

Opposition performance at the polls in 2009

Justin Sylvester

South Africa's electoral system is designed to sustain a multiparty democracy. The premise being that multi-partyism breeds electoral competition and in turn entrenches and consolidates democracy. However, this has not been the case over 15 years of democracy. The multiparty system is strong (in form) and evident in the fact that 42 parties are contesting elections in April 2009. But weak as a result of a number of factors... e.g. that electoral competition between parties has been far from meaningful given the ever increasing majorities received by the African National Congress (ANC) during elections since 1994. The opposition has been unable to significantly challenge the electoral dominance of the ANC and has rendered South Africa's political system to one-party dominance.

This becomes even more perplexing when contrasted with the significant levels of discontent with the ANC government across South African society. Opposition parties have as of yet been unable to make significant inroads into this large voting bloc in the past 15 years of democracy. Nor have they capitalized on the discontent around issues such as service delivery. But this may be largely due to citizens seldom conflating poor service delivery with the ANC government. Nevertheless, we have not seen significant shifts away from the ANC due to this discontent.

This is essentially problematic for democracy in a number of ways and has possibly had a negative impact on our young democracy. The first of which is that democracy cannot be said to be strong until there has been a change in ruling-party. This is a crucial test for the strength of a democracy and is yet to be seen in the South African context. The second is that an electorally unchallenged ANC will be more prone to abuses of power and become less accountable to the citizenry. Third, that a government that is fearful of its electorate – that it would simply take its support elsewhere- is more responsive to the needs of its electorate and creates a stronger incentive for good performance.¹

Thus, this brief seeks to discuss the landscape of opposition politics and understand the issues that may affect the opposition's performance in election 2009, with regards to possible shifts of electoral support to the opposition.

The socio-economic landscape and disaffected voters

After 15 years in government, the ruling-ANC has had significant successes. However, the majority of voters continue to face significant socio-economic challenges. These can be narrowed down to four main areas: poverty, inequality, unemployment, and poor service delivery. It would be generally accepted that such issues would drive voters away

¹ Jonathan Faull, *Moribund opposition and why the alliance won't fold*, in *Epolitics SA*, Ed. 2 (Cape Town: 2005) 1.

from a long-term incumbent such as the ANC to the opposition. But this has not necessarily been the case in South Africa.

A wide range of research confirms that after 15 years of ANC governance, almost half of South Africans live in poverty.² However, this is not to say that there has not been improvement in poverty alleviation. Van der Berg *et al* indicate that the depth and severity of poverty “increased slightly from 1993 to 2001, but decreased substantially from 2001 to 2006.”³ Levels of inequality among South Africans also remain extremely high and rank as some of the highest in the world. More importantly, levels of inequality have increased within race groups, and currently is the highest among black South Africans.⁴ With regards to unemployment the situation becomes much more bleak. South Africa has an unemployment rate that is one of the highest compared to other developing countries. In 2007 the official unemployment rate was 23% with a real unemployment rate of 34,3%.⁵ South Africans are also largely clear that unemployment tops their list of priorities for government. Afrobrometer findings show that 59% of respondents indicated that unemployment was the most important issue facing the country.⁶ This has created much disaffection among South Africans as a whole where only 26% of Afrobarometer respondents in 2008 approved of government’s performance with regards to reducing levels of unemployment.⁷ South Africans are essentially feeling the pinch of the global economic contraction and this will play a large role in the minds of voters during elections 2009.

Table 1 below indicates public perceptions on government performance over the period 1994 to 2008 compiled by Markinor’s *Government Performance Barometer*.

² See Statistics South Africa, *Income and Expenditure of households Survey 2006/2006*, (Pretoria: 2008); Servaas van der Berg, Megan Louw, and Leon du Toit, *Poverty trends since the transition: What we know*, Stellenbosch Department of Economics (2007).

³ Van der Berg *et al*, 2007.

⁴ See Van der Berg *et al*, 2007.

⁵ Labour Force Survey Sept. 2007.

⁶ Afrobarometer, 2008.

⁷ Afrobarometer, *Public opinion in South Africa, October-November 2008 selected results from the Afrobarometer*, (2009) Johannesburg.

Table 1.

| Public perceptions of government performance, 1994-2008 | | | |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Average % for preceding 5 years | 1999 | 2004 | 2008 |
| Creating jobs | 28 | 21 | 31 |
| Controlling the cost of living | - | 32 | 49 |
| Controlling inflation | 38 | 40 | 52 |
| Narrowing the income gap | 53 | 53 | 56 |
| Managing the economy | 49 | 47 | 62 |
| <i>Source: The Presidency, 2008b: 92, citing Markinor, Government Performance Barometer</i> | | | |

The table clearly shows that on job creation, the ANC government has received poor performance ratings with a slight increase from 28% in 1999 to a 31% rating in 2008. On reducing inequality there has been very slight change in approval ratings with an average of just over 50%. Approval ratings did however increase significantly for managing the economy with a high of 62% in 2008. Thus, a significant level of dissatisfaction exists among the populace. A number of opinion polls in recent months have also indicated significant levels of dissatisfaction among voters.

A MarkData opinion survey conducted in July 2008, found that up to 31% of black voters were dissatisfied with government performance.⁸ This is significant as 75% of respondents who indicated their intention to vote for the ruling party in a Plus 94 Research survey, conducted in March 2009, were black.⁹ This indicates that despite serious levels of dissatisfaction among traditionally partisan ANC supporters, only a small segment of these supporters were willing to take their votes elsewhere. This indeed begs the question, why?

The Afrobarometer Survey (2008) found that partisan support for the ANC has declined from 52% of respondents indicating that they would vote for the ANC if an election were held tomorrow in 2006, to 43% in 2008.¹⁰ But despite this decline, the level of partisan identification for the ANC remains much higher than the closest opposition party. So although there has been a significant decline in partisan support for the ANC, this support remains highest where it matters, among black voters.

This is seemingly inexplicable but on closer inspection points to a number of things. The ANC continues to be perceived among the poor as a 'party of the poor.' Thus class is the driver in this regard. This is in contrast to the opposition who are largely perceived as parties for the wealthy, whereas the ANC is perceived as rooted among the working class.

⁸ Lawrence Schlemmer, *Testing Times for Democracy: Assessing results of a July 2008 Markdata political opinion survey*, (MarkData: 2008).

⁹ Plus 94 Research, *Democracy Poll Survey*, (Plus 94 Research: 2009).

¹⁰ Afrobarometer, 2008.

This is despite the pro-poor policy platforms of some opposition parties such as the ID. Even a party such as the DA, who are often criticized as representing wealthy white interests, has had a basic income grant for the poor as a cornerstone of their policy on poverty since the 2004 election. Yet this has not translated into new more votes. Here one must point to the inability for these dissatisfied voters to find an alternative political home within the opposition. And moreover, levels of partisan identification with the ANC that remain strong. The ruling-party, in a sense, has the credentials and history that currently remains unmatched by the opposition.

Nevertheless, a significant amount of floating voters have emerged onto the political landscape, possibly in search of a new political home. In other words, one would expect to see significant shifts in party support away from the ANC towards the opposition. But what are the issues that have constrained such shifts in the past and may play a similar role in election 2009?

Fragmentation

Political opposition in South Africa has since, 1994, been characterized by fragmentation within itself. This has created a situation where opposition parties simply engage in intra-party competition during elections without having made significant inroads among ANC supporters.¹¹ Over this period the opposition as a whole has failed to attract a wide range of voters across racial, class and policy divides. Much of this is due to the shifts and changes on the opposition landscape over this ten year period.¹² These included: the demise of the New National Party (NNP); the emergence of the Democratic Alliance (DA) as the main opposition party; the decline of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP); and the emergence of a number of smaller parties such as the Independent Democrats (ID) and the United Democratic Movement (UDM). Electoral competition for the opposition, so essential for a multi-party democracy, was effectively a zero-sum game. The demise of the NNP, to the benefit of the DA, is clear indication of this trend.

The NNP emerged as the main opposition party after the 1994 election. But due to weak leadership, incoherent opposition tactics and a fateful merger with the then Democratic Party (DP) to form the Democratic Alliance, it suffered significant losses of support in the 1999 election. This was then hammered home in the 2004 election where the NNP, after having left the DA in 2001 and cosied up to the ANC in an inexplicable alliance, gained only 5% of the total opposition vote. This was down from 55% of the opposition vote it had secured in 1994. The DA on the other hand increased its share of the opposition vote from 5% in 1994 to 41% in 2004.¹³

¹¹ Faull, *Moribund Opposition and why the Alliance won't fold*, 2.

¹² Susan Booysen, *The Democratic Alliance: Progress and pitfalls*, in *Electoral politics in South Africa: Assessing the first democratic decade*, (ed) Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink, (HSRC Press, Johannesburg: 2005), 129.

¹³ *Moribund Opposition*.

However, these gains by the opposition must be contextualized against the backdrop of the increasing majorities received by the ANC over the same period. Between 1994 and 2004, the ANC increased its share of the total votes cast from 66.35% in 1994, to 69.68% in 2004.¹⁴ In other words the gains made by the DA and the ID have not come at the expense of the ruling-party.

Although much of the DA's increased support over the ten year period can be attributed to the demise of the NNP, not all of these de-aligned voters were captured by the DA or the ID. A large number simply did not turn up at the polls. But what is more important is that the ANC was also affected by the low voter turnout. Piombo argues that the ruling party also failed to attract a number of voters to the polls in 2004 as is evident in its ability to only increase its absolute number of votes by 279 585. Thus, the ANC's increase in the number of seats in Parliament was based on the increased proportional strength of its support in relation to that of the opposition.¹⁵ The issue of turnout will be discussed later on in the brief. But what this indicates is that de-alignment has occurred not only among the opposition, but also with the ruling-party, further indicating that the electoral landscape is open to change.

The practice of floor crossing also played a significant role in the fragmenting of the opposition. A number of opposition parties were significantly reduced in their representation in Parliament through this process. The DA scored particularly well at the expense of other opposition parties such as the NNP. More importantly the ANC was the biggest winner over the floor-crossing years, at the expense of the opposition. This practice has since, thankfully, been abolished.

Nonetheless, fragmentation across the political opposition landscape has led to significant shifts and changes. But these shifts have not produced an electoral challenge to the ANC. Although these shifts have increased levels of electoral competition, they have served only to create a zero-sum game within the opposition. In the context of pressing socio-economic challenges and a fragmented opposition, why are opposition parties unable to widen their appeal across South African society?

Race, class and the opposition


Demographic shifts are reconfiguring opposition party politics and will have an effect on electoral outcomes among the opposition. These shifts pose challenges to the inclusiveness of the ANC in terms of the public's perception of their identity and their development priorities. The ANC has often been described as a 'broad church' straddling a number of social cleavages such as race, class and the urban/rural divide. But this broad church has recently fragmented, although marginally, and the key question will be

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Jessica Piombo, "The results of election 2004: Looking back, stepping forward," in *Electoral politics in South Africa: Assessing the first democratic decade*, (ed) Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink, (HSRC Press, Johannesburg: 2005), 279.

whether opposition parties such as COPE can capitalize on these new opportunities across the political landscape.

The first shift is the creation and expansion of a black middle class. A MarkData survey (March 2009) showed that the majority of the ANC's supporters are to be found in the lower income groups. The relative majority of opposition voters, on the other hand, is found to be within minority groups who are generally higher income earners than the black cohort.¹⁶ Support for the opposition in South Africa is thus concentrated among higher income earners whereas the ANC draws its support from lower income earners as evident below in Fig 1.



Source: Plus 94 Research (2009)

But a bloc of middle class blacks challenges the assumption that opposition parties will be unable to draw support across the racial and class divide. South Africa's stark levels of inequality are unquestionably racialised. But fifteen years of democracy has seen the emergence of a significant black middle and upper class. A product of this has been an increase in inequality within race groups, particularly among black South Africans. The emergence of the COPE has been said to represent the class interests of this new emergent class.

¹⁶ Lawrence Schlemmer, *The impact of COPE on political support in Gauteng*, (MarkData: 2009)

A recent *Plus 94 Research* survey in March, showed party support in South Africa continues to be racially polarized. Black South Africans accounted for 75% of the ANC's support among respondents. While white South Africans accounted for 71% of the DA support among respondents. But significant percentages of black, coloured and Indian respondents also indicated their intention to vote for opposition parties such as COPE and the DA.¹⁷ Voter support cannot simply be understood by race, nor is it in any way the sole driver for party support. The interplay between class and race cleavages in South African society sheds more light on whether opposition parties will be able to transcend previous divides.

But, although significant, this new social stratum remains too small to offer any opposition party the electoral strength it would need to challenge the ANC's dominance. This is essentially not where the power lies. Thus, an opposition party would either have to successfully contest for support among the poor or the emerging middle class will have to double in size. The test for opposition parties is to adapt to these new, fragmented, identities while maintaining their base of party support. In turn, parties must diversify their messaging to meet a changing audience while simultaneously maintaining a cohesive identity.

Style of opposition

The key for opposition players seems thus to appear as "inclusive" as possible. Simply representing a minority group, ethnic or otherwise, does not win elections. Since the 2004 elections opposition parties have tried to carefully craft widely representative identities. But these have up to now seemingly been largely unsuccessful in their ability to attract widespread support across South African society. There are two approaches to opposition that can be gleaned from this period. The first is the combative Westminster-style of opposition practiced by the DA. The second is a softer issue-based approach as practiced by parties such as the ID, IFP, and UDM.

The DA has often been criticized for its combative style of opposition most evident under the stewardship of its former leader, Tony Leon. This style became more strident after the merger between the then DP and the NNP in 2001. Piombo (2005) argues that the party then shifted from a "liberal English-dominated voice for freedom into its current conservative form."¹⁸ This was in large part due to the assimilation of 'old Nats' into the party which established a conservative element within its membership and support base. Perhaps this may be an unfair characterization, which the party would vehemently deny, but research does show that this perception has endured among the populace.¹⁹

¹⁷ Plus 94 Research, Democracy Poll Survey: South African National and Provincial Elections, (March 2009).

¹⁸ Piombo, *Electoral politics in South Africa*, 277.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Nonetheless, whether it is largely conservative or liberal the DA's opposition style has been characterized as aggressive or overly robust by a range of commentators.

Schrire interestingly juxtaposes this style against what he calls the ANC's "historic mission," that is that the ANC's political history has been characterized by a long history of struggle against racial inequality, which extends beyond the dawn of democracy in 1994. Thus, the strident adversarial style of the DA is likely to inflame racial and class tensions, and in the end de-legitimize the very acceptance of opposition in South Africa's democracy in the minds of its adversaries.²⁰ This is most evident in the cold relationship between former President Thabo Mbeki and Tony Leon. This has also seemingly continued under the leadership of ANC President Jacob Zuma and current DA leader, Helen Zille.

However, the DA has often stated that its style of opposition is what strengthens South Africa's democracy, as it plays an important watchdog role and acts as a restraint/check on ANC power. Nevertheless, what is important is whether this style of opposition can attract a widespread support base for the DA across the spectrum. Up to now, it has not. Although there have been noticeable attempts under the current DA leadership to include a wider range of voters, the party may have reached a glass ceiling. Polls suggest that the majority of its support remains among higher income earners. This may be due to a lack of organization at grassroots level in comparison to the ANC's extensive branch structure at these levels. But the electoral test in April 2009 will offer the most conclusive evidence whether the party has been able to bridge some of these divides.

But, the softer approach taken by other opposition parties has also not seemingly fared any better in attracting widespread support. The IFP for instance, since 2004, has been trying to craft a less ethnic identity but this has not panned into wider support. And opinion polls suggest that it is being overtaken by the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and more importantly, in its rural strongholds.²¹ The IFP has seen a marked decline since the 1999 election losing its position as the majority party in KZN to the ANC after the 2004 election. The UDM, to an extent, is also a proponent of the issue-based style and has also not fared well since its establishment in 1999. It has failed to attract national support and was largely relegated to a base in the Eastern Cape following 2004.²² The ID, although performing fairly well in its first election in 2004, has seemingly not made a big splash on the electoral scene, although it made a point of not pitting itself against the ANC in the 2004 election.²³

These performances point to questions of leadership, internal party organization and resources. The ID is led by a strong leader, as is the UDM and the IFP. But this

²⁰ Robert Schrire, "The realities of opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences," in *Opposition in South Africa's new democracy*, (ed) Roger Southall, (KAS, Johannesburg: 2001), 34.

²¹ Ipsos Markinor, *The political landscape is changing provincially*, (Markinor: April 2009).

²² Piombo, 278.

²³ Ibid, 279.

leadership is not broad-based and centers round individual personalities. This is a major restraint when on the campaign trail as party leaders can only be in one place at a time. The ruling-party, on the other hand, is able to muster a number of recognized leaders on a national scale. These parties also fair poorly in terms of organization and resources when compared to the DA. Thus, perhaps a party like the ID may have more appeal to a wider range of South Africans compared to the DA, but it is hampered by these internal deficiencies.

Thus, style of opposition although playing an important role in the performance of opposition parties, may not be the main driver. Cherrel Africa has pointed to the quality of political campaigning as a key indicator. She argues that between 1999 and 2004, party political campaigning has often been characterized by negative tones and personalized attacks, which in turn has made the voting public more cynical.²⁴ This has two effects. First, voters are unlikely to spot important policy differences between political parties due to the ‘noise’ generated by various political personalities. But on the other hand, there are not too many clear differences between the major parties, which in turn can confuse voters. The ideological divide is essentially not that wide, so the opposition is left with limited space to differentiate itself in a quite saturated electoral market. Overcoming this challenge however, requires imaginative strategies, but this has not been very apparent over recent years. Thus, voters are unlikely to be attracted to new political homes due to their increasing distaste for politics. Second, voters can become so cynical and apathetic that they instead ‘switch off’, which in turn leads to low voter turn-out.

Opposition voter turnout

Turn-out will be a key driver in the performance for opposition parties in election 2009. A close look at electoral performance over the 1999 and 2004 elections in the Western Cape, gives a clear indication just how important turnout will be to the opposition. The Western Cape is also interesting as it is the most hotly contested province during the current election period and the province most likely to be lost by the ANC to the opposition.

Recent opinion polls have largely suggested that the DA is likely to supplant the ANC as the majority party in the Western Cape. In other words a large turnout among opposition voters is likely to unseat the ANC from power in the province. Table 2 below, shows support for the main parties contesting in the Western Cape over the 1999 and 2004 general elections.


²⁴ Cherrel Africa, *The relationship between campaigns and the quality of democracy in South Africa*, (Institute for Security Studies Presentation, Cape Town: March 2009).

Table 2: Change in electoral support in the Western Cape

| Party | 1999 Votes | 2004 Votes | Difference | Real % Gain/Loss |
|---------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------|
| ANC | 682748 | 740077 | 57329 | 8.40% |
| DA | 227087 | 432107 | 205020 | 90.28% |
| NNP | 550775 | 151476 | -399299 | -72.50% |
| ID | NA | 127991 | | |
| ACDP | 49807 | 60613 | 10806 | 21.70% |
| TOTAL* | 1601922 | 1605016 | 3094 | 0.19% |

* total votes cast in the province excluding spoilt votes.

One can clearly see the demise of the New National Party (NNP) and the gains made by the DA in 2004 due to fragmentation within the opposition. However, although the DA and, to a lesser extent, the Independent Democrats (ID) scored from the demise of the NNP, not all traditional opposition voters (read NNP voters) took their vote elsewhere. A large percentage of registered voters, significantly from predominantly coloured wards, in the Western Cape remained at home as seen in Fig.2 below.²⁵ Voter turnout in the Western Cape has also consistently been lower than the national average, particularly in the 2004 elections.

Figure 2: Voter turnout in 1999 and 2004 provincial elections

²⁵ Jonathan Faull, *How the West was won (and lost)*, Idasa (2004)

Source: EISA; Independent Electoral Commission

Kate Lefko-Everrett argues that these “stay-at home” voters increased the proportional strength of electoral support for the ANC, which enjoyed high levels of turnout from black wards.²⁶ Although the ANC gained support across predominantly coloured voting districts between the 1999 and 2004 elections, much of the ruling party’s victory in the province should be attributed to the “stay-at home” voters among the coloured community, who previously had voted for the opposition.²⁷ Thus, the high turnout within black areas increased the proportional strength of the ANC’s electoral support.

If this situation were to be repeated, the ANC may hang on to the province despite a recent surge of discontent with the new ANC leadership. Opinion surveys show that ANC President, Jacob Zuma, maintains his lowest approval rating in the province.²⁸ This is compounded by the discontent produced by a range of socio-economic challenges as discussed earlier in the brief. The Western Cape is thus fertile ground for the opposition as a whole and the DA in particular.

But the point here is that none of this matters in the final analysis unless opposition parties are able to attract their supporters to the polls. Turnout is crucial and as seen in 2004, can have a strong effect on the performance of the opposition in election 2009.

Conclusion

The South African political landscape in the run-up to 2009 elections is more conducive to shifts in electoral support than in previous elections. In short, this is a moment of opportunity. Stepan argues that the opposition has a crucial role to play in consolidating and deepening democracy.²⁹ Effective electoral competition is an important ingredient in this regard. Provided that opposition parties are able to exploit it, the new political landscape provides an opportunity to reinvigorate opposition politics and electoral performance.

The current set of socio-economic challenges has created a significant amount of discontent among the populace and we have also seen some de-alignment from the ANC among voters. However, the history of political opposition in South Africa has been characterized by fragmentation within itself, which has led to electoral competition among opposition parties while the ANC has gained increasing majorities. Opposition parties have simply up to now been unable to provide an alternative political home for discontented voters.

²⁶ Kate Lefko-Everrett and Gabriella Sacramone-Lutz, *Voter turnout and the 2009 elections: why vie for the stay-at-home vote?*, Idasa (2009)

²⁷ Jonathan Faull, *How the West was won (and lost)*, Idasa (2004)

²⁸ MarkData, 2008.

²⁹ See Alfred Stepan, “Democratic opposition and democratization theory,” in *Government and Opposition*, Vol 34, No 2. (1997), 657

A number of variables are at play here and although this brief has not engaged with all of them they can be isolated to three important issues. Firstly, cleavages of race and class continue to pose significant hurdles to opposition parties in the attempt to attract more widespread support among South Africans. However, demographic shifts have occurred overtime such as the emergence of a black middle class. So opportunities exist for opposition parties to capitalize on these shifts. Secondly, two styles of opposition have emerged from within the opposition in recent years. Neither the aggressive robust style personified by the DA, nor the softer approach of parties such as the ID, have managed to breach the political divide with the ANC. Negative campaigning has also played a significant role in alienating voters either from the opposition, or the polls themselves. Third, voter turnout will indeed play a major role in the performance of opposition parties in election 2009. Opposition parties simply must convince voters to turn up at the polls if they are to make good on any possible shifts in electoral support.

The COPE effect will play a large role here. The party managed to make quite a splash on the political landscape when it first emerged. Yet, COPE has faltered somewhat since then due to incoherence among its leadership on issues such as an inquiry into the Arms Deal and a number of defections to the ANC. Earlier opinion surveys polled COPE at somewhere between 10 to 15%. That should probably now be tempered down to between 7 and 9% of the national vote. Indications are that the DA will score on a higher turnout among its voters this time around, thus polling round 14%. Other opposition parties like the ID, IFP and the UDM are likely to fight an uphill battle in trying to maintain their share of a now much larger electoral pie. The ANC, although likely to miss out on a two-thirds majority, will maintain its dominance at above 62%.

Such a result would show that the opposition, although capitalizing on the minor shifts, still have a long way to go in terms of challenging the ANC. In South Africa, the electoral power lies among the large stratum of lower income earners. And it may be that opposition parties will have to wait a long time before the middle class grows large enough to hand them the much needed electoral support to displace the ruling-party. In the meantime their best bet would be to successfully compete for the votes of the poor. But the proof, as they say, will be in the electoral pie.

References

Cherrel Africa, *The relationship between campaigns and the quality of democracy in South Africa*, (Institute for Security Studies Presentation, Cape Town: March 2009).

Afrobarometer, *Public opinion in South Africa, October-November 2008 selected results from the Afrobarometer*, (2009) Johannesburg.

Susan Booysen, The Democratic Alliance: Progress and pitfalls, in *Electoral politics in South Africa: Assessing the first democratic decade*, (ed) Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink, (HSRC Press, Johannesburg: 2005)

Jonathan Faull, *Moribund opposition and why the alliance won't fold*, in Epolitics SA, Ed. 2 (Cape Town: 2005)

Jonathan Faull, *How the West was won (and lost)*, Idasa (2004)

Kate Lefko-Everrett and Gabriella Sacramone-Lutz, *Voter turnout and the 2009 elections: why vie for the stay-at-home vote?*, Idasa (2009)

Neeta Misra-Dexter, *What should we be discussing as we head to the polls?*, Election Briefing (PIMS-Idasa, Cape Town: 2009)

Jessica Piombo, "The results of election 2004: Looking back, stepping forward," in *Electoral politics in South Africa: Assessing the first democratic decade*, (ed) Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink, (HSRC Press, Johannesburg: 2005)

Plus 94 Research, *Democracy Poll Survey: South African National and Provincial Elections*, (March 2009)

Lawrence Schlemmer, *The impact of COPE on political support in Gauteng*, (MarkData: 2009)

Lawrence Schlemmer, *Testing Times for Democracy: Assessing results of a July 2008 Markdata political opinion survey*, (MarkData: 2008)

Robert Schrire, "The realities of opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences," in *Opposition in South Africa's new democracy*, (ed) Roger Southall, (KAS, Johannesburg: 2001)

Statistics South Africa, *Income and Expenditure of households Survey 2006/2006*, (Pretoria: 2008)

Labour Force Survey Sept. 2007.

Servaas van der Berg, Megan Louw, and Leon du Toit, *Poverty trends since the transition: What we know*, Stellenbosch Department of Economics (2007)