Confronting Exclusion: Time for Radical Reconciliation

SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey: 2013 Report

Kim Wale



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ACRONYMS

AMPS	All Media Products Survey
ANC	African National Congress
EA	enumerator area
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
LSM	living standards measure
NEHAWU	National Education Health and Allied Workers' Union
SAARF	South African Audience Research Foundation
SARB	South African Reconciliation Barometer
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCT	University of Cape Town
NPC	National Planning Commission
NYDA	National Youth Development Agency
SAPS	South African Police Service
SOE	state-owned enterprise
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
VAP	voting-age population



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Difference in a society is not necessarily an obstacle to national reconciliation. To the contrary, it can be one of its greatest assets. However, when difference and a skewed distribution of power combine, it is likely to result in inequality and exclusion, which hampers the broader objectives of a society in which justice is a prerequisite for reconciliation. Reconciliation requires the building of bridges of understanding across lines of difference, especially where they have been reinforced by an unjust distribution of power.

The 2013 South African Reconciliation Barometer (henceforth SARB or Reconciliation Barometer) Report pays closer attention to the relationship between reconciliation, inequality and exclusion. It posits that reconciliation becomes difficult when social divisions are the result of unequal power relations that are being perpetuated in society. Reconciliation, exclusion and inequality are intimately tied to one another. More often than not an imbalance in power results in the material, symbolic, political and social exclusion of marginalised sectors of society.

Chapter one introduces the topic conceptually, demonstrating the need for us to engage with the relationship between reconciliation and economic exclusion under the adapted concept of *radical reconciliation*. Chapter two outlines the conceptual background and methodology of the SARB survey. The results to questions of unity, exclusion and division in South Africa are presented in chapter three. Key findings show that South Africans regard class to be the single biggest source of division, and the greatest impediment to reconciliation. Race relations, on the other hand, are seen to have improved since 1994, and race has shifted down to the 4th spot on the list of primary sources of division as rated by South Africans. However, further analysis demonstrates that in terms of the racial make-up of material exclusion, race and class remain intimately connected. It is therefore necessary to think more deeply about the nature of the relationship between these two sources of division.

Chapter four presents South Africans' perceptions on political culture in relation to reconciliation. Key findings point to a significant decline in confidence and trust in governance institutions. In particular, results show a drop in citizen's confidence in governance institutions, especially national government (10.8% decrease since 2012), as well as a 13% increase in the percentage of citizens who feel that government does not care about people like them. It is of interest to note that these declines occurred in the wake of the African National Congress (ANC) National Conference that was held in Mangaung in December last year, and in the run-up to the 2014 general elections. The previous time that we witnessed declines of this magnitude was in 2008, following on the ANC's Polokwane conference and leading up to the 2009 general elections. It is too soon to tell whether this is a pattern, but may suggest that citizen perception about the efficacy of national governance is being impacted by what happens in the country's ruling party.

Chapter five focuses on issues of human security. Results show that the perceived dirth of employment opportunities poses a threat to the sense of economic security of South Africans. In general the majority of South Africans describe themselves as 'poor' or 'struggling but getting by'. A key finding of this section and for our understanding of radical reconciliation, is that when white South Africans are asked to compare their living conditions with the rest of South Africa, those in the middle (5–6) living standards measure (LSM) groups report that there are no South Africans who are worse off than them. This seems to demonstrate a lack of awareness about the plight of black and coloured South Africans in the lowest four LSM groups. In terms of religion, it is positive to note that South Africans express high levels of human security in this area.

Chapter six reflects on findings on race relations and historical confrontation. Results on levels of interracial contact demonstrate that material exclusion obstructs interracial reconciliation, as the majority of poor South Africans in the lowest four LSM groups are black and isolated from an interracial middle and upper class. Furthermore, it appears that low levels of interracial reconciliation between poor black and middle/upper class white South Africans may in turn impact on differing levels of agreement with the need for economic redress and victim support. Findings show that while all South Africans share a similar desire to forgive the injustices of the past and move forward, white South Africans are 20–30% less likely to agree with the need to continue to support victims of apartheid or that economic re-dress is required for reconciliation.

The concluding chapter pulls out key insights from these findings for the concept of radical reconciliation, which focuses on the relationship between economic inclusion and reconciliation. First, for radical reconciliation to proceed, issues of economic justice need to be central to the process of reconciliation. Second, the concept requires us to think more carefully about the relationship between different vectors of exclusion, such as class and race, in South African society. Third, radical reconciliation critiques the divisive nature of political party discourse which is counterproductive to the aims of building citizen's confidence and trust in governance institutions. Finally, radical reconciliation recognises that in order to address questions of economic injustice, we also need to build intersubjective awareness and social relationships across intersecting race and class boundaries.

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of reconciliation has played a central role in the history of our democracy. In the process of our democratic transition, reconciliation combined with a search for historical truth in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), with the aim of bringing South Africans together to come to terms with their violent legacy and craft a new future.

Truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and redress are all terms which are closely associated with the concept of reconciliation. It is a multidimensional concept and practice that cuts across the psychological, philosophical, political and material realms of society.

The complexity of reconciliation is what gives it richness, but it can also be its downfall. The concept of reconciliation incorporates psychological, structural and political elements. Therefore it can become problematic if it is used to emphasise some of these elements while denying others. Professor Brandon Hamber (1998) argues that if reconciliation does not address issues of deep-rooted structural inequality, then it can act as a deceptive concept. Without incorporating these issues into our understanding of reconciliation, Hamber argues, it can act as a Jekyll and Hyde concept, showing us its flattering side (Dr Jekyll), while deceiving us about the structural issues (Mr Hyde) which lie beneath.

Political analysts of reconciliation discourse have more recently demonstrated that the focus tends to be on the therapeutic aspects of the concept, rather than the material (Humphrey, 2005; Moon, 2006, 2008). This pattern has been seen in South Africa where there is a leaning towards the psychological and interpersonal aspects of reconciliation. As a result the language of reconciliation has been criticised for being at best fluffy and meaningless and at worst ideological. Almost 20 years after the transition, the Reconciliation Barometer survey finds that for ordinary citizens issues of economic inequality and material injustice are the biggest blocks to reconciliation faced today. In light of conceptual critiques and lived realities, it is important that we re-conceptualise reconciliation in ways that place issues of material injustice front and centre.

This point has been emphasised in a recent *SA Reconciliation Barometer* newsletter by Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio, senior researcher at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (Villa-Vicencio, 2013). He asks whether perhaps we should declare a moratorium on reconciliation in order to focus on the issues of inequality and human dignity which hamper simple coexistence. If we focus on redressing the development issues of our society, he posits, maybe reconciliation will take care of itself. Furthermore, 'the danger of reconciliation talk is that it too easily steers us away from tough policies and practices that in the short term may well further divide a diverse and unequal society' (Villa-Vicencio, 2013: 4).

Placing development and economic justice at the centre is long overdue in South Africa. As Villa-Vicencio points out, material

inequality has become the greatest challenge to forging meaningful connections in this country. Inclusive development and economic transformation is not only imperative for material justice, but also for reconciliation across the country's historical cultural and racial divides. However, it is important that we do not swing from one extreme to the other, emphasising the economic and political at the expense of the psychological and philosophical. Instead we need to re-think reconciliation in ways which emphasise the relationship between the psychological and material, interpersonal and structural. To use Hamber's metaphor, we must hold both faces together at the same time: the material inequality face and the interpersonal healing face.

A key conceptual connection between the psychological and the material aspects of reconciliation can be found in Hegel's original political theorisation of the master-slave dialectic (Hegel, 1977). He proposes that it is reciprocal recognition that is the basis of freedom. Without it we exist in relations of bondage. This idea has underpinned work on the psychology of colonial oppression (Fanon, [1952] 1986) and the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994) and is relevant for understanding the relationship between reconciliation and economic justice. Across these works is the underlying idea that if one does not recognise the other's humanity, then both remain oppressed. The current inequality and material injustice in South Africa dehumanises all of us. In terms of the psychological and philosophical component of reconciliation, it must be forged between victims and perpetrators, oppressor and oppressed, black and white, and wealthy and poor. The 2013 Reconciliation Barometer results indicate that South Africans have not yet gained a mutual understanding and awareness of divided lived realities across race and class lines. Socially and psychologically this lack of connection across intersecting race and class barriers is connected to patterns of economic, geographical and social exclusion. Furthermore, results demonstrate that South Africans do not share a desire for economic redress across race. Black, coloured and Indian/Asian South Africans are 20-30% more likely to agree on the need for economic redress and victim support than white South Africans.

If this is the time to confront economic injustice and exclusion with more purpose, then reconciliation speaks to the relationships required to bring South Africans together in this shared project. The SARB results show that the majority of South Africans do want a unified country, and they have experienced meaningful social change since 1994. However, ordinary citizens see what Villa-Vicencio highlights, that material inequality is the biggest challenge to reconciliation in South Africa. This year's SARB focuses on issues of exclusion, and attempts to dig beneath the connection between reconciliation and inequality. It argues that reconciliation does have a key role to play in reducing material inequality, but it needs to be re-articulated in a radical light. The word radical implies depth in the sense of 'root', as in going to the root of the issue. Radical also mean revolutionary, or to create something new that is different from what has preceded it. On both counts this understanding of reconciliation is radical. Following Hegel, the mutual recognition of the lived experience of the other is radical in the sense that it is the pre-condition or 'root' out of which freedom is possible. In terms of revolutionary, this understanding of reconciliation departs from the ambiguous, soft uses of the term that have preceded it. This term grounds reconciliation in a new direction which places the connection between economic justice and reconciliation at the centre of radical reconciliation.



II. METHODOLOGY

The Reconciliation Barometer is a nationally representative public opinion poll that has been conducted by the IJR since 2003.¹ It is the only survey in South Africa at present that provides a longitudinal measure of progress in reconciliation since the transition to democracy in 1994.

In addition to tracking and reporting trends and year-on-year change, it is among the project's founding goals to collect reliable and accurate data that can meaningfully inform public and policy debates, particularly where these risk overreliance on assumptions, rhetoric and stereotypes as is sometimes the case in discourse around reconciliation, social relations and nation-building. Two qualitative studies on reconciliation have also been conducted by the IJR alongside the survey, in 2001 and again ten years later in 2011.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The Reconciliation Barometer survey recognises that, like many other facets of social change, reconciliation is difficult to define and inherently challenging to measure. IJR founding director Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio has described reconciliation as involving multiple processes and parameters, but necessarily it interrupts patterns of events. It entails understanding, social dialogue, grieving and healing, acknowledgement of the truth, the pursuit of justice, reparations, and sometimes forgiveness (Villa-Vicencio, 2004: 6–8). Daniel Philpott (2009) refers to the importance of restoring 'right relationships within a community' through processes that 'address the wide range of harms that crimes cause, and enlist the wide range of persons affected by these crimes (2009: 392). Louis Kriesberg also usefully defines reconciliation as

the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between enemies or formerly antagonistic groups. It often refers to the process of moving toward a relatively cooperative and amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in relations involving extreme injury to one or more sides in the relationship. (Kriesberg, 2007: 2)

IJR Executive Director Fanie du Toit has also proposed that reconciliation should be 'framed as a call of recognition of the basic and radical interdependence of comprehensive (moral, political, social and environmental) wellbeing across conflict lines', and as a process should allow for both participation and creativity but also 'concrete agendas, fostering shared memories and more effective institutions (Du Toit, 2012: 10, 15, 25–57).

A wide range of thought and theory on conflict, social and political transition and reconciliation was taken into account in the development of the Reconciliation Barometer survey. Initial and important

contributions were made by Professor James Gibson, who worked closely with the IJR in the early stages of the survey's development. Gibson proposed that the measurement of reconciliation in South Africa required testing of the following concepts:

- 'Interracial reconciliation defined as the willingness of people of different races to trust each other, to reject stereotypes about those of other races, and generally to get along with each other;
- Political tolerance the commitment of people to put up with each other, even those whose ideas they thoroughly detest;
- Support for the principles (abstract and applied) of human rights – including the strict application of the rule of law and commitment to legal universalism; [and]
- Legitimacy in particular, the predisposition to recognise and accept the authority of the major political institutions of the New South Africa.' (Gibson, 2004: 4)

From these concepts, as well as the results of an initial exploratory study conducted in 2002 that aimed to identify the 'meanings and associations South Africans attribute to the concept of reconciliation' (Lombard, 2003: 3), seven initial indicators and hypotheses were used to develop the measures included in the Reconciliation Barometer research instrument. These were later reduced to six hypotheses, as shown in Table 1.

SAMPLING AND FIELDWORK

The Reconciliation Barometer survey is conducted through face-toface interviews with South Africans in all nine provinces of the country. using a quantitative questionnaire developed by the IJR that includes approximately one hundred survey items. All questions are closeended, and the majority are in the form of five-point Likert scales. Sampling, piloting and interviews were conducted by lpsos, and form part of the bi-annual KhayaBus, which focuses on measuring social and political trends. A national sample is drawn that is representative of the South African adult population aged 15 and above, and in 2013 includes approximately 1 989 metro and 1 601 non-metro inhabitants, with an equal gender split. The sample frame is based on the 2001 census enumerator areas (EAs). Following random selection of EAs, secondary sampling is conducted at the household level, before a final stage of selecting respondents aged 15 and above. Random sampling 'ensures that each person in the South African adult population has an equal probability of being chosen to do the interview'. As a representative sample, the 'results of the survey can be projected onto the South African population as a mirror image of trends in attitudes and perceptions amongst adult South Africans in general'. In 2013, a sampling error of 1.7% on a sample of 3 590 respondents was achieved, with a confidence interval of 95% (Ipsos, 2013). Participation is voluntary, and no incentives were offered to respondents.

Table 1: SA Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2004–2013									
Hypotheses	Indicators								
Human security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	Physical security; economic security; cultural security								
Political culture: If citizens view the institutions, leadership and culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to progress.	Justifiability of extralegal action; legitimacy of leadership; legitimacy of Parliament; respect for the rule of law								
Cross-cutting political relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Commitment to national unity; commitment to multiracial political parties								
Historical confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	Acknowledgement of the injustice of apartheid; forgiveness; reduced levels of vengeance								
Race relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	Interracial contact; interracial preconceptions; interracial tolerance								
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	Commitment to more dialogue								

Table 2: SA Reconciliation Barometer sample, 2013									
	Achieved sample	% split	Weighted sample	% split					
Female	1 802	49.8	18 081	52.1					
Male	1 788	50.2	16 630	47.9					
Black	2 635	73.4	26 435	76.2					
Coloured	299	8.3	3 065	8.8					
Indian	116	3.2	957	2.8					
White	540	15	4 254	12.3					
15–24 years	764	21.3	9 857	28.4					
25–34 years	1 010	28.1	7 849	22.6					
35–49 years	1 016	28.3	8 455	24.4					
50+ years	800	22.3	8 550	24.6					
Sources Incose 20									

Source: Ipsos, 2013

Prior to the commencement of fieldwork in 2013, pilot interviews were conducted to test several new and revised questions. Ipsos subsequently reported that the pilot was successful, and no problems were encountered with these questions.

Fieldwork was carried out between April and May of 2013. Interviews were conducted in six languages, according to the preferences of respondents: English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa and Tswana. Ipsos ensures a minimum back-check of 20% of interviews conducted by each fieldworker, to ensure accuracy and consistency. The metro sample is then weighted according to race, metro, gender and age, while the non-metro sample is weighted by community size, age, gender and province, based on 2011B All Media Products Survey (AMPS) data (Ipsos, 2013).

ADDITIONAL REPORTING CONSIDERATIONS

The results of the Reconciliation Barometer survey are released annually by the IJR to coincide with the commemoration of the Day of Reconciliation on 16 December. This report provides a snapshot overview of national public opinion in relation to the social, economic and political indicators shown in Table 1. All reported data is weighted unless otherwise stated, to allow for conclusions to be drawn about the entire South African population.

Data is generally analysed and presented using several key demographic variables that include age, living standards measure (LSM) and historically defined race categories. A variable has been created that distinguishes between 'youth' respondents, aged 15-34, and 'adult' respondents aged 35 years and older. This age range differs from that captured in policy, which also includes 35-year-olds in the national definition of 'youth'. However, this analytical distinction was used for purposes of consistency and comparability with other national surveys that frequently report on age bands of five to ten years, usually either 30-34 or 25-34. The LSM is a composite that includes a range of survey items that assess dwelling type, telecommunications, domestic workers employed in the household, water and sanitation services on site, ownership of household consumer items (refrigerator, microwave oven, television, etc.), and residence in a rural or metropolitan area. Further, it is not the intent of the IJR to endorse the continued use of apartheid racial categories in South Africa, but survey responses are presented according to race where this is analytically meaningful and deemed relevant to the tracking of public opinion.

Finally, the IJR grants external access to the Reconciliation Barometer survey datasets for purposes of secondary analysis on an application basis. Interested researchers, academics, students, civil society organisations and others are encouraged to contact the Institute with access requests (see www.ijr.org.za).

NOTES

 During 2003 and 2004, the survey was conducted twice per year, and reduced to annually in 2005. For purposes of longitudinal comparison, this report only includes data from rounds 1 and 3 from 2003 and 2004, conducted in March/April during the first term Khayabus, and excludes rounds 2 and 4, which were conducted mid-year in 2003 and 2004.



III. UNITY, DIVISION AND EXCLÚSION IN SOUTH AFRICA


South Africa is a diverse society, but when does diversity become a source of division and exclusion? In the past a divisive and exclusionary system was created on the basis of racial difference. Today we are challenged to understand the nature of exclusion and oppression in post-apartheid South Africa.

This section presents the results of the Reconciliation Barometer survey on questions of unity, division and material exclusion. Furthermore it discusses the living standards measure (LSM) as a measure for material exclusion and examines the relationship between this variable and race, home language and perceived sources of division.

DESIRE FOR UNITY AND SOURCES OF DIVISION

The Reconciliation Barometer survey hypothesises that if citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance. Figure 1 illustrates the degree to which South Africans agree with the statement that *it is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country*.

Figure 1: Desire for a united South Africa, 2013 (%)



From the perspective of ordinary citizens, the majority express a desire for a united South Africa: 36.7% agree and 18.3% strongly agree with the statement that it is desirable to create one united


South African nation. In total, the majority of 55% of South Africans are in agreement, while only 12% are in disagreement with this statement. Furthermore, what South Africans desire for unity is almost matched by what they believe is possible: 53.6% agree that *it is possible to create one united South African nation*, while 13.3% disagree with this sentiment. In sum, not only do the majority of South Africans desire a united South Africa, but the majority also believe that this is possible.

Table 3 summarises the response to the question which asks South Africans to compare the country they experience today with what it was in 1994 on a number of difference issues. In general citizens are more likely to say that things have improved rather than worsened. In terms of race relations, 44% of South Africans assert that these have improved and only 17.4% think they have worsened. In terms of family life, hope for the future, moral values and personal safety, about 40% of South Africans report that these aspects of social life have improved, and the figures for disagreement range from 21.3% to 26%. On the whole South Africans are more likely to say that their personal economic circumstances have improved (39.5%) than worsened (24%). However, they are also more likely to say that employment prospects have worsened (42.1%) rather than improved (31.1%), and that the gap between the rich and the poor has widened (36.7%) rather than narrowed (30.3%). In other words, South Africans generally perceive that the social relations of the country have improved, but that this is not necessarily the case with regard to employment, income inequality and the economy in general.

Table 4 and Figure 2 summarise and present the results to the question of *what, in your experience, is the biggest (exclusionary) division in South Africa?* A similar emphasis on issues of inequality is found in the percentage of South Africans who choose class inequality as the biggest source of divisive social relations. Consistently since 2003,

Table 3: Perceptions of South Africa's progress since democracy (%)										
Economic circumstances		Race relations		Family life		Moral values				
Worsened	24.0%	Worsened	17.4%	Worsened	21.3%	Worsened	21.4%			
Improved	39.5%	Improved	44.0%	Improved	40.7%	Improved	41.4%			
Employment oppo	ortunities	Hope for your future		Gap rich poor		Personal safety				
Worsened	42.1%	Worsened	25.4%	Worsened	36.7%	Worsened	26.0%			
Improved	31.1%	Improved	39.1%	Improved	30.3%	Improved	37.8%			

Table 4: Biggest divisions in the country, 2003–2013 (%)											
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Income	29.8%	23.8%	30.8%	30.0%	31.0%	29.3%	26.8%	25.0%	31.6%	25.4%	27.9%
Disease (HIV/AIDS)	14.3%	15.9%	21.1%	17.7%	21.4%	17.2%	18.6%	15.8%	14.4%	19.3%	20.7%
Political parties	22.0%	27.9%	17.7%	19.1%	11.9%	21.7%	23.2%	25.3%	21.5%	17.4%	16.0%
Race	20.1%	20.4%	17.3%	19.7%	21.4%	18.6%	18.5%	20.6%	19.8%	13.2%	14.6%
Religion	6.9%	6.9%	5.8%	7.4%	6.6%	6.6%	6.7%	7.2%	6.5%	12.5%	8.6%
Language	6.3%	4.8%	6.2%	5.8%	7.4%	6.3%	6.2%	5.9%	5.6%	4.0%	4.8%



South Africans have cited the division between poor, middle and wealthy South Africans as the biggest source of division in the country (except for 2004 when the division between supporters of different political parties was 4.1% more likely to be selected than class division and in 2010 when class division and political parties shared the top spot). In 2013 almost 30% pointed to the gap between the rich and the poor as the biggest source of division. In the two most recent rounds discrimination related to HIV/AIDS and other diseases has come to replace political parties as the second most indentified source of division, with 20.7% of South Africans selecting it as the foremost cause of social division. With a general election due to take place in 2014 it is also noteworthy that 16% of South Africans have cited political parties as being the primary driver of fraught social relations.

Race was the third most chosen source of division in 2003, by 20.1% of South Africans and in 2013 it comes in fourth place chosen by 14.6% of respondents, followed by religion (8.6%) and language (4.8%). In conjunction with the finding that more South Africans believe that race relations have improved rather than worsened, it seems that, in the perceptions of citizens, race relations are steadily improving as class relations get worse. In the sections below, however, we look more closely at the relationship between these two sources of division.

LIVING STANDARDS MEASURE (LSM) AND MATERIAL EXCLUSION

Across different questions, the Reconciliation Barometer shows that class inequality is the most serious divisive issue inhibiting reconciliation. In order to interrogate this finding further, the living standards measure (LSM) developed by the South African Audience Research Foundation (SAARF) provides a useful indication of degrees of wealth and material inclusion/exclusion experienced by South African citizens. It is a composite score which draws on a number of variables to provide a measure of an individual's standard of living. It takes into account, among other things, the degree of urbanisation, dwelling type, levels of consumption, access to services, social activities, ownership of assets and employment of household helpers.

LSM scores are translated into ten LSM categories, with Category 1 representing the lowest living standard and Category 10 the highest. LSM provides us with a proxy measure for degrees of wealth and material inclusion/exclusion, which includes a number of variables. However, income level is not one of these variables, as the managing director of SAARF Dr Paul Haupt explains in a website article, 'Essentially, the LSM is a wealth measure based on standard of living rather than income - in fact, income does not appear anywhere within the LSMs at all' (Haupt, n.d.). Since the focus of this year's report falls on the connection between inequality, exclusion and reconciliation, the LSM, therefore, serves as a useful indicator of material standing and (through comparison) exclusion and allows us to test the relationship between living standard and perceptions of reconciliation. A new LSM variable, which groups LSM categories into low, middle and high living standards, has therefore been created. The decision to group LSM 1-4, LSM 5-6, and LSM 7-10 to represent low, middle and high LSM groupings follows the way in which SAARF groups these categories in their own research. Table 5 describes the dominant characteristics of each grouping and was constructed out of SAARF's summary descriptions for each LSM category.

South Africans with the lowest standard of living can be found under LSM 1–4. According to the SAARF categorisation, respondents in these categories are likely to live in a traditional hut, shack, or matchbox house, with an average household income of between R1 363 and R3 138 per month, and have minimal access to services (at the higher end, those belonging to LSM 4 have electricity, water on a plot or communal and non-flush toilet). LSM 5–6 represent the middle LSM groups, who live in either small rural or urban areas and earn a household income of between R4 165 and R6 322 per month,

Table 5: Summary of LSM descriptions (AMPS 2011)								
	LSM 1–4	LSM 5-6	LSM 7-10					
Household income (per month)	R1 369–R3 141	R4 200–R6 454	R8 768–R33 590					
Education	Low: Primary completed	Low: Some high school	Low: Matric and Higher					
	High: Some high school	High: Matric	High: Matric and Higher					
Housing structure	Traditional hut/shack/matchbox house	Matchbox/matchbox improved/house/ townhouse	House/flat/security complex					
Access to services	Low: Minimal access to services/communal access to water	Low: electricity, water on plot, flush toilet outside, radio TV, fridge, stove	Access to all services					
	High: water (communal or on plot), electricity, non flush toilet, TV set	High: Water in home, flush toilet inside, microwave						
Activites	Low: Singing/attend society or traditional gatherings	Low:singing, bake for pleasure, go to night clubs, attend gatherings, buy lottery tickets	Participate in all activities					
	High: Gatherings/go to nightclubs	High: hire DVDs, night clubs, take aways, gatherings, buy lottery tickets, gym						
Media	Radio, TV (SABC 1)	Radio, TV (SABC/e.tv/Top TV), newspapers	Radio, TV (all networks), internet, cinema, all print					

Source: SAARF website http://saarf.co.za/LSM/lsms.asp


and have access to a flush toilet either inside or outside their house. In comparison to LSM 1–4, LSM 5–6 have more durables such as TV sets, fridges and cell phones, as well as more entertainment and social activities such as buying take-aways, going to night clubs, hiring DVDs and baking for pleasure. LSM 7–10 represent those in the higher living standard bracket, who live in urban areas and earn an average household income of between R9 320 and R32 521. Those belonging to this bracket have access to all services, and at the lower end have increased ownership of durables plus a DVD player and a motor vehicle, and at the higher end have full ownership of durables plus a personal computer.

RELATIONSHIPS OF EXCLUSION

This section looks at the relationship between LSM and race, home language and sources of division selected by South Africans in 2013. The previous section demonstrated that, in general, South Africans report that race relations are improving in South Africa and class relations are deteriorating. However, deeper analysis presented below indicates that we need to think more carefully about the nature of the relationship between LSM and race is presented in Figure 3, and the first thing we notice is that in the lowest four LSM categories there is a much higher percentage of black South Africans (relative to the total black South African population) than any other race group in the most economically excluded LSM categories – 35.4% of black South Africans are in the lowest four LSM are in the highest four categories.

We see the opposite trend for white and Indian/Asian South Africans as they are entirely absent from the lower LSM categories and the majority of individuals within these race groups are found in the higher LSM groups. For white South Africans, 0% are in the lowest four LSM groups (in fact there are no white South Africans in our sample in the first five LSM categories), 5% are in the middle categories, and 95%

Figure 3: LSM by race, 2013 (%)



are in the top four categories (with 73.3% of white South Africans in the highest 2 LSM categories 9 and 10). Within Indian/Asian South Africans, 0% are in the lowest LSM categories, 15.5% are in the middle LSM categories and 84.3% in the highest LSM categories. For coloured South Africans, the majority are found in the middle LSM groups with 3.6% in the lowest four LSM categories, 38.7% are in the middle categories and 57.8% are in the highest four LSM categories.

While a small percentage of South Africans choose language as the most divisive identity in South Africa, the language question and its relationship to identity politics and education policy remains an important issue facing by the nation. Table 6 takes a closer look at the relationship between language and LSM group. Findings show that English and Afrikaans speakers are more likely to fall in higher LSM groups with 72% of Afrikaans first language speakers and 89.4% of English first language speakers falling in LSM group 7–10. On the other side, 51.2% of Xhosa speakers and 41.7% of North Sotho

Table 6: LSM group by home language, 2013 (%)												
LSM group	Afrikaans	English	Ndebele	North Sotho (Sepedi)	South Sotho (Sesotho)	Swazi	Tsonga/ Shan- gaan	Tswana	Venda	Xhosa	Zulu	Other
LSM 1-4	2.1%	0.3%	22.9%	41.7%	18.7%	23.5%	34.0%	26.4%	27.6%	51.2%	36.3%	12.6%
LSM 5-6	25.9%	10.4%	56.0%	48.5%	59.5%	61.5%	56.9%	55.0%	53.7%	38.7%	43.6%	58.4%
LSM 7-10	72.0%	89.4%	21.1%	9.9%	21.8%	15.0%	9.1%	18.6%	18.7%	10.1%	20.1%	29.0%

Table 7: Biggest divisions in the country by LSM, 2013 (%)									
	LSM 1-4	LSM 5-6	LSM 7-10	Total					
Class	27.3%	28.5%	27.5%	27.9%					
HIV/Aids (Disease)	26.5%	19.8%	16.8%	20.7%					
Political parties	17.0%	14.8%	16.6%	16.0%					
Race	11.7%	16.9%	14.2%	14.6%					
Religion	6.9%	8.8%	9.6%	8.6%					
Language	3.3%	5.9%	4.7%	4.8%					

speakers find themselves in the lowest LSM groups. There is a relationship demonstrated between mother tongue and material exclusion, with the high majority of English and Afrikaans speakers falling in the high LSM groups and with more Xhosa and North Sotho speakers falling in the lowest LSM category (in relation to the population of Xhosa and North Sotho speakers) than other language groups. It is interesting to note that Zulu speakers (the most commonly spoken South African language), have the third highest percentage (36.3%) of individuals within the lowest LSM categories, and the fifth highest percentage of those in the highest LSM categories (20.1%).

Finally, Table 7 presents the relationship between South Africans' responses to the question of the biggest source of division in South Africa and their position on the LSM. In general there is not much variance across LSM groups, except on the question of HIV/AIDS, where 16.8% of LSM 7–10 choose this division, which rises by 3% to 19.8% for LSM 5–6 and by another 6.7% to 26.5% for LSM 1–4. Therefore, it appears that the lower the LSM group the more likely it is that respondents will cite HIV/AIDS as a major source of division in society.

CONCLUSION

The majority of South Africans desire unity, and cite class inequality as the most divisive gap in society. Most South Africans assert that race relations have improved since 1994, and do not rate race as a top source of division (race has dropped to fourth position). However, when the relationship between living standard and race category is analysed, the strong connection that continues to exist between class and race is demonstrated. Black South Africans comprise the vast majority of the materially excluded in South Africa, a dire reality which is not experienced by most white South Africans. This is part of the legacy passed down from the apartheid system which fostered a mutually reinforcing relationship between racial discrimination and class inequality. In their 2006 book Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa, Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass explain that although policies of economic empowerment have allowed a few black South Africans to climb the social ladder to build a more multiracial middle class, they have been less successful in uplifting the marginalised masses and undoing the apartheid legacy of disenfranchisement (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). As a result, intraracial class inequality has widened among black South Africans and, as such, did not result in the dismantling of the race/class system that underpinned apartheid. In sum, these results show that even though class is cited as the key divisive identity in South Africa, it remains intimately intertwined with race. Especially in terms of the racial make-up of material exclusion, our apartheid inheritance continues to be alive to this day. It is necessary, therefore, to think more deeply about the nature of the relationship between race and class division in South Africa.





IV. POLITICAL CULTURE

'When it comes to local elections people are refusing to vote because they say it's not worth the effort. Most times they just don't' care because every promise that gets made does not get delivered. They don't benefit. If you vote for the ANC you don't benefit and if you vote for the DA you still don't benefit. That's what threatens democracy at the end of the day because people just don't care anymore. Things are just carrying on. Nobody cares about them, so why must they vote people into positions, which don't do anything for them'. (Focus Group 3, Worcester, 2011)

This quote comes from a youth in the Western Cape town of Worcester and was collected during a national focus group study that the IJR conducted during 2011. It articulates a sentiment expressed by many in the study who felt caught in the middle of a politics of hope and despair, characterised by a repeating cycle of unrealisable political promises and citizen despair. A comparison of election statistics since 1994 has shown that this phenomenon has not been without a cost to the democratic system, as the number of non-voters has continued to grow from one election to the next. In the run-up to the 2014 general election, it seems necessary to caution political parties, particularly those that govern at different spheres of government, to refrain from committing themselves to outputs that are unlikely to be realised. During 2013 new actors have come onto the party political scene, intent on filling the credibility gap of existing political parties. These entities should, of course, pay heed to the same caution.

The Reconciliation Barometer survey hypothesises that in order for reconciliation to take root it is important for citizens to view political leaders, public institutions and government as legitimate, accountable and responsive. This section on political culture reviews the extent to which South Africans demonstrate confidence in public institutions, and the degree to which they experience a sense of political agency to influence government. It further looks at alternate forms of political voice, such as protest and asks respondents whether they are likely to vote in the upcoming elections.

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS


Table 8 summarises confidence in South African institutions in terms of race by presenting the percentage of South Africans within each historically defined race group who report that they have 'quite a lot' or 'a great deal' of confidence for each institution. The top three institutions as far as citizen confidence in 2013 is concerned, are religious institutions (67%), the Public Protector (64.4%) and the Constitutional Court (59.3%). The three institutions with the lowest ratings are political parties (46.2%), the police (47.9%) and local government (48.6%). Particularly significant in the context of the coverage that police brutality (and particularly the Marikana massacre) has received, is the 12.7% drop in confidence from the 60.2% in the 2012 survey. Across the different historically defined racial groups, black South Africans tended to show more confidence in the various institutions than other groups. In terms of confidence in local government, the Constitutional Court and religious institutions, South Africans across race groups hold similar perceptions. However, in terms of confidence in who leads the country, South African perceptions differ on racial lines. Confidence levels in the presidency reveal the most divergent views, with 61.6% of black South Africans demonstrating confidence in the presidency, followed by Indian/Asian (51.1%), coloured (36.6%) and white (28.8%) respondents.

Table 8: Confidence in institutions by race, 2013 (quite a lot + a great deal) (%)								
Confidence in institutions	Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Total			
Presidency	61.6%	28.8%	51.1%	36.6%	55.1%			
National government	60.4%	33.7%	49.5%	34.6%	54.6%			
Parliament	58.9%	37.3%	54.5%	41.1%	54.5%			
Provincial government	54.8%	40.7%	43.1%	44.0%	51.8%			
Local government	49.5%	45.1%	48.8%	45.2%	48.6%			
Legal System	61.3%	44.9%	50.5%	43.2%	57.4%			
Constitutional Court	61.7%	51.8%	52.3%	51.9%	59.3%			
SAPS	51.3%	37.9%	39.5%	35.0%	47.9%			
Political parties	50.8%	30.2%	43.9%	29.7%	46.2%			
Public Protector	67.5%	51.4%	62.0%	56.4%	64.4%			
Religious institutions	68.6%	59.8%	58.8%	65.7%	67.0%			

Figure 4 indicates that confidence in governance institutions has dropped on all fronts since 2012. The presidency is the highest ranking governance institution, with 55.1% of South Africans reporting that they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in it. However, this represents a 8.6% decline from the 2012 figure. Confidence in the presidency is followed by national government (54.6%), parliament (54.5%) and provincial government (51.8%). Local government remains the lowest ranking governance institution at 48.6%, but there has only been a slight drop in confidence in local government since 2012 (by 1.2%). The steepest drop in confidence between 2012 and 2013 is by 10.8% for national government, which was rated with the highest confidence in 2011 and 2012.

In 2013 levels of disillusionment have been higher, as evidenced in a decline in confidence in government, which in the most recent survey was as low (and in some instances lower) as they were in 2008 and

Figure 4: Confidence in governance institutions, 2006–2013 (quite a lot + a great deal) (%)




2009 when South Africa witnessed an economic decline and far reaching power shifts within the ANC. It is interesting to note that in the lead-up to national elections in 2009 and 2014, the ANC ruling party held its national conference to elect its executive committee in Polokwane in December 2007 and in Mangaung in 2012. Post Polokwane witnessed a dip in confidence figures in 2008 and 2009, which then rose again post national elections in 2010, 2011, and 2012, only to drop again post Mangaung in the lead-up to the 2014 elections. We have yet to see whether this pattern continues, but it may demonstrate the effect which divisive political discourse within the ANC has on the confidence of the citizenry in the party. As individuals vie for positions within the organisation in the lead-up to the national conference, this may have had a counterproductive effect on the nation's perception of government institutions and the ruling party. This longitudinal tendency is further evidenced when we look at questions of perceived political efficacy below.


PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL INCLUSION, VOICE AND PARTICIPATION

In general South Africans' trust in governance institutions has dropped in 2013, and this section reflects on citizens' sense of agency to influence institutions. The issue of political voice goes to the heart of perceptions of political inclusion. The concept of political efficacy deals with whether citizens feel that they can trust government, and whether they perceive they can understand and influence government policy.

Table 9 summarises citizens' sense of political efficacy in terms of their LSM and race and Figure 5 demonstrates the change in political efficacy over the past ten years. Looking at the results in Table 9 and Figure 5 we see that 62.3% of South Africans feel that leaders are not concerned with people like them. This figure has jumped by 13% from 49.3% in 2012. A similar amount of agreement is found across race groups with about 62% of black, white and Indian/Asian South Africans agreeing with this sentiment, but this figure is lower for coloured South Africans with 56.6% agreeing with this statement. Just over half (51.6%) of South Africans say that there is no way to make

Table 9: Political efficacy by LSM group and race, 2013 (% agreement)											
Agree or Strongly Agree		Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Total					
Leaders are not concerned with people like me	LSM 1-4	61.9%	N/A	N/A	64.2%	61.9%					
	LSM 5-6	64.1%	60.7%	95.3%	61.2%	64.1%					
	LSM 7-10	61.2%	63.0%	56.2%	53.0%	60.1%					
	Total	62.8%	62.8%	62.3%	56.6%	62.3%					
No way to make disinterested public officials listen	LSM 1-4	52.8%	N/A	N/A	64.8%	52.9%					
	LSM 5-6	53.9%	27.0%	46.0%	45.9%	52.7%					
	LSM 7-10	53.8%	47.9%	50.1%	39.8%	49.1%					
	Total	53.5%	46.9%	49.4%	43.0%	51.6%					
Trust leaders to do what is right	LSM 1-4	51.0%	N/A	N/A	33.9%	50.8%					
	LSM 5-6	53.1%	17.5%	39.6%	39.4%	51.3%					
	LSM 7-10	61.7%	27.7%	39.7%	28.4%	42.1%					
	Total	53.8%	27.2%	39.7%	32.9%	48.3%					





disinterested officials listen. This question speaks to issues of political voice and influence, and it has increased slightly since 2012, from 49.1% to 51.6% in 2013. On questions of trust, and whether South Africans trust leaders to do what is right, this figure has dropped by 2% from 50.3% in 2012 to 48.3% in 2013.

Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate South African responses to questions of perceived political voice and inclusion at the local level. In Figure 6, when South Africans are asked whether *citizens like me have the power to influence decisions made by local government*, 34.8% agree

Figure 6: Perceived power to influence local government, 2013 (%)





Figure 7: Perceived lack of power to influence big company, 2013 (%)



and 15.1% strongly agree with this statement. In other words half of South Africans agree that they have power to influence local government, and only 18% disagree with this statement. In contrast, Figure 7 demonstrates that when citizens are given the statement *if a big company treats people like me unfairly, there is really no way for me to make them listen*, South Africans feel they have less say in the matter. Higher levels of agreement indicate lower levels of power and voice. In this instance 50.2% agreed, with only 16.6% who disagreed. In other words while about a fifth of South Africans feel voiceless in the face of local government, about half of South Africans feel voiceless in the face of big business.

Tables 10 and 11 summarise South Africans perceived power to influence government and business in terms of LSM and by race. Table 10 appears to indicate that the highest LSM group feels least able to influence local government (46.1% agreement) but most able to influence business (20% disagreement). When we look at the same questions in terms of race in Table 11 we see that black South Africans demonstrate the highest percentage of agreement with perceived power to influence local government (52.3%), followed by coloured (47.6%), Indian/Asian (45.1%) and white (38.3%) South Africans. White South Africans are also the least likely to agree with the statement that there is nothing they can do if a big company treats them unfairly, with 32.3% of white South Africans agreeing, followed by 33.5% coloured, 38.1% Indian/Asian and 55.4% black South Africans. These results indicate that in general, white South Africans feel the least disempowered in the face of big business and the most disempowered in the face of local government. Conversely, black South Africans feel the most empowered in the face of local government, and the least empowered in the face of capital.

Table 10: Perceived power to influence by LSM, 2013 (%)										
		LSM 1–4	LSM 5–6	LSM 7–10	Total					
Power to influence local	Agree	49.4%	53.2%	46.1%	49.9%					
government decisions	Disagree	18.8%	17.7%	18.7%	18.3%					
Lack of power to influence	Agree	54.6%	53.2%	42.3%	50.1%					
big companies	Disagree	14.7%	15.3%	19.9%	16.6%					

Table 11: Perceived power to influence by race, 2013 (%)

		Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Total
Power to	Agree	52.3%	38.3%	45.1%	47.6%	49.9%
influence local government decisions	Disagree	17.2%	22.1%	23.5%	20.9%	18.3%
Lack of	Agree	55.4%	32.3%	38.1%	33.5%	50.1%
power to influence big companies	Disagree	14.4%	22.1%	20.2%	27.1%	16.6%

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF VOICE AND POWER

The previous section focused on the perceived ability to influence centres of power in government and the private sector. When citizens feel excluded and without recourse, many are likely to resort to some form of protest. In their book Who Rules South Africa, Martin Plaut and Paul Holden (2012) have shown that so-called service delivery protests have brought more than two million people (roughly 5% of the entire population) onto the streets every year since 2008. Such protests may have a variety of causes, but central to most has been a profound frustration of poor South Africans with the inability of governance institutions to be responsive to their plight. The Reconciliation Barometer survey measures South Africans trust in local government and service delivery through citizens degree of agreement with the question: my local government can be trusted to deliver the services that I expect from them. This variable is analysed in relation to LSM and province for 2013, and presented in Figure 8 and Table 12.

In total, 48% of South Africans agree and 20.6 % disagree with the statement that local government can be trusted to deliver services. Figure 8 provides the mean score for citizen trust in local government (with 1 representing strongest disagreement and 5 representing strongest agreement) in terms of province and LSM group. The average score across all of South African citizens was 3.34 and the three provinces of the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, North West and Limpopo scored above the average trust in local government to deliver services. The Northern Cape and the Eastern Cape scored the lowest in average trust in the capacity for service delivery, at 2.92 and 3.15.

The Western Cape scores an overall above average trust of 3.35 and Gauteng scores slightly lower than average with 3.32. However, when we look at the percentage of people who agree with the statement of trust in local government, we see a different story. While 43.1% of South Africans in the Western Cape agree with the statement, a greater percentage of 50.3% of the population in Gauteng agree. Furthermore, 53.5% of those in the lowest LSM 1-4 agree with this statement, but in the Western Cape only 15.4% in LSM 1-4 agree. Therefore at 15.4% agreement, the most economically excluded South Africans who fall in

LSM 1-4 in the Western Cape are about 30% less likely to trust local government to deliver services than those who fall in the middle LSM 5-6 (45.6% agreement) and higher LSM 7-10 (42.4% agreement) LSM groups. We do not see such a marked difference between class and trust in local government in any of the other provinces.

Professor Peter Alexander reports on a rise in the reported incidence of unrest based on an analysis of crowd management statistics (Alexander, 2012). He demonstrates that between 2009 to 2012 an average of 2.9 unrest incidents were reported per day, which is an increase of 40% over the average of 2.1 unrest incidents a day recorded for 2004–2009. Drawing on these and other statistics, he posits that South Africa is witnessing a 'rebellion of the poor'. Professor Steven Friedman, however, argues that popular discontent may not be at the point of erupting, as has been the case with citizen discontent in North African countries during the Arab Spring (Friedman, 2013). He argues that as long as there are free and fair elections, and the poor have the vote, they will use it rationally to vote out, rather than overthrow, a government that they are unhappy with. To Friedman the state of labour relations is of more concern and an inability to address this may cause a more significant disruption. Recent research has shown that within the poorest communities up to nine people depend on the income of an employed worker. As a result the material anxiety related to job losses is potentially a far more potent force.

The Reconciliation Barometer measures the degree to which South Africans report participation in demonstrations, strikes and violent protests and the results are summarised in Figures 9 and 10.

Figure 9 shows the reported engagement in different levels of protest action between 2011 and 2013. The results demonstrate that the percentage of people who responded that they have 'sometimes', 'often' or 'always' engaged in protest action in 2013 was 22.8% for demonstrations, 21.8% for strikes and 16.6% for forceful measures, like the destruction of property. These results are higher than they were for 2011, but have dropped slightly since 2012. Figure 10 indicates that justification for demonstrations and strikes has been on a steady decrease since 2009 when 53.10% of South Africans agreed




Figure 8: Mean trust in local government by province and LSM, 2013

Table 12: Trust in local government by province and LSM, 2013 (% agreement) Province LSM 1-4 LSM 5-6 LSM 7-10 Total Western Cape 15.4% 43.1% 45.6% 42.4%

Eastern Cape	42.8%	45.8%	39.6%	43.3%
Northern Cape	34.7%	22.4%	17.0%	23.9%
Free State	34.0%	40.9%	32.9%	38.1%
KwaZulu-Natal	47.3%	54.9%	51.6%	51.2%
North West	68.7%	49.6%	59.7%	56.7%
Gauteng	53.5%	53.0%	47.5%	50.3%
Mpumalanga	41.8%	48.4%	49.6%	46.9%
Limpopo	52.3%	56.4%	46.6%	53.4%
Total	47.9%	49.7%	46.1%	48.0%


that demonstrations were justified and 51% agreed that strikes were justifiable. Between 2009 and 2013 we witness a marked decrease of 18.9% to 34.2% of South Africans who agree that demonstrations are justifiable and a decrease of 15.4% to 35.6% of those who believe that strikes are justifiable. However, in terms of violent protests as a last resort, this figure has risen by 6.2% from 13.5% in 2012 to 19.7% in 2013. This increase in the justification of violent protest since 2011 as a last resort should be read against the backdrop of previously reported findings in relation to trust in public institutions (particularly the police) and leaders, as well as the widespread sense of a lack of agency. No doubt, the events related to the Marikana massacre on 16 August 2012, have also fed into such perceptions.

PARTY POLITICS AND VOTING LIKELIHOOD

Chapter three demonstrated that political parties were rated third on the list of sources of division in South Africa with 16.1% of South Africans citing political parties as the primary divider in South Africa. This statistic, combined with the growing 'stay-away vote' from registered voters over the past two decades, suggests a significant degree of scepticism towards parties. New players, such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and AgangSA, will in 2014 try to capitalise on this perception about established parties, but it remains to be seen whether their presence will not be met by the same scepticism by voters. This section looks at citizens likelihood to vote in the next elections, as well as the flexibility South Africans demonstrate in questions of party membership.

Figure 11 illustrates citizens expressed likelihood that they will vote in the 2014 national elections by race and within race by LSM. In total, 61.7% of citizens report that they are 'likely' or 'very likely' to vote in next year's elections, with little variance across race. In general South Africans within LSM 1-4 demonstrate the lowest voting likelihood (56.7%) in comparison to the other LSM groups. This is especially evident for black South Africans with a figure of 56.6% in LSM 1-4 reporting that they are likely to vote compared to 70.9% in LSM 7–10 reporting the same thing. Therefore, it appears that voting likelihood for black South Africans decreases as material exclusion increases. For coloured South Africans we see the reverse as those who occupy LSM 1-4 are more likely (69.4%) to vote than those who occupy LSM 7-10 (51.10%). White South Africans who fall in LSM 5-6 report the lowest voting likelihood (34.6%) and black South Africans in LSM 7-10 report the highest voting likelihood (70.6%). In general Indian/Asian South Africans are the most likely to vote (64.6%) followed by black (62.2%), white (61.3%) and lastly coloured (57.1%) South Africans.

Table 13 summarises the responses to questions of political party membership and flexibility by race and LSM group. When South Africans are presented with the statement: *I would consider joining a political party that represents my views, even if it is different from the party supported by my close friends*, 55.5% agree with the statement and 17.5% disagree. The majority therefore demonstrate that membership of a political party does not necessarily depend on the social group which one belongs to. Economically excluded black South Africans within LSM 1–4, however, are the least likely to agree with this statement at 49.6%, and Indian/Asian South Africans within LSM 5–6 are the most likely to agree at 79.2%.






Figure 10: Justification of protest, 2003–2013 (probably + completely justified) (%)




Figure 11: Likely to vote in next elections by LSM and race, 2013 (%)




Table 13: Party membership and identification by LSM and race, 2013 (agree + strongly agree) (%)											
Agree		Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Total					
Would consider joining a different political party	LSM 1-4	49.6%	N/A	N/A	54.6%	49.7%					
	LSM 5-6	60.4%	64.3%	79.2%	50.4%	59.8%					
	LSM 7-10	62.5%	52.4%	50.9%	43.2%	54.8%					
	Total	56.9%	53.0%	55.3%	46.4%	55.5%					
Better not to vote than to change parties	LSM 1-4	36.9%	N/A	N/A	50.5%	37.1%					
	LSM 5-6	47.7%	33.2%	54.7%	37.3%	46.7%					
	LSM 7-10	49.9%	32.5%	39.0%	22.6%	38.2%					
	Total	44.2%	32.5%	41.4%	29.3%	41.4%					
Could not imagine being a racial minority in a party	LSM 1-4	33.0%	N/A	N/A	34.9%	33.0%					
	LSM 5-6	38.1%	11.4%	47.7%	30.3%	37.2%					
	LSM 7-10	40.3%	19.1%	15.3%	17.8%	26.9%					
	Total	36.6%	18.7%	20.3%	23.2%	32.8%					

In terms of the statement: *It is better not to vote at all then to change your vote from the party you have always supported to a different party*, 41.4% of South Africans agree with this statement and 26.2% disagree with this statement. Therefore 41.4% would rather not vote at all than change to another political party. Coloured South Africans are least likely to agree with this sentiment (29.3%) compared to white (32.5%), Indian/Asian (41.4%), and black (44.2%) South Africans. This figure drops further to 22.6% for coloured South Africans within LSM 7–10. Finally in response to the statement: *You could never imagine being part of a political party made up mainly of (other race group) people*, 32.8% of South Africans agree that they could not imagine being a racial minority in a political party and 30.9% disagree. The percentage of agreement is lowest for white South Africans (18.7%) and highest for black South Africans 36.6%.

CONCLUSION

It appears that the highest percentage of South Africans demonstrate confidence in religious institutions (67%) and the Public Protector (64.4%), and the lowest percentage report confidence in political parties (46.2%) and the police (47.9). Key findings further demonstrate that in this post Mangaung period we witness a drop in confidence and trust in governance institutions to the low levels they were in the post Polokwane period of 2008 and 2009. In particular results show a drop in citizens' confidence in governance institutions, especially national government (10.8% decrease since 2012), as well as a 13% increase in the percentage of citizens who feel that government does not care about people like them. While alternative forms of voice and political inclusion such as strikes, demonstrations and more violent unrest have been on the rise since 2011, in 2013 we witness a slight drop in the percentage of citizens participating in protest. Finally a total of 61.7% of the survey report they are likely to vote in the next elections. However, for black South Africans there appears to be a relationship between material and political exclusion as those in the lowest LSM 1-4 group report only a 55.6% voting likelihood, 15% less than the voting likelihood (70.6%) of black South Africans in the highest LSM 7–10.




V. ECONOMIC AND HUMAN SECURITY

The Reconciliation Barometer survey hypothesises that citizens are more likely to feel reconciled if they feel secure, or alternatively, when they live free from fear. Human security can be measured at a number of different levels including economic, cultural and physical security.

This report places stronger emphasis on the economic dimension, given that most respondents have singled it out as the most significant source of social division elsewhere in the survey. Selected results on questions of cultural and physical security are, however, also presented here.

PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC SECURITY

Employment stands central to addressing the question of poverty alleviation in South Africa. Figure 12 summarises the degree of economic security reported by South Africans on questions of employment and economic situation from 2004–2013. These 2013 results demonstrate that when South Africans were asked about their prospects for finding employment compared to a year ago, 29.3% noted an improvement, compared with 34.9% who noted an improvement in 2012. Therefore the percentage of South Africans who report that their employment opportunities have improved has decreased since last year by 5.6%. Furthermore, almost half of South Africans expect to be unemployed sometime in the next year. Findings such as these are not encouraging. However, South Africans are more hopeful when it comes to questions of their personal financial situation, with 33.8% agreeing that it is better than a year ago, which is slightly higher than the 29.9% of 2012. As far as the country's economic



70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Retter chance of finding a job than one year ago Better financial situation than one year ago Economic situation likely to improve in the next two years Likely to be unemployed in the next year

prospects are concerned, 41.3% (a slight drop of 3.6% from last year) of respondents agreed that the economic situation is likely to improve in the next two years. Longitudinally, perceptions of economic security seem to have gradually improved from the dip in 2008/9, following the global economic recession. Employment and unemployment remain a considerable worry for South Africans, which influences their sense of economic security. In the two most recent surveys the figures for expected unemployment in the next year are the highest they have been since the beginning of the SARB survey (45.9% for 2012 and 45.6% for 2013).

Table 14 breaks down the perceptions of economic security by racial category, and demonstrates that a sense of economic hope for the future is not shared across race lines. While almost half of black (45.2%) and Indian/Asian (44.7%) South Africans believe that the economic situation will improve for people like them in the next two years, only about a quarter of white (28.4%) and coloured (24%) citizens share this hopeful economic sentiment. This pattern of difference in perception in terms of race cuts across responses to questions of economic security. In terms of whether South Africans think they are in a better financial situation than a year ago or have a better chance of finding a job than a year ago, white and coloured South Africans demonstrate lower levels of economic security than African and Indian/Asian respondents.

RELATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF LIVING CONDITIONS

Figure 13 illustrates South Africans responses to the question *how would you describe your own living conditions*? Most of South Africans (52.9%) feel that they are 'struggling but getting' by, 21.3% feel they are 'very poor', 19.3% feel they are 'living comfortably' and 4.6% feel they are 'very well off'. On the whole South Africans do not feel content with their living conditions, with almost three quarters feeling either that they are poor or struggling. When they compare themselves to other people in their community (Table 16), the results are similar, with three quarters responding that the people in their community are poor or struggling. When they compare their living standard with that of the rest of South Africa (Table 16), almost 40% perceive that their own living conditions are more or less the same as that of other South Africans. Respondents were also more likely to see themselves as better off (34.5%), rather than worse off (24.1%) than most other South Africans.

Table 14: Perceived change in economic security by race, 2013 (%)										
Change in economic security		Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Total				
Better financial situation than one year ago	Worse	24.1%	24.0%	20.7%	33.4%	24.8%				
	Same	36.2%	47.8%	46.7%	42.0%	38.4%				
	Better	36.8%	26.0%	31.2%	19.7%	33.8%				
Better chance of finding a job than one year ago	Worse	25.4%	32.7%	23.1%	32.4%	26.8%				
	Same	35.4%	43.2%	51.6%	43.0%	37.5%				
	Better	33.0%	18.8%	20.8%	14.4%	29.3%				
Economic situation likely to improve in next two years	Worse	20.6%	31.7%	19.5%	36.9%	23.4%				
	Same	30.0%	36.2%	33.8%	32.5%	31.1%				
	Better	45.2%	28.4%	44.7%	24.0%	41.3%				

Figure 13: Self perception of living conditions, 2013 (%)




Table 15:	Table 15: Comparing own living standards to the rest ofSouth Africa by LSM and race, 2013 (%)											
LSM		Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Total						
LSM 1-4	Worse	34.6%	N/A	N/A	35.8%	34.7%						
	Same	41.8%	N/A	N/A	31.2%	41.7%						
	Better	21.4%	N/A	N/A	17.4%	21.4%						
LSM 5-6	Worse	21.7%	46.7%	20.3%	40.4%	23.6%						
	Same	38.1%	50.0%	60.8%	30.6%	37.9%						
	Better	38.2%	0.0%	18.9%	28.5%	36.6%						
LSM 7-10	Worse	11.7%	19.2%	13.2%	19.1%	15.8%						
	Same	28.6%	44.2%	42.3%	50.8%	39.0%						
	Better	58.6%	34.0%	43.0%	25.4%	43.0%						

Table 15 summarises the comparisons South Africans make between their own living conditions and those of most other South Africans by LSM and race. The results show that in the most economically excluded LSM 1–4 a higher percentage (34.7%) of South Africans perceive themselves to be worse off than the rest of South Africa than in LSM 5–6 (23.6%) and LSM 7–10 (15.8%). Conversely and to be expected, 21.4 % in LSM 1–4 perceive themselves to be better off than the rest of South Africa compared to 36.6% in LSM 5–6 and 43.0% in LSM 7–10. In all three LSM groupings around 40% see their living

standard as being more or less the same as the rest of South Africa. In LSM 5–6, almost half white and coloured South Africans perceive themselves as worse off than the rest of South Africa, even though they are in the middle of the LSM groupings, and in this same group none of the white respondents indicate that they are better off than the rest of South Africa. This could be because white South Africans are only comparing themselves with other white South Africans, and if this is the case, this figure is correct as there are no white South Africans in the bottom five LSM categories. White South Africans in LSM 5–6 seem to believe that they are either the same as (50%) or worse off (46.7%) than the rest of South Africa. However there are four LSM groups which lie beneath this group which do not seem to factor into their perception.

By contrast 18.9% of Indian/Asians, 28.5% of coloured and 38.2% of black South Africans in LSM 5–6 believe they are better off than the majority of South Africans. Black South Africans in the highest LSM groups 7–10 appear to have the greatest awareness of their relative class position. While 50.8% of coloured South Africans, 42.3% of Indian/Asian and 44.2% of white South Africans in the highest four LSM groups assert that their living standard is the same as the majority of South Africans, only 28.6% of black South Africans think their living standard is the same, and almost 60% think it is better than the rest of South Africa. These results may indicate deeper class connections and across-class awareness within black South Africa than in the rest of South Africa. The transition has brought with it shifts in class position for many black South Africans through policies of economic empowerment, and as a result the poor and the rich in black South Africa remain more closely tied, with family networks that can transcend class positions.

Table 16 demonstrates that across South Africa's provinces, most of the respondents that described themselves as very poor resided in the Northern Cape (34.2%), the Free State (33.4%), Limpopo (31.2%) and the Eastern Cape (30.9%), while those that described themselves as either living comfortably or very well off, in the Western Cape (38.3%), Mpumalanga (37.5%) and Gauteng (33.4%). In comparison to the rest of the country, Gauteng (45%), North West (43.9%), Limpopo (43.7%) and Mpumalanga (42.3%) are the provinces where the most citizens feel they are better off than the rest of the country. By contrast, Eastern Cape (38.5%), Free State (36.9%) and Northern Cape (34%) are the provinces where the most respondents felt that they were worse off than the rest of the country.

Table 16: Pe	Table 16: Perceptions of economic security and living conditions by province, 2013 (%)											
Perceived living conditions		Western Cape	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Free State	KwaZulu- Natal	North West	Gauteng	Mpuma- langa	Limpopo	Total	
Your living	Very poor	9.6%	30.9%	34.2%	33.4%	22.4%	21.6%	14.1%	11.2%	31.2%	21.3%	
conditions	Struggling but getting by	49.5%	58.2%	32.6%	43.0%	55.7%	52.7%	52.0%	51.4%	56.0%	52.9%	
	Living comfortably	34.1%	9.0%	10.4%	11.2%	15.9%	19.2%	26.4%	31.0%	7.4%	19.3%	
	Very well off	4.2%	0.5%	5.5%	2.3%	4.7%	5.9%	7.0%	6.5%	4.2%	4.6%	
Of people	Very poor	13.2%	33.0%	38.3%	36.1%	24.0%	27.0%	17.3%	13.4%	36.4%	24.3%	
in your community	Struggling but getting by	47.4%	53.8%	20.5%	39.1%	53.6%	49.6%	51.3%	52.4%	46.5%	49.8%	
continuanty	Living comfortably	32.1%	10.1%	10.4%	9.2%	14.1%	17.0%	24.0%	26.5%	8.9%	17.9%	
	Very well off	4.1%	0.9%	5.5%	1.4%	7.0%	5.6%	5.8%	7.7%	6.7%	5.1%	
In comparison	Great deal worse	5.6%	12.2%	15.7%	17.2%	11.1%	2.9%	4.7%	1.3%	5.7%	7.8%	
to other South Africans	Worse	13.7%	26.3%	18.3%	19.7%	14.9%	18.1%	13.6%	18.9%	9.3%	16.3%	
7 milliounis	About the same	47.0%	40.6%	31.3%	27.4%	45.9%	33.3%	35.3%	36.5%	39.6%	39.3%	
	Better	26.1%	16.5%	22.5%	20.6%	19.9%	34.6%	36.6%	30.1%	31.4%	27.0%	
	Great deal better	4.9%	1.7%	6.1%	7.2%	7.1%	9.3%	8.4%	12.2%	12.3%	7.5%	

EDUCATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF YOUTH PROSPERITY

South Africa's future prospects and the wellbeing of its citizens are intimately intertwined with the state of the country's education system. In an increasingly skills-based economy it is critical that young South Africans receive quality education. It is therefore important to ascertain whether respondents feel that the country's youth receive such an education, and whether the government is doing enough to create employment for those that exit the schooling system.

The SARB survey asks these questions to South Africans, and the findings summarised in Table 17 demonstrate some interesting differences in perspective across age and racial categories. Almost half of the sampled respondents (47.1%) believe that the education system prepares their children or the children of their friend to find jobs. Indian/Asian respondents (54%) were the most likely to respond in this way, followed by Black African (50.6%), white (32.9%), and coloured (34.5%) respondents. Interestingly, white youth are almost

10% more positive that their education prepares them for jobs (39.1%) than white adults (30.6%). The reverse is true for Indian/Asian South Africans with 57.1% of adults and 47.1% of youth agreeing with the statement. In terms of the question on whether government is doing enough to get young South Africans into jobs, young people are more likely to agree (41%) than adults (34.7%). However, this difference is more pronounced for white and coloured South Africans. While youth across historically defined racial categories agree with this statement at 43.4%, agreement amongst white adults is 20% lower at 23.2% and for coloured adults it is 25% lower at 18.9%.

EMPLOYMENT EQUITY


South Africa's historically defined racial categories continue to be used for official purposes in post-apartheid South Africa. Given that the apartheid system was structurally designed to build a race-based society, progress in measuring its undoing can only be done in terms of measuring integration in racial terms.

Table 17: Perceptions of education and future prosperity by age and race, 2013 (% agreement)										
Agree		Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Total				
Education system prepares your child to find a job	Adult	50.4%	30.6%	57.1%	34.4%	45.4%				
	Youth	50.8%	39.1%	47.1%	34.5%	48.7%				
	Total	50.6%	32.9%	54.0%	34.5%	47.1%				
Government doing well getting children into jobs	Adult	40.3%	23.2%	31.9%	18.9%	34.7%				
	Youth	43.4%	33.7%	39.3%	20.3%	41.0%				
	Total	42.1%	26.0%	34.2%	19.5%	37.9%				
Financial success depends on who you know	Adult	51.9%	42.7%	49.2%	40.1%	48.9%				
	Youth	52.9%	41.3%	62.5%	32.6%	50.8%				
	Total	52.4%	42.3%	53.3%	36.8%	49.8%				

Table 18: Support for employment equity, 2007–2013 (% agreement)										
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013			
Government should use race categories to measure progress	40.1%	43.0%	46.7%	44.4%	45.0%	49.2%	48.5%			
Workforce should be representative of race	70.7%	65.9%	72.0%	75.2%	69.8%	57.7%	59.7%			
Workforce should be representative of gender	82.2%	79.7%	82.4%	75.3%	70.9%	57.7%	60.2%			
Workforce should be representative of disability	77.4%	75.9%	79.3%	72.9%	69.2%	63.1%	59.4%			

A significant proportion of South Africans continue to agree with this sentiment. Table 18 and Figure 14 show that in 2007 40.1% of citizens concurred with the use of racial categories to measure the impact of programmes that address previous disadvantage, and this figure has been steadily increasing to almost 48.5% in 2013. Most South Africans still share the opinion that the workforce should be representative of race and gender. In 2013 there was a slight rise in this figure from 55.7% to 59.7% of South Africans agreeing the workforce should be representative of race, and from 55.7% to 60.2% agreeing it should be representative of gender.


Figure 14: Support for employment equity, 2007-2013 (% agreement)



PHYSICAL AND CULTURAL SECURITY

During the latter half of 2013 a group of mostly white Afrikaners, led by singer, Steve Hofmeyr, paticipated in the Red October protest against what they perceive to be the genocide of the white race. However, crime statistics by the Institute for Race Relations suggest that the reality is far from the perception. Instead the statistics show that of the murders committed between 1994 and 2009, only about 2% had white victims. The corresponding figure for black Africans was 86%. What these statistics highlight is that violent crime is far more related to socio-economic conditions than race relations. The question of physical security therefore makes it even more important to engage the question of social inequality with more urgency.

Figure 15: Change in personal safety over the next two years, 2013 (%)



The results from the SARB survey show that in terms of perceptions of personal safety (Figure 15), there are more South Africans who believe that their personal safety circumstances would improve (41.3%) rather than those who feel that it would deteriorate (23.4%). A further 31.1% felt that their circumstances would stay the same. When we look at the same question in terms of language categories (demonstrated in Table 19), Afrikaans-speaking South Africans were the most likely to say that their personal safety will get worse (36.2%), followed by Xhosa speakers (29.5%), Ndebele speakers (27.8%) and English speakers (27.7%).

Table 19: Per	able 19: Perceptions of cultural and personal security by language group, 2013 (%)													
		Afrikaans	English	Ndebele	North Sotho (Sepedi)	South Sotho (Sesotho)	Swazi	Tsonga/ Shangaan	Tswana	Venda	Xhosa	Zulu	Other	Total
Mother tongue	Disagree	22.8%	11.8%	16.7%	10.5%	8.4%	23.7%	7.8%	10.7%	3.6%	11.9%	11.0%	13.8%	12.5%
recognition	Uncertain	20.2%	28.5%	24.6%	28.4%	24.9%	24.0%	34.3%	24.2%	23.8%	28.2%	22.4%	33.7%	25.2%
	Agree	53.0%	55.5%	58.7%	58.8%	64.1%	52.4%	55.9%	63.4%	72.6%	54.3%	64.4%	52.5%	59.2%
Religious	Disagree	13.7%	14.6%	23.7%	7.8%	14.4%	14.4%	5.8%	12.1%	5.8%	14.2%	14.6%	13.8%	13.1%
groups enjoy equal rights	Uncertain	17.3%	21.3%	14.9%	22.3%	22.0%	12.2%	16.4%	21.4%	17.6%	23.9%	18.1%	3.8%	20.0%
oquarngnio	Agree	61.8%	59.3%	61.4%	63.1%	59.8%	73.4%	76.7%	64.1%	76.0%	53.0%	63.4%	82.4%	61.9%
Other cultural	Disagree	29.2%	20.8%	16.8%	20.3%	13.7%	23.2%	18.5%	13.9%	11.7%	20.3%	21.6%	21.1%	20.5%
groups are harmful to mine	Uncertain	26.8%	38.5%	20.3%	24.3%	26.3%	12.1%	24.1%	26.3%	25.4%	31.5%	24.9%	18.0%	27.4%
	Agree	36.4%	35.1%	62.9%	52.4%	56.2%	64.8%	55.5%	58.0%	62.9%	40.0%	50.3%	54.0%	47.6%
Change in	Worse	36.2%	27.7%	27.8%	16.7%	19.6%	26.5%	20.7%	16.0%	14.5%	29.5%	19.9%	26.7%	23.8%
personal safety in next 2 years	Same	36.0%	38.4%	39.0%	37.2%	34.2%	23.8%	23.5%	28.7%	23.1%	35.8%	37.8%	28.6%	35.0%
Junio Activity of the second s	Better	24.0%	28.5%	31.3%	42.6%	43.5%	46.5%	46.4%	53.9%	56.5%	28.5%	38.7%	44.7%	37.0%

Table 19 further shows that there is a high level of positive evaluations for the recognition of language rights in South Africa. Afrikaans and Swazi speakers demonstrated the highest percentage of disagreement (22.8% and 23.7% respectively) with the statement that their mother tongue enjoys the recognition it deserves. It is also interesting to note that only 55.5% of English language speakers agree with the statement, even though English is the lingua franca of the business and political elite of South Africa. It is encouraging to note the high level of positive evaluations for religious rights in South Africa, with 61.9% of South Africans agreeing that religious groups enjoy equal rights. However, in terms of cultural security almost 50% of South Africans feel that the promotion of other cultures threatens their own culture. This percentage is especially high for Swazi (64.8%), Venda (62.9%) and Ndebele (62.9%) agreement with the statement that the promotion of other culture.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the findings on economic security demonstrate that in 2012 and 2013 figures for expected unemployment are the lowest they have been since the outset of the survey (around 50%). This is cause for concern as employment stands central to addressing economic exclusion. In general 74.2% of South Africans describe their living conditions as 'poor', or 'struggling but getting by'. A key finding of this chapter relates to the way in which South Africans compare their living conditions to the rest of South Africa in terms of race and LSM. It appears that white South Africans may only be comparing themselves to other white South Africans, when 0% in LSM 5-6 report that there are South Africans who are worse off than they are. This does not make sense as there are many (mainly black) South Africans who are in LSM 1-4. A possible interpretation is that since there are no white South Africans in LSM 1-4, those in LSM 5-6 are comparing themselves to other white South Africans and concluding that no one is worse off than they are. If this is the case, then race (at

least for white South Africans) may be a much stronger identity source than popular perception demonstrates. Furthermore, this points to a bubble-like perception and lack of awareness of the economic exclusion faced by many black South Africans. Finally on questions of physical and cultural security, it is positive to note that more South Africans believe that their physical security will improve rather than deteriorate, and in general citizens demonstrate a high sense of religious and language security.



VI. RACE RELATIONS AND HISTORICAL CONFRONTATION

South Africans are in the process of debating the question of whether it is still useful to use race as an indicator of disadvantage, especially in relation to university administration. The University of Cape Town (UCT) council is considering removing race from their admissions policy and replacing it with other measures of disadvantage.

Students have responded in protest, demonstrating their discontent with this proposal, and the provincial Western Cape secretary of the National Education Health and Allied Workers' Union (Nehawu), Luthando Nogcinisa, also argued against it, asserting that South Africa's education system and socio-economic situation continue to reflect 'deep inequality, with race still a major issue' (Phakathi, 2013).

From the perspective of ordinary citizens, in 2013 almost 50% of South Africans agree on the question that *the government should still use racial categories to measure the impact of its programmes for previously disadvantaged communities*. In addition, the Reconciliation Barometer results presented in chapter three indicate that in terms of LSM, race and material disadvantage remain closely tied to one another. This chapter summarises data on identity, race relations and historical confrontation and deepens the insights brought to bear on the 2013 focus on the relationship between reconciliation and economic inclusion.

IDENTITY

The Reconciliation Barometer hypothesises that if citizens are able to form relationships across divisions, reduce their negative stereotypes about one another and are committed to deep dialogue, then reconciliation is possible. These three requirements for reconciliation speak to the psychological and interpersonal dimensions of this concept. An underlying pre-condition for these processes of interpersonal reconciliation was originally theorised by Hegel as *reciprocal recognition* (Hegel, 1977). This concept posits that the basis of freedom is that we recognise our shared humanity. Identity construction can either result in an inclusive or exclusive world perspective. The former recognises and assesses other people from a perspective that assumes a shared humanity, which encourages inclusion and (following Hegel) freedom; the latter stems from a world view, based on exceptionalism and social hierarchies, that excludes others and sustains relationships of bondage and alienation.

The promotion of radical reconciliation requires that our sense of the humanity of others reaches beyond our perceived in-group.




Figure 16: Primary identity association, 2007-2013 (%)

Table 20: Primary	Fable 20: Primary identity association, 2007–2013 (%)											
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013					
Language	20.4%	24.1%	19.3%	20.7%	18.3%	17.0%	23.2%					
Ethnicity	15.1%	18.4%	19.3%	18.5%	18.6%	15.8%	11.1%					
Race	11.8%	12.0%	10.9%	14.5%	19.0%	18.4%	13.4%					
Economic class	6.9%	6.3%	5.2%	5.4%	6.1%	10.6%	8.8%					
Neighbourhood	8.9%	7.1%	8.4%	8.7%	7.2%	8.9%	12.0%					
Religion	6.9%	5.2%	7.1%	6.4%	6.3%	4.8%	6.0%					
South African first	11.2%	11.9%	14.2%	13.7%	12.6%	8.3%	7.1%					


To evaluate the bonds, linkages and group preferences of South Africans, the SARB survey has asked respondents to indicate the kinds of groups with which they associate. This has been done to ascertain whether these group identities are inclusive or exclusive. The responses in the most recent round of the survey (presented in Table 20 and Figure 16) have shown that language (23.2%), race (13.4%) and shared neighbourhoods (12%) were the top three choices for 2013, with ethnicity following a close fourth at 11.1%. Race was the most selected option in 2012 at 18.4% and has dropped by 5% to second place, while language has jumped by 6.2% into first position. Neighbourhood has also jumped by 3.1% to surpass ethnicity for third place.


Interestingly, all of these responses, with the exception of those living in the 'shared neighbourhood' are explicitly exclusive identities. It is a concern that the percentage of South Africans who associate with a more inclusive South African identity has dropped by half from 14.2% in 2009 to 7.1% in 2013. Across the historically defined categories it appears as if most South Africans prefer to associate with categories that are more difficult to transcend. It is, furthermore, interesting to note, that although economic class is highlighted as the biggest division in South Africa, it only features at fifth place on the list of identity associations. This is an important finding as it demonstrates that even though class inequality divides South Africans at the material level, racial and language inequality divides South Africans at the symbolic level of identity construction and exclusion.


INTERRACIAL CONTACT

In social psychology, the contact hypothesis, attributed to Gordon W. Allport (1954) posits that the most effective way to reduce prejudice between groups is through interpersonal contact under the correct conditions. These conditions include equality between groups, sharing common goals, and interpersonal interactions at the level of friendship formation. The Reconciliation Barometer survey tests the degree of interracial contact in two different environments. The first kind of contact is referred to as everyday interracial talk and is tested through the question, on a typical day during the week, whether at work or otherwise, how often do you talk to [different race group to respondent] people? The second kind of contact is referred to as interracial socialisation and is tested through the question, When socialising in your home or the homes of friends, how often do you talk to [different race group to respondent] people? Following the contact hypothesis, it is the second kind of contact which is more likely to reduce prejudice and negative stereotypes, as social environments are more likely to create a sense of equality and personal interaction. Through social interracial relating it is also more likely that individuals will reciprocally recognise their shared humanity and come to learn about and be concerned with the lived experience of different people.

Figure 17 demonstrates the slow increase in the percentage of citizens who report that they always, often or sometimes engage in interracial everyday talk and interracial socialisation over the past ten years. Figure 18 and 19 compare South Africans responses to these two questions. When we look at the percentage of South Africans who engage in everyday and social interracial talk, it is evident that there has been a steady increase between 2003 and 2013. In the most











Figure 19: Frequency of interracial socialising, 2013



recent survey, 56.3% of South Africans reported 'always', 'often' or 'sometimes' talking to someone of another race in an everyday context, however when we focus on those who 'often' or 'always' report interracial everyday talk, this figure drops to 33.1%. In terms of interracial socialisation required to reduce intergroup prejudice and negative stereotyping, 43.4% reported 'always', 'often' or 'sometimes' socialising with people of another race. This figure has increased by 14% since 2003. However, if we break up the figures for 2013, the results show that a greater number of South Africans report 'never' or 'rarely (41.1%) rather than often or always (33.1%) engaging in everyday interracial talk. In terms of talk occurring in a social setting,

the 'never' or 'rarely' figure increases to 53.9% in comparison to the 'often' and 'always' figure of 23.5%.

SOCIAL AND MATERIAL EXCLUSION

Figure 20 illustrates the relationship between interracial contact and material exclusion measured by LSM. In general it demonstrates that as the LSM groups rise, so too do levels of inter-racial contact and socialisation. Between LSM 1–5, the amount of South Africans who report 'often' or 'always' engaging in contact or socialisation with South Africans they perceive to be of another race remains below 20%, but for LSM 9 and 10 figures for contact reach 64.7% and 76.8% respectively. However, figures for socialisation are much lower, even in the higher LSM groups, with South Africans belonging to LSM 9 reporting the highest amounts of interracial socialisation at 41.4%. Therefore, as class position improves, so does the degree of interracial contact and socialisation. However, this improvement is at a much steeper rate for everyday contact than for socialisation.

Figure 21 demonstrates the relationship between class, race and contact for black and white South Africans, and Table 21 looks at this relationship across all four historical race groups. In general white South Africans are the most likely to report high levels of interracial talk, with almost 70% asserting that they often or always talk to people of another race group. Black South Africans by contrast are the least likely to report speaking to someone of another race with 25.7% saying they often or always speak to population–race ratios as there are many more black South Africans than white South Africans. Statistically the likelihood of a white South African encountering a black South African is therefore far higher than the reverse. However, when we break these figures up in relation to LSM, we see there is a strong class component, which can be interpreted in terms of geographies of segregation.

Turning our attention to Figure 21 and thinking back to Figure 3 in section III, LSM groups 1–5 are made up of mostly black South

Africans with almost 60% of black South Africans belonging to these groups. By contrast, there are no white South Africans in our sample that belong to these bottom five groups, 0.6% of Indian/Asian and 14.1% of coloured South Africans belong to LSM 1–5. Therefore, the lowest five LSM groups consist mainly of black South Africans, and it is within these five groups that interracial contact is low. By contrast, black South Africans in the higher LSM groups report almost as high amounts of interracial contact (60.6% in LSM 9 and 70.1% in LSM 10) as white South Africans (71.6% in LSM 9 and 77% in LSM 10). In terms of interracial socialisation, these figures are higher for black South Africans in LSM 9 (48%) and LSM 10 (45.3%) than for white South Africans in LSM 9 (39.8%) and LSM 10 (34.8%).

These figures on the relationship between race and class in South Africa paint a picture of class segregation with racial inflections. The majority of poor South Africans continue to be black and segregated from the multiracial, urban middle-class. This pattern is witnessed on the geographical landscape of South Africa, where our cities may demonstrate increasing interracial integration, but townships and rural settlements continue to be poor, black and segregated as was intended by apartheid planners. This finding is important for racial contact and reconciliation in South Africa and points to the need to address the relationship between material and social exclusion that results in the segregation of many poor black South Africans from interracial middle-class city spaces.

IMPROVING CROSS-CULTURAL RELATIONSHIPS

Table 22 summarises the degree to which South Africans desire to improve cross-cultural relationships and how responses vary along racial lines. The percentage responses to three questions are presented in this table. The first asks South Africans how much they agree with the question, you find it difficult to understand the customs and ways of [other race group] people, to which a higher percentage report agreement (42.1%) than disagreement (31.4%). However, when respondents are asked the question, you want to learn more about the customs and ways of [other race group] people, a higher




Figure 20: Interracial talk and socialisation by LSM, 2013 (often + always) (%)

Figure 21: Interracial talk and socialisation by LSM for black and white South Africans, 2013 (often + always) (%)






Table 21: Frequency of inter-racial contact and socialisation by race and LSM category											
	LSM 1	LSM 2	LSM 3	LSM 4	LSM 5	LSM 6	LSM 7	LSM 8	LSM 9	LSM 10	Total
Black talk	14.5%	8.0%	12.6%	12.7%	19.0%	34.6%	44.4%	54.5%	60.6%	70.1%	25.7%
Black socialisation	14.5%	8.3%	8.7%	12.0%	15.4%	26.4%	28.4%	35.2%	48.0%	45.3%	19.6%
White talk	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	70.8%	35.6%	57.9%	71.6%	77.0%	68.9%
White socialisation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	49.3%	18.8%	40.5%	39.8%	34.8%	36.8%
Indian/Asian talk	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.0%	48.3%	53.7%	50.4%	69.0%	71.8%	59.5%
Indian/Asian socialisation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.0%	48.3%	42.3%	38.5%	35.2%	46.6%	41.8%
Coloured talk	0.0%	47.1%	0.0%	19.4%	34.0%	23.6%	49.7%	34.7%	46.7%	92.0%	38.8%
Coloured socialisation	0.0%	47.1%	0.0%	19.7%	33.0%	19.7%	43.1%	29.4%	38.1%	74.5%	33.2%

Table 22: Desire to improve cross cultural relationships by race, 2013 (%)								
Agree		Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Total		
Difficult to understand customs of others	Disagree	26.8%	47.9%	31.3%	48.0%	31.4%		
	Uncertain	21.1%	16.4%	19.5%	21.4%	20.5%		
	Agree	46.4%	29.4%	41.9%	22.6%	42.1%		
Want to learn more about customs of others	Disagree	27.1%	44.7%	24.6%	24.4%	29.0%		
	Uncertain	26.3%	21.9%	22.7%	25.2%	25.6%		
	Agree	40.4%	27.3%	44.5%	40.4%	38.9%		
Want to talk to people of different races	Less	24.6%	11.7%	8.0%	7.1%	21.0%		
	Same	46.0%	69.4%	53.5%	62.1%	50.5%		
	More	20.1%	11.7%	34.3%	19.5%	19.4%		

percentage report agreement (38.9%) than disagreement (29%). Therefore although South Africans in general find it difficult to understand the customs of other race groups, they demonstrate a desire to do so. In terms of the question, *if you had a choice, would you want to talk to [other race group] people?*, half of South Africans report that they would want to keep this amount the same as it already is, and about 20% would like it to increase and about 20% would like it to decrease.

The desire to improve cross-cultural relationships is not the same across race groups. For instance, black South Africans are the most likely to agree that it is difficult to understand the customs of others (46.4%) but they also demonstrate relatively high levels of desire to learn about other customs (40.4%), 1% higher than the average score across race groups. Coloured South Africans are the least likely to report that they find it difficult to understand the customs of others. In comparison to other race groups, Indian/Asian South Africans are the most likely to assert that they would like more opportunities to interact with people of other race groups (34.3%). Conversely white South Africans are least likely to report wanting to learn about the customs of others (27.3%) or wanting more opportunities to interact with people of other race groups (11.7%).

REMEMBERING THE PAST

Most South Africans share a history of apartheid, racial oppression and state violence. Together the country has moved through a transition to democracy, but how we remember our past is important for our present and our future. This section deals with the question of memory, and whether South Africans share a similar view on the meaning of the past. It demonstrates the connection between reconciliation and economic justice through the concept of redress.

Redress speaks to the need to address and right the wrongs of the past that continue to impact on the present. Economic exclusion and redress are linked to one another. When we engage with the historical connection between the oppression of black South Africans during apartheid and the poverty faced by black citizens today, redress aims to dismantle this historical legacy in order to move forward from the past. However, if we do not engage with this connection between memory and economic exclusion then strategies for moving forward do not include programmes of redress but rather an attempt to forgive and forget. Economic inequality and exclusion is recognised by South Africans as the key issue faced by the nation. However, the findings of this section demonstrate that not all South Africans recognise the link between economic exclusion and memory, and between reconciliation and redress.

Table 23: Perceptions on historical truths by age and race, 2013 (%)								
Agree			Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Total	
Apartheid was a crime against	Youth	Agree	80.4%	52.8%	82.7%	73.6%	78.1%	
humanity		Disagree	17.3%	35.7%	11.2%	10.2%	17.9%	
	Adult	Agree	81.5%	52.8%	74.6%	68.0%	74.6%	
		Disagree	17.5%	38.5%	24.2%	17.9%	21.6%	
	Total	Agree	80.9%	52.8%	77.1%	70.4%	76.4%	
		Disagree	17.4%	37.7%	20.2%	14.5%	19.7%	
Apartheid government wrongly	Youth	Agree	75.4%	51.0%	68.5%	72.0%	73.4%	
oppressed the majority of South Africans		Disagree	22.2%	35.0%	22.4%	13.9%	22.4%	
Amodalio	Adult	Agree	77.8%	49.8%	68.9%	61.7%	70.7%	
		Disagree	21.2%	38.8%	29.0%	24.9%	25.1%	
	Total	Agree	76.4%	50.2%	68.8%	66.2%	72.1%	
		Disagree	21.7%	37.8%	27.0%	20.1%	23.7%	
Many black South Africans are poor	Youth	Agree	75.5%	37.5%	65.4%	60.0%	71.7%	
today as a result of apartheid's legacy		Disagree	22.0%	48.3%	26.8%	26.7%	24.1%	
	Adult	Agree	78.1%	31.9%	68.3%	57.6%	67.2%	
		Disagree	20.3%	56.6%	29.6%	27.5%	28.0%	
	Total	Agree	76.6%	33.4%	67.4%	58.6%	69.5%	
		Disagee	21.3%	54.3%	28.7%	27.1%	26.0%	

Table 23 summarises youth and adult agreement (across historically defined race groups) with three historical truths about the nature and legacy of apartheid. It is positive to note that across these three questions South Africans report high agreement with historical truths, but it is concerning to note that white South Africans are much less likely to agree with the rest of South Africa. Youth are slightly more likely than adults to agree with historical truths by 3–4%. In terms of the statement that *apartheid was a crime against humanity*, 76.4% of South Africans agree, but only 52.8% of white South Africans agree compared to 70.4% coloured, 77.1% Indian/Asian and 80.9% black South Africans who agree with this statement. In terms of the statement that *the apartheid government wrongly oppressed the majority of South Africans*, about half of white South Africans agree with this statement and almost 40% disagree compared to 72.1% of South Africans who agree and 23.7% who disagree with it.

When South Africans are asked whether they agree that *many black South Africans are still poor today because of the lasting effects of apartheid*, almost 70% agree that the poverty of the present is linked to the injustice of the past. However, less than half as many white South Africans agree (33.4%) with this statement. White youth are 5.6% more likely than white adults to agree with this statement which provides some hope that the younger generation of white South Africans may recognise the effects of the past on the poverty of the present. This is important as if South Africans do not agree on the connection between economic exclusion and our historical legacy, they are not likely to agree with the need to address that legacy. The link between memory, reconciliation and redress is further demonstrated in the section below.


PERCEPTIONS OF RECONCILIATION

The Reconciliation Barometer results presented in Table 24 and Figure 22 demonstrate that while all South Africans agree on the importance of moving forward as a nation united, they do not agree on the importance of redressing the racist injustice of the past. A key finding from this year's barometer is that when it comes to remembering and dealing with the systemic legacies of our racist past, South Africans of different racial experiences hold very different views. On the positive side, the majority of South Africans express a desire for forgiveness, unity and moving forward from apartheid. The majority of South Africans (61.9%) share a desire to forgive those who hurt others during apartheid (with 10.2% of South Africans disagreeing with this sentiment) and 64% want to move forward from the past in unity (with only 9.1% disagreeing). White South Africans are only 4.2% more likely than black South Africans to express a desire for forgiveness, and 6.7% more likely to express a desire to move forward in unity.

Across race groups, South Africans hold similar perceptions on the desire for forgiveness and moving forward. However, when it comes down to how this process of moving forward should take place, South Africans do not agree with one another across racial lines. For example, in terms of the statement that *government should provide support to victims of gross human rights violations during apartheid*, white South Africans are much less likely to agree with this sentiment (33.3%), than black (61.8%), Indian/Asian (63.7%), or coloured (52.9%) South Africans. Similarly, in responding to the statement that *reconciliation is impossible if those who were disadvantaged under apartheid continue to be poor*, only 28.5% of white South Africans, compared to 57.7% of black South Africans, agree with this statement.

Table 24: Perceptions of reconciliation by race, 2013 (%)								
		Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Total		
Progress in reconciliation since 1994	Agree	65.3%	44.9%	65.4%	50.0%	61.4%		
	Disagree	13.6%	26.1%	13.3%	13.3%	15.1%		
Experienced reconciliation in own life	Agree	52.0%	28.3%	55.5%	32.4%	47.4%		
	Disagree	18.2%	28.2%	13.7%	21.1%	19.5%		
Forget apartheid and move on	Agree	62.5%	69.2%	72.6%	66.8%	64.0%		
	Disagree	10.1%	7.8%	6.6%	3.2%	9.1%		
Forgive those who hurt others	Agree	60.8%	64.2%	64.0%	67.7%	61.9%		
	Disagree	11.6%	7.0%	8.8%	2.8%	10.2%		
Government should support victims of apartheid	Agree	61.8%	33.3%	63.7%	52.9%	57.6%		
	Disagree	11.1%	31.5%	6.5%	10.4%	13.4%		
Reconciliation impossible without economic redress	Agree	57.7%	28.5%	54.9%	36.4%	52.2%		
	Disagree	14.4%	32.7%	6.7%	15.6%	16.5%		

Figure 22: Reconciliation and redress by race, 2013 (% agreement)



The majority of white South Africans do not share the opinion that in order to move forward with reconciliation, we must also support victims of apartheid and address the economic imbalance created by the past.

CONCLUSION

This section presented South Africans' experience of race relations and their perceptions on the meaning of our past in relation to the present (historical confrontation). Results indicate that material inequality and our historical legacies of geographical exclusion are an inhibitor to interracial contact. Furthermore, on questions of memory and historical legacy South Africans agree on moving forward from apartheid, but disagree along racial lines on questions of redressing the economic and psychological legacies of the past. Race therefore continues to be an exclusionary identity in South Africa, but this exclusion is heightened in relation to class inequality, and also expressed in terms of different perceptions of redress and economic justice.

Following the contact hypothesis, the lack of interracial contact between poor black South Africans and other race groups may provide an explanation for why white South Africans show less agreement with the need to support victims of apartheid and redress the economic imbalance which plagues poor black South Africans. Intergroup contact creates the conditions for relationships of friendship, reduced negative perceptions, and reciprocal recognition. However, the lack of contact on intersecting race and class lines means that the least contact and therefore reciprocal recognition occurs between poor black and middle- and upper-class white South Africans. Perhaps this lack of contact across race/class lines is related to the finding that white South Africans are generally less likely to agree with other race groups on questions of victim support and economic redress.





VII. CONCLUSION

The aim of this year's Reconciliation Barometer report is to address the issue of exclusion and its relationship to reconciliation. In doing so the concept of radical reconciliation was proposed in order to move South Africa forward in ways which foreground economic injustice but not at the expense of continuing to work to bridge relationships of division and exclusion at the psychological level.

The crux of the concept of radical reconciliation is the relationship between economic justice and reconciliation which it implies. Towards developing this concept this conclusion pulls out a number of key findings from the 2013 SARB survey results which offer insight on a future path towards radical reconciliation.

The first insight comes from chapter three. Economic exclusion in the form of class inequality, unemployment and poverty is highlighted across a number of questions as the greatest impediment to reconciliation in present day South Africa. Therefore, economic justice needs to be placed front and centre of radical reconciliation. However, this does not mean that issues of race take a backseat. On the contrary, results demonstrate that material exclusion is a racial issue, as the majority of those in LSM 1–4 are black, with no white South Africans occupying this impoverished LSM bracket. Radical reconciliation requires us to think more carefully about the relationship between different vectors of exclusion, such as class and race. Economic justice must be understood in relation to other forms of societal marginalisation (including but not limited to race, gender, nationality and age).

The second insight comes from chapter four on political culture. A key finding of this chapter was the significant drop in citizen confidence and trust in leadership. The Reconciliation Barometer survey hypothesises that if citizens do not view leadership as accountable and legitimate, reconciliation will not proceed. It appears as if citizen's trust and confidence in leadership tends to take a dip in the wake of divisive politicking that unfolds in the run up to national elections, especially in the process of vying for seats within the ANC. Therefore radical reconciliation should include the critique of divisive political party discourse and call politicians to account when they put power plays above the need to build an inclusive, trusting citizenry.

A third insight re-emphasises the link between economic justice and racial reconciliation in South Africa. A key finding of chapter five revealed that white South Africans appear to compare their living circumstances only to other white South Africans. The figure of 0% of white South Africans in LSM 5–7 who report that there are South Africans who are worse off than they are does not make sense as there are many (mainly black) South Africans who are in LSM 1–4. A possible interpretation is that since there are no white South Africans in LSM 1–4, those in LSM 5–6 are comparing themselves only to other white South Africans and concluding that no one is worse off than they are. This finding is important for the concept of radical reconciliation and

requires shared concern for the plight of the economically excluded across race and class groups. Part of the task of radical reconciliation must be to address what appear to be racialised bubbles of perception which prevent awareness from engaging beyond race/class boundaries.

A final insight speaks to the relationship between race relations, reconciliation and economic redress. Chapter six demonstrates that racial reconciliation is hampered by the geographical exclusion of poor black South Africans. This in turn may also impede attempts at economic redress as many white South Africans do not identify with the plight of poor black South Africans (as demonstrated in chapter five). This insight builds on the previous one, as well as the key findings that white South Africans are 20-30% less likely to agree on questions of economic redress and victim support than South Africans of other race groups. These findings are important for our understanding of radical reconciliation as they demonstrate a need to build intersubjective awareness and social relating across race and class boundaries. The desire for unity expressed by all South Africans may be sincere, but it also needs to be grounded in a shared aspiration to redress the effects of the past on the present. By not supporting efforts to redress the wrongs of the past, the majority of white South Africans allow a system of racial privilege and inequality to continue. We can constructively build on the shared desire to unite and move forward from apartheid. To do so, however, South Africans of all races need to come together on the same page about the pressing need to rectify the economic, cultural and psychological imbalance which pervades our society.

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FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS

Focus Group 3. 2011. White English speaking South Africans between 16–24 years old, Southern Suburbs, Cape Town.

Appendix A

Location and composition of SA Reconciliation Barometer focus groups

Table /	A1: SA Reconciliation	Barometer focus groups			
#	Province	Area	Age	Race	Language
1	Western Cape	Cape Town – Southern Suburbs	16–24	White	English
2	Western Cape	Cape Town – Southern Suburbs	25–49	Coloured	English
3	Western Cape	Worcester	16–24	Coloured	Afrikaans
4	Western Cape	Worcester	25–49	Coloured	Afrikaans
5	Gauteng	Johannesburg	25–49	White	English
6	Gauteng	Johannesburg	50 and above	Black	Sotho/Zulu
7	Gauteng	Pretoria	16–24	White	Afrikaans
8	Gauteng	Pretoria	25–49	African	Sotho/Zulu
9	Free State	Heilbron	25–49	White	Afrikaans
10	Free State	Warden	16–24	Black	Sotho
11	Free State	Warden	25–49	Black	Sotho
12	KwaZulu-Natal	Ladysmith	16–24	Black	Zulu
13	KwaZulu-Natal	Ladysmith	25–49	Black	Zulu
14	KwaZulu-Natal	Phoenix DBN	25–49	Indian	English
15	KwaZulu-Natal	Chatsworth DBN	16–24	Indian	English
16	Eastern Cape	Mount Frere	50 and above	Black	Xhosa
17	Eastern Cape	Mount Frere	25–49	Black	Xhosa
18	Eastern Cape	Umtata	16–24	Black	Xhosa