were aggrieved Sunnis. Foreign-born terrorists infiltrated into Iraq. The insurgency increased its size, scope, and sophistication with time. After the election of the interim government in January 2005, a new Shiite dominated security apparatus emerged under the control of the Interior Ministry. It was alleged to have been abducting, torturing, and killing Sunni men primarily in and around Baghdad. Independent Shiite militias and elements of the Interior Ministry forces were thought to be forming “death squads” targeting Sunnis. In Kirkuk, Kurdish militia elements in the police forces were also accused of abducting and intimidating Arab residents. Fundamentally, the insurgency escalated into a civil war.

After the invasion, the former regime's complex security apparatus comprised of five competing security and intelligence agencies collapsed. By May 2003, the former regime's security apparatus had disappeared, moving the indicator to its lowest rating of 5.

But the calm was short-lived. The coalition failed to fill the security vacuum that existed following the collapse of Saddam's security apparatus. By August 2003, U.S. forces faced insurgent attacks on a daily basis from a miscellany of insurgent groups and militias claiming responsibility. This marked the emergence of security forces operating outside of U.S. control. Armed groups were vying for power to attack civilians of other groups and to provide security where the U.S. could not. By the end of October 2003, attacks on U.S. troops reached 35 per day.¹⁸⁷ Violence spread outside of the Sunni Triangle and into Kirkuk.¹⁸⁸ As violence and deadly attacks continued to spread, and the rise of insurgent groups and militias continued, the indicator was rated a consistent 10.

From 2003 through early 2005, this indicator's high rating was mainly due to the growing presence of the large number of insurgent groups and militias attacking coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians. None of the groups operated under the control of the coalition forces or the Iraqi government, and rivalry between them intensified the insecurity. Initially, the bulk of the insurgency was comprised of former military members who had been disbanded. They regrouped and kept the same military rankings as they were assigned under Saddam. They focused their attacks on coalition forces. In Fallujah, where the national insurgency movement began, residents clashed with U.S. forces immediately after the invasion. Small groups of men banded together, without a leader, strategy, or structure. Eventually, these small groups joined together and leaders emerged. Iraqi insurgents were forced to forge ties with foreign insurgents due to lack of funds. Near the end of 2003, foreign insurgent groups grew in power and prominence, as evident from the large-scale attacks on the UN headquarters. They not only targeted coalition forces, but began to take aim at civilians as well.¹⁸⁹

In February 2004, a high ranking official of the Shiite political party, Sciri, asserted that Sciri's armed militia wing, the Badr Organization, should be allowed to play a greater role in Iraq's security affairs, contrary to policies of U.S. administrators. L. Paul Bremer had attempted to disarm and disband the Badr Organization, along with many other militias, since the beginning of the war.¹⁹⁰

In June 2004, nine militias agreed to disband following legislation banning militias, including the Badr Organization and the Peshmerga, the Kurdish militia. Interim Prime Minister Allawi claimed that this would encompass 100,000 individuals and that they would be encouraged to return to civilian life or to join the ranks of Iraq's Ministry of Interior security forces.¹⁹¹ The deal did not include the disbanding of the Mahdi Army, a militia loyal to the fiery Shiite cleric Moqtadr al-Sadr, which still firmly resisted the U.S. occupation.

Even with this agreement, there was a large presence of active, armed insurgent groups, keeping this indicator's rating very high. The Brookings Institution estimated that the number of insurgents in Iraq as of July 2004 was 20,000.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ "U.S. soldier killed by Iraqi guerillas," *The Washington Post*, 10/13/03.

¹⁸⁸ "Violence in Iraq spreads to north," *The Washington Post*, 10/12/03.

¹⁸⁹ "The insurgency," *Public Broadcasting Station*, Frontline, 2/21/06.

¹⁹⁰ "Iraq report," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 2/27/04.

¹⁹¹ "Nine Iraqi militias to disband," *The Guardian*, 6/7/04.

¹⁹² "The state of Iraq: An update," *The New York Times*, 9/10/04.

In November and December 2004, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched “Operation Dawn” in Fallujah, which had been under the control of armed insurgent groups since April 2004. The operation was met with resistance, but by the end of November and throughout December, the U.S. and Iraqi forces had brought the city under control and routed out the armed groups.

In 2005, Iraq’s interim government was elected in January, a month that saw a sharp increase in insurgent attacks at around 70 per day.¹⁹³ The newly elected government took power in late April. Nonetheless, the high rating of this indicator stayed a constant 10 due to militias both infiltrating the state’s security apparatus and operating outside the boundaries of the official security apparatus.

Efforts to control the militias dissolved in June 2005, when Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a Shiite Arab, and President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, came out in support of two militias, the Kurdish KKG Peshmerga and the Iranian-trained Shiite Badr Organization. Despite Sunni fears that the militias would be used against them, Iraqi officials insisted that the Defense and Interior Ministries would control the militias, though the Kurdish leaders explicitly stated that the KKG would command the Peshmerga who served in government security forces, and would therefore be outside of the official chain of command.¹⁹⁴

This contributed to the Sunni sense of paranoia and victimization (see indicator 3). Sunni leaders claimed that Sunni citizens were being targeted by government security commando units; they alleged that Sunnis had been abducted and tortured and were victims of extrajudicial killings. This happened in Kurdish controlled areas (see indicator 9) and in the Baghdad area. In August, the bodies of 36 men were found killed execution style with their hands bound behind their back, one of many allegations of atrocities committed by the security apparatus operating outside the limits of the law.

During the month of September 2005, in the southern city of Basra, two British soldiers were detained in a police building by the Jameat, a force of 200 to 300 police officers who are known to kill and torture at will and answer only to Shiite militia leaders. British forces mounted an offensive to rescue the two detained soldiers, partially destroying the police building. Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, was widely regarded as being under the control of militias loyal to the Shiite political party Sciri. The Jameat and other militias operated outside of the control of the government.

In November 2005, U.S. soldiers found a secret prison in Baghdad, run by Iraqi commandos of the Interior Ministry. Detainees were held in secret and starved, abused, and tortured. Not only did this event violate human rights of Iraqi citizens (see indicator 9), but it delegitimized the government in the eyes of many Sunni Iraqis (see indicator 7) and reinforced group paranoia of Sunnis (see indicator 3) who believed the national security forces had been infiltrated by Shiite militias who were targeting them.

In December 2005, another secret Interior Ministry prison, holding 625 malnourished and tortured prisoners, mostly Sunni, was discovered.¹⁹⁵ However, the spotlight was turned away from these secret detention facilities as the election was held later in the month, as well as during January 2006 when political bargaining to form a government took place. However, there was no evidence that the indicator rating should be changed. Insurgent violence resumed in early January after a short lull following the December 2005 election, similar to the drop in the indicator’s rating in February and March of 2005 after

¹⁹³ “Baghdad governor slain by insurgents,” *The Washington Post*, 1/5/05. “Ever bloodier; Iraq,” *The Economist*, 1/8/05. “Some Iraq areas unsafe for Iraq vote, U.S. general says,” *The New York Times*, 1/7/05.

¹⁹⁴ “Iraq backs sectarian militias,” *The New York Times*, 6/10/05.

¹⁹⁵ “Human rights report,” *UNAMI*, 1 November—31 December 2005.


the previous election. Additionally, Sunni leaders continued to assert that Sunnis were targeted throughout January by Interior Ministry forces and demanded the resignation of the Interior Minister.

In February 2006, the former UN human rights chief in Iraq reported that most of the corpses in Baghdad's mortuary died as a result of the Shiite death squads controlled by the Interior Ministry. The former chief stated that the Interior Ministry was "acting as a rogue element within the government."¹⁹⁶ Also in February, insurgents bombed the Askariya Shrine, one of the holiest Shiite symbols. As reprisal attacks were carried out throughout the country, police commandos showed allegiance to their religious or ethnic group and participated in the violence.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ "Iraq's death squads: On the brink of civil war," *The Independent*, 2/26/06.

¹⁹⁷ "Iraq-sectarian violence," *National Public Radio*, Talk of the Nation with Neal Conan, with guest Bobby Ghosh, 2/28/06.

11 Rise of Factionalized Elites



Under Saddam, Sunni tribes and tribal confederations were dominant in the leadership apparatus. In the months after Saddam's overthrow, a power vacuum ensued. Many previously suppressed groups, including anti-Saddam Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and Turkmen, competed to fill the vacuum. Iraq was deeply divided along religious and ethnic lines following years of dictatorial rule by Saddam. Rather than bringing in wider pools of Iraqi leaders to bridge the gap of sectarian divisions and form a national government early on when there was some room for political inclusion, the U.S. accepted ethnic competition as a basis for governance, thus institutionalizing the factional competition for power along group lines. This became the foundation of elite formation as decision-making authority was transferred from U.S. to Iraqi leaders. No single Iraqi leader has been able to mobilize a following that crossed ethnic or religious lines.

While the CPA governed Iraq, tensions among groups were suspended slightly, as most of the focus was between the leaders of Iraq and the U.S. This slowly changed as the U.S. fast-tracked the democratization process.

Over the summer of 2003, Iraqi groups openly questioned the decisions made by the U.S. leaders. Although many groups were opposed to the presence of U.S. forces, their criticisms and calls for action varied. Al-Sistani, Iraq's most influential Shiite Muslim cleric, characterized the U.S. presence not as a liberating force, but as an occupying force that had made many mistakes. Al-Sadr, a young, but popular Shiite cleric in Baghdad, called for elections sooner rather than later. The Shiite political party, Sciri, called for peaceful protests against the presence of U.S. forces.¹⁹⁸ Al-Sadr's rhetoric turned increasingly violent in July 2003, when he urged thousands of his followers to expel U.S. forces from the holy city of Najaf and for the U.S. appointed Governing Council to be dissolved.¹⁹⁹

The situation worsened in August 2003 when Ayatollah Baqr al-Hakim, the head of Sciri and brother of Sciri leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, was killed by a massive car bomb along with 100 others in the city of Najaf. Baqr al-Hakim had supported the U.S. appointed Iraqi Governing Council, although the U.S. was wary of his support given that he had lived in exile in Tehran, Iran, where he received support after his return to Iraq. The death of Baqr deepened leadership competition among the Shiites.²⁰⁰

In October 2003, the split among Shiite leaders became blatantly evident when al-Sadr proclaimed his own government in defiance of the U.S. appointed Iraqi Governing Council and the more mainstream Shiite parties. Although his call was not met with widespread support, he did manage to hold a successful rally with hundreds of supporters in Najaf, and had strong support in Sadr City, a poor neighborhood in Baghdad with about 2 million residents.²⁰¹ Although al-Sistani never made any official statements against al-Sadr, he was implicitly critical of al-Sadr's stance by supporting the U.S. leadership's decisions. This changed in November 2003 when the U.S. leadership decided that the sovereignty of Iraq would be transferred before national elections were held, which al-Sistani vehemently opposed, thus moving the indicator's rating to a 10.

In December 2003, Saddam was captured. Many Iraqis, especially Shiite Arabs and Kurds, were happy to see the former dictator finally taken into custody, but many others, most of them Sunni Arabs, were happy to see the dictator alive, and held mass demonstrations in support of him in the Sunni triangle towns of Ramadi and Fallujah.²⁰²

In February 2004, U.S. officials delayed replacing the Governing Council with the interim Iraqi national assembly and government, allowing more factional competition. Also during this month, eight out of the 13 Shiite members of the Iraqi Governing Council walked out of a session for drafting an interim constitution over contentious issues. According to one member, the Governing Council was under extreme pressure from the U.S. to produce a document quickly and was told to resolve other issues later.²⁰³ Without sufficient time to fully flesh out important issues, this process worsened the ethnic and sectarian divisions. A similar situation would develop later during the permanent constitution drafting process.

¹⁹⁸ Available online at: <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/642/re11.htm>, *Al Ahram weekly*.

¹⁹⁹ Available online at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48594-2003Jul25.html>, 7/26/03.

²⁰⁰ "SCIRI," available online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/post_saddam_iraq/html/shia_sciri.stm, *BBC News*. "Splits worsened by cleric's murder," *BBC News*, 9/2/03.

²⁰¹ "An anti-American cleric declares his own government," *The New York Times*, 10/12/03.

²⁰² "Iraq report," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 12/18/03.

²⁰³ "Iraqi council Shiites walk out of session on constitution," *The Washington Post*, 2/28/04.

In May 2004, al-Sistani issued a fatwa against the interim constitution, which he said was illegitimate. However, when the interim government took office in June 2004, al-Sistani cautiously approved the government as legitimate. Al-Sadr also conditionally approved, and accepted a cease-fire between his Mahdi Army and occupation forces in Najaf. He rejected the invitation to participate in the Iraqi national conference because he was only offered one seat.²⁰⁴ In August 2004, al-Sadr ended the ceasefire in Najaf. After three weeks of intense, inconclusive fighting, al-Sistani returned from a medical trip to London to broker a ceasefire, drawing al-Sadr into the political process.²⁰⁵

By the fall, religious, rather than secular, leaders were gaining popular support among the people. Al-Sadr issued a fatwa for his followers not to participate in the upcoming January 2005 elections. Al-Sistani made statements urging his supporters to head to the polls.²⁰⁶

More governing power was handed over to the leaders of Iraq's political parties after the January 2005 transitional national assembly election, and tensions grew in the political wrangling for power over the government and the constitution. Democratization intensified sectarian political competition. Sunnis largely boycotted the election. Tensions after the election soared between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds; the latter two were overwhelmingly and disproportionately victorious in the national assembly election as a result of the Sunni boycott. Kurdish leaders became emboldened by their success in the polls, pressing hard for autonomous control over the northern region of Iraq.²⁰⁷ Among Sunnis and Shiites, even more internal divisions were present. Sunni political parties, which lacked cohesion and strong leadership, called for a greater presence on the drafting committee for Iraq's permanent constitution, even though they had boycotted the election. Shiites realized that there were many different political persuasions within their own group, some more secular and others more theocratic.

When the new transitional government was sworn in at the end of April 2005, many posts were not filled as a result of the gridlock among Iraqi leaders. Many Sunnis were left out of the government, which consisted of mainly Shiites and Kurds. Al-Jaafari stated that Sunnis would be included once they united behind candidates that are "acceptable" to Shiites.²⁰⁸

In May of 2005, al-Sistani urged the newly appointed al-Jaafari to include more Sunnis in the constitutional drafting process.²⁰⁹ Al-Sadr also called for Shiite restraint in his first public statement since the Mahdi Army, his militia, fought U.S. troops in 2004.

The statement came after at least 46 bodies were discovered in a mass grave. The victims, most of them Sunnis, were killed execution style; this fueled fears that Shiite militias were no longer heeding orders from their religious leadership.²¹⁰ Indeed, an increasing amount of violence had taken place, apparently by Shiite militias against Sunni civilians, and some reports indicated that militias were posing as government security officials. Sunni religious leaders accused Shiite militias backed by the Ministry of Interior of killing Sunnis with impunity. A thousand Sunnis came together in Iraq to form a new group to

²⁰⁴ "Rebel cleric spurns Iraq council invite," *UNAMI*, 6/24/04.

²⁰⁵ "Iraqi cleric calls cease-fire after blood uprising," *Reuters*, 8/30/04.

²⁰⁶ "Moqtada al-Sadr says he will boycott elections," *Azzaman*, 11/22/04. "Iraq's al-Sistani spearheading effort to ensure Shiite electoral victory," *The Associated Press*, 11/17/04.

²⁰⁷ "Kurds press role as dealmakers," *The New York Times*, 2/9/05.

²⁰⁸ "Iraqi posts unfilled as cabinet sworn in," *The Boston Globe*, 5/4/05.

²⁰⁹ *Newsday*, 5/23/05.

²¹⁰ *Agence France Presse*, 5/16/05.

consolidate Sunni political power. The organization's first demand was for Interior Minister Bayan Jabr to resign.²¹¹

Divisions among the leadership of the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds widened further after Prime Minister al-Jaafari, a Shiite, and President Talabani, a Kurd, openly stated that the government would back the use of militias as a part of the security apparatus. Specifically, the Badr Organization, the militia wing of the Shiite political party Sciri, and the Peshmerga, the militia forces of the Kurds, were mentioned; the two leaders insisted that the Ministries of Defense and Interior would exercise control, but Kurdish leaders explicitly stated that the Peshmerga would remain under the command of the Kurdish political party the KKP, therefore loyal to a separate chain of command. The Badr Organization maintained local political control as well. A third of all provincial governors were Badr Organization members²¹² and the Minister of Interior, who controlled the national police force, was a former Badr commander.

As discussed in indicator 3, in June 2005, the Sunnis launched a campaign to demand 25 more seats with full voting powers on the 55 member committee charged with drafting Iraq's national constitution. Sunni leaders threatened that if their demands were not met, then they would urge the Sunni dominated provinces to reject the constitution in the referendum scheduled for October 2005. However, some committee members asserted that the Sunnis had failed to coalesce around a single leader or group, and several influential Sunnis fought each other for the leadership role. Eventually, the Sunnis were granted 15 additional seats on the committee, but even then these new members of the committee were forced to operate without basic security protection, hampering the process in the following months.

On October 1, 2005, Shiite and Kurdish members of the Iraqi national assembly marginalized Sunni voters. They voted to interpret 'eligible voters' in the October referendum as those already registered, stating that it would take 2/3 of eligible voters in three of the country's 18 provinces to reject the constitution. Sunni politicians strongly objected to the interpretation because nearly the entire Sunni population had boycotted the elections. After strong criticism by the UN, which was overseeing the elections, the national assembly reversed the interpretation, instead stating that 'eligible voters' meant any Iraqi who showed up at the polls.²¹³

The political bargaining had stalled many times, causing the August 15, 2005 deadline for the draft constitution to be bypassed. The national assembly approved the final constitution only days before the October 15, 2005 referendum; most Iraqis did not even have a chance to read it before voting. Two days before the referendum on the constitution, two prominent Sunni Arab groups, the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Sunni Endowment, sponsored the final draft of the Iraqi constitution, while the powerful hard-line Sunni Arab groups, the Muslim Scholars Association and the National Dialogue Council, urged Iraqis to reject the constitution or boycott the referendum entirely.²¹⁴

Among the political compromises that broke the stalemate was the agreement that the most controversial issues of the constitution would be addressed in future negotiations. But this promise was not set in stone and was not binding. After the December 2005 national assembly election results became clear in January 2006, Shiite leaders stated that the constitution was not up for future debate.

²¹¹ "Sunni Iraqis announce political coalition," available online at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/21/iraq.main/>, CNN.com, 5/22/05.

²¹² "Militiaman denies tie to secret Iraq prison," *The Washington Post*, 12/01/05.

²¹³ "Iraq alters rule for vote on charter," *The Washington Post*, 10/06/05.

²¹⁴ "Some Sunnis now support constitution, splitting opposition," *The New York Times*, 10/14/05.

Al-Sadr cemented his role in the political process in February 2006 when his followers cast the determining votes that gave al-Jaafari a one-vote win to continue as prime minister. He has forged ties with neighboring Iran and Syria. His militia dominated police forces in the southern provinces and parts of Baghdad.²¹⁵ His ascension to power has caused a rift in the Shiite political party between Sadrists and Sciri.


Also in February 2006, following the bombing of the Askariya Shrine, both al-Sadr and al-Sistani said that Shiites should go and protect their mosques.²¹⁶ Al-Sistani, who generally called for restraint, indicated that Shiite patience was waning and called for demonstrations. He stated that if the government could not protect holy sites, then Shiites should.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ "Radical cleric well-placed to influence politics," *The Chicago Tribune*, 2/16/06.

²¹⁶ "Toll in Iraq's deadly surge: 1,300 morgue count eclipses other tallies since Shrine attack," *The Washington Post*, 2/28/06.

²¹⁷ "Iraq-sectarian violence," *National Public Radio*, Talk of the Nation with Neal Conan, with guest Bobby Ghosh, 2/28/06.

12 Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors²¹⁸



The U.S., UN, and U.K. had extensive influence in the affairs of Iraq since 1991 through economic sanctions, the oil-for-food programme, and the no-fly zones in the northern Kurdish region and the southern Shiite region. Thus, this indicator rated high even before the invasion. The presence of an occupying military force automatically means this indicator's rating is a 10. Therefore, in the entire three-year period under review, this indicator stayed at a 10. Even when the occupation ends, Iraq will likely be dependent upon outside military and economic assistance for years to come, unless the country disintegrates.

²¹⁸ Data in graph regarding troop levels found in "Iraq index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq," *The Brookings Institution*, 2/9/06.

Since 2003, the U.S. has obviously had a great deal of influence and control over the governance of Iraq. The decisions made by the U.S. greatly affected reconstruction efforts and aspects of security around the country. As for reconstruction, since 2003, USAID awarded \$1.7 billion in reconstruction contracts to American companies, but Iraqi officials complained that there was a lack of transparency in the process of awarding reconstruction contracts.

One of the first things the U.S. did, which greatly impacted reconstruction and security, was to disband the Iraqi army and prohibit the top four levels of Ba'ath Party members from serving in the government, which included school teachers. This left many Sunnis unemployed and disenfranchised with the new political process that was taking place around them. It also left security for the entire country completely up to the U.S. and coalition forces.²¹⁹ This security vacuum went unfilled and violence spread across Iraq as insurgent groups coalesced.

From the onset, the U.S. urged Iraqi officials to keep the democratization process moving forward at a quick pace. Iraqi Governing Council officials stated that the U.S. applied pressure for them to sign the November 15, 2003 plan agreeing to turn sovereignty over to an Iraqi government by July 1, 2004.

The UN office in Baghdad aided in some reconstruction and repatriation efforts following the invasion. In August 2003, this building was bombed in a terrorist attack, killing the top UN envoy to Iraq. The UN closed its mission in Baghdad due to rising instability, maintaining its Mission of Assistance for Iraq in Jordan, which had limited capacity to provide services to the Iraqi people.

Iraqis grew impatient with the U.S. and the results it had promised to bring to the people. An end to the occupation became a unifying theme for many Iraqis despite sectarian divisions; they believed the U.S. and its allies caused increased violence, decreased public services, and increased unemployment. Disproportionate U.S. support of Kurdish and Shiite political parties marginalized the Sunni population and leadership.

In March 2004, L. Paul Bremer announced that Iraq's new security forces would remain under the command of the U.S. military, despite the transfer of sovereignty planned for the summer of 2004. Regarding this transfer of sovereignty, the Iraqi Governing Council was excluded from discussions at the UN regarding a resolution that would determine the handover of power to Iraqis. The Council was disappointed and requested that it be included in all discussions that would determine the fate of its security forces.²²⁰ In April of 2004, the CPA reversed its earlier decision to exclude Ba'athists from government, realizing that it had turned away many individuals fully qualified to participate in the new government.

In 2004, U.S. officials accused Syria and Iran of not doing enough to seal their borders to prevent foreign fighters from entering Iraq. Both countries were also accused of supporting terrorist attacks within Iraq. Iran called for an emergency meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to discuss Iraq, which Iraqi officials rejected.²²¹ It was also found that many Saddam supporters lived in Syria and therefore used Syrian bank accounts to fund insurgents.²²²

²¹⁹ "Occupational hazards; George Packer describes a poorly planned and executed takeover of Iraq," *The New York Times Book Review*, 10/30/05.

²²⁰ "Debate on Iraqi sovereignty continues after Bush speech," *The Wall Street Journal*, 5/25/04.

²²¹ "Iraq rejects Iranian summit idea," *The New York Times*, 8/25/04.

²²² "U.S. said to weigh sanctions on Syria over Iraqi network," *The New York Times*, 1/5/05.

Even as the new government took power in the beginning of May 2005, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) maintained control of the Iraqi intelligence service. U.S. officials stated that they would not give the new government the power because many of the Shiite parties in power still had close ties with Iran. Iraqi officials said that the hold out could lead to a rival Iraqi led intelligence service.²²³

There was an estimated 700 to 2,000 foreign fighters in Iraq between November 2005 and January 2006.²²⁴ The largest groups of foreign nationals fighting in Iraq came from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.²²⁵

Even after significant military operations were initially successful at driving insurgent forces out of strongholds in Ramadi and Fallujah, in 2004, the U.S. was unable to leave sufficient forces behind in these cities to maintain stability. The most violent parts of Iraq—Ramadi, Mosul, Mahmudiya – all said that they needed more manpower to fight insurgents from coming back after U.S. forces had left.

The British forces provided security for the southern region, especially the province of Basra. In September 2005, two British special forces soldiers were taken into custody by the *Jameat*, a division of the Basra police force made up of officers who purportedly only answer to local Shiite controlled Badr militia leaders. The Jameat have been rumored to torture political rivals and carry out extrajudicial killings against Sunnis and former Ba’athists. The two undercover British commandos were arrested for allegedly shooting two Iraqi police officers. In an effort to free them, British forces partially destroyed the police building where the two soldiers were believed to be detained, and they were attacked by a rioting mob of men who threw firebombs and launched rockets. The two soldiers were later found being held in a house in a nearby neighborhood. The British use of force was sharply criticized by local Shiite leaders, calling their actions “barbaric and irresponsible,”²²⁶ and was later protested by the residents of the city. The event captured the lack of trust, communication, and cooperation between the British and Iraqi security apparatuses.

In October 2005, the U.S. military advised that they do not expect the Iraqi military to be fully operational and prepared to function on its own for another 18 months to two years.²²⁷ Members of the U.S. military voiced concern that Washington was too focused on what happened in the past and who was to blame, rather than seeing what the real problems were and trying to work out feasible solutions. If the U.S. military begins to draw down, officials who are in Iraq were unsure if the Iraqis stood ready to fill the vacuum that would be created after years of U.S. occupation.²²⁸ American troops also expressed concern over Iraq’s lack of preparedness, noting that Iraqi forces erratically handled weapons to respond to an attack and sold their guns while on patrol. However, Iraqis were frustrated that the Americans did not trust them.

In early December 2005, it was revealed that the Pentagon had been buying space in Iraqi media to produce favorable stories about coalition forces and the reconstruction effort.²²⁹ Not only did this

²²³ “Amidst doubts, CIA hangs on to control of Iraqi intelligence service,” *Knight Ridder*, 5/8/05.

²²⁴ “Iraq index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq,” *The Brookings Institution*, 1/3/06.

²²⁵ “Saudi militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom’s response,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 9/19/05, found in “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” *The Brookings Institution*, 1/3/06.

²²⁶ “British smash into Iraqi jail to free 2 detained soldiers,” *The Washington Post*, 9/20/05. “British armor smashes jail, frees pair--Basra authorities had arrested commandos for alleged cop killing,” *Memphis Commercial Appeal (TN)*, 9/20/05.

²²⁷ “U.S. general sees further delay in Iraqi military taking over,” *The New York Times*, 10/22/05.

²²⁸ “U.S. general in Iraq: Growing disconnect with Washington,” *United Press International*, 10/5/05.

²²⁹ “Pentagon describes Iraq propaganda plan,” *The Miami Herald*, 12/2/05.

interfere with the Iraqis' right to a free and independent press, as mentioned in indicator 9, it also showed that the Pentagon was taking drastic steps to influence the attitudes of the general population.

In February 2006, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and confirmed that Iraqi reconstruction money had been mismanaged. The CPA did not put in place proper oversight measures and corruption permeated the system.²³⁰

²³⁰ "Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction," testimony by Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2/8/06.

Police

Following the invasion, Iraq's police disintegrated. Stations were looted and many officers abandoned their posts. As the U.S.-led coalition tried to rebuild a police force, its members became primary targets of insurgent attacks. Nonetheless, due to widespread unemployment, young men lined up to apply for jobs as these were some of the few job opportunities in the country. Many Iraqi citizens saw police officers as traitors for cooperating with the U.S.-led coalition. This distrust created tension between the police force and citizens. Moreover, recruitment was uneven, favoring Shiites mostly. In addition, recruitment lacked sufficient vetting. Police officers were found to be collaborators in insurgent attacks and some provided intelligence that would aid an insurgent group. Officers lacked proper equipment and weapons. Few police officers received adequate training; as of June 2004, only 32 percent of Iraq's police force had received training.²³¹ Following the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004, the police force showed signs of improvement and an increased presence on the streets. However, charges of corruption and human rights abuses persisted. Militias infiltrated police forces, carrying out arbitrary arrests and mob-style executions. The discovery of secret Interior Ministry prisons, holding mostly Sunni detainees who had been starved and tortured, demonstrated the extent of deterioration in the police. By the end of 2005, the police were not regarded as legitimate, representative, or professional.

Leadership

Leadership in Iraq exists along ethnic and religious lines. Some Iraqi exiles who had opposed Saddam returned after he was removed from power. However, there was no one successor following years of dictatorship. The country divided along ethnic and religious lines with leaders emerging accordingly. Shiite clerics began to use their influence and push for Islamic reforms. Sunni leaders fought for representation in the new government. Kurdish leaders joined together to press for an autonomous region in the north. The Iraqi Governing Council and the interim government were unable to gauge the support of all Iraqi citizens, form a strong central governing authority, or establish a unity government that would transcend sectarian constituencies. Ayatollah al-Sistani remained the most powerful Shiite figure. Moqtada al-Sadr positioned himself as a "kingmaker." He was revered by many poor Shiites, had a militia, with an important bloc of Shiite followers dedicated to him personally, and entered the political arena occupying every political space available to him. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a Shiite, was named Interim Prime Minister and Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, was named Interim President following the January 2005 national assembly elections. Sunnis, who boycotted the January 2005 elections, were largely excluded from government positions. Although they gained seats in the assembly in the December 2005 elections, Shiites and Kurds retained the majority. There was no national figure or national political party pulling the factions together and the majority alliances each had their own internal divisions by the beginning of 2006.

Civil Service

Iraq's civil service, which had employed approximately two million Iraqis prior to the invasion, also collapsed in the months after Saddam's fall from power. Hospitals were looted. Electricity, water, and sewage treatment were unable to be reliably restored. Instability and violence prevented many institutions from functioning. Paul Bremer purged the civil service of all former Ba'ath members, ultimately putting many Iraqis out of work, including many teachers. Those who were eventually employed were initially unable to be paid. Corruption permeated the ranks of government ministries and public services remained inadequate. The World Bank assisted rebuilding the bureaucracy through financing and training. However, by early 2006, key ministry positions remained unfilled due to delays in forming a new government that would incorporate Sunnis. Lacking leadership, the ministries functioned

²³¹ "Iraq index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq," *The Brookings Institution*, 6/28/04.

at a minimum level of efficiency. Each was regarded as a power center through which political parties could extend their base of support through patronage, control of contracts, and revenue.

Judiciary

Iraq's judiciary system received a large amount of attention as judges were vetted and the Iraqi Special Tribunal was formed to try Saddam. International law experts met with Iraqi judges in an effort to help them reform the courts. The U.S. invested millions of dollars in Iraq's judiciary. However, jails swelled, overcrowding set in, and many prisoners spent lengthy amounts of time in jail awaiting trial. The system was not prepared to handle the deluge of prisoners being held by coalition forces. Further, there was no uniformity in the application of law. In November 2004, the chief investigator for Iraq's Central Criminal Court was dismissed for targeting top political figures, damaging the judicial system's image. Further, 135 of 869 judges were removed because of links to corruption or affiliation with the Ba'ath Party. The Special Tribunal was established, in part, to demonstrate that the judiciary was a functioning institution. However, the atmosphere of the court (Saddam's defiance and use of the trial as a political tool, the chaotic and haphazard manner of the proceedings, and the resignation of the chief judge) did not instill confidence in the judiciary's capability. The tribunal was criticized for being too inexperienced and ill-prepared to try the case of Saddam and members of his regime. Human rights groups called for the trial to be held in an international court. Iraqis questioned the legitimacy of the tribunal. Courts functioned in all provinces, although with varying degrees of cases tried.²³² In 2003, around 4,000 felony cases were resolved in Iraqi courts, and in 2004, there were around 8,000 felony cases resolved. By 2005, it is estimated that more than 10,000 felony cases were resolved.²³³ Also untested was the constitutional issue of reconciling Sharia law with secular law, particularly as it applied to women. A hybrid solution was enacted, leaving the choice of which court system to use to households, in effect depriving women of equal rights before the law.

Military

While the military disintegrated with the invasion, members of the Iraqi armed forces were also formally dismissed when L. Paul Bremer dissolved the Ministry of Defense, the Republican Guard, and Iraq's army in May 2003. He allowed militias that were under CPA command to maintain possession of their automatic weapons, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, which angered Shiites. In December 2003 the CPA announced that it would be forming a battalion that incorporated the militias of the five main political parties. Many Iraqi leaders disagreed with this decision, as they believed it would further exacerbate ethnic tensions and instead called for militias to be disbanded. As new Iraqi armed forces began to be recruited, they too were viewed as traitors and were targets of insurgent attacks. They also showed signs of indiscipline, questionable loyalties, and lack of professionalism, and there was a notable absence of military leaders. When faced with fighting violent insurgents, many Iraqi soldiers would not show up for work, abandoned their posts, or joined the insurgents. Officers complained about lack of proper equipment and training. At the outset, the U.S. was primarily focused on reaching target numbers, rather than being concerned with the quality of soldier recruited. In December 2004 the U.S. changed strategy and emphasized capabilities. By December 2005, two-thirds of Iraq's army units were deemed able to fight along side American units in operations planned, led, supplied, and supported the U.S., but they were deemed unable to plan and execute their own missions.²³⁴

²³² "Measuring stability and security in Iraq," report to Congress in accordance with conference report 109-72, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, page 25, October 2005.

²³³ "Measuring stability and security in Iraq," report to Congress in accordance with conference report 109-72, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, page 25, October 2005; "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," National Security Council, November 2005, page 17. Both sources found in "Iraq index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq," *The Brookings Institution*, 1/3/06.

²³⁴ "Why Iraq has no army," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 2005.

This report marks the fifth in a series of progress reports on the war in Iraq launched in March 2003. These reports are based on an analytical methodology, CAST (the Conflict Assessment System Tool), that has been developed and tested over the past 10 years. The objectives of this particular project are to:

- Assess the extent to which Iraq is moving toward sustainable security, a situation in which it can solve its own problems peacefully without an outside military or administrative presence. This will provide the basis for an exit strategy.
- Analyze trend lines in Iraq along 12 top social, economic and political/military indicators of internal instability.
- Evaluate five core institutions, (political leadership, civil service, system of justice, police and military) which are necessary for the state to function.
- Review “stings” – the surprises, triggers, idiosyncrasies, national temperament, and other frequently overlooked factors.
- Present a “before” and “after” portrait, with trend lines, showing progress and regression in specific indicators as well as the aggregate at several intervals over time.
- Make concrete policy recommendations and conclusions.

This study is an objective, nonpartisan assessment, tracking the post-war reconstruction effort in systematic fashion, with updates at approximately six-month intervals. It is important that both the U.S. presence in, and exit from, Iraq be neither premature nor longer than necessary. Only a comprehensive tracking and assessment study can make reasonably reliable judgments of this kind.

This report offers a balanced combination of quantitative data grounded in rigorous qualitative research. This even blend of statistical and descriptive analysis accurately portrays the internal situation in Iraq according to trends across 12 distinct variables, or indicators. Ratings are assigned to each indicator according to a comprehensive assessment of daily news coverage of Iraq. The research team referenced over 150 domestic and international news sources, including Arabic language sources, for this report. The data collected is information available to the public through accessible media sources. In later reports, data was collected electronically from 11,000 diverse sources. At the end of each month, a rating (on a scale of 1-10, 1 being the best and 10 being the worst) is assigned based on the developments of that particular month by indicator. Each month’s rating is assigned relative to the previous month’s ratings.

This report is a comprehensive three-year analysis that examines trends since the start of the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. The findings are presented in a new format from previous reports, with particular emphasis on graphic representations of trends. An analysis of the trends accompanies each indicator. In the enlarged graph, Iraq Three-Year Trend Line on page 6, the scale begins at 85, rather than zero, on the y-axis in order to provide the reader with a more detailed trend analysis. As can be seen in the individual indicator charts, none of the ratings has fallen below a four since the invasion began. In the individual indicator graphs, a red-dotted line distinguishes between ratings that remain in the “alert” area and those that are in the “warning” area. Thus, any indicator seven or above is considered in alert.

It is important to note that these summaries provide a condensed representation of the most significant developments on the ground, as reported by the media, expert, and independent organizations, some of which were on site. Any specific developments omitted are done so because they are judged by the research team to be redundant, outliers, or relatively unimportant with respect to the highlighted events. From this methodology, the internal stability of Iraq is assessed by following trends, both by indicator and aggregate ratings.

This research team, led by Dr. Pauline H. Baker, president of the FfP and the original author of the methodology, accepts that the rating system of 1-10 is somewhat subjective. However, in light of the logistical barriers to conducting field research in any conflict environment and/or collapsing state, the potential for bias is reduced by internal checks, extensive citation, the collection of vast amounts of data, and comprehensive discussion. Moreover, the research team maintained consistency in research patterns and sources, accompanied by cross-referencing of any observed inconsistencies. Furthermore, over time, as these reports continue, the numerical ratings define themselves in specific tangible conditions, relative to previous ratings, so that clear trends emerge.



THE FUND FOR PEACE
1701 K Street, NW
Eleventh Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 223-
7940 (phone)
(202) 223-7947 (fax)
www.fundforpeace.org