Understanding contemporary trends in conflict and armed violence is a complex undertaking. On the one hand, the Human Security Report 2013 concluded that from the early 1990s, ‘the number of conflicts within states declined substantially after increasing for some four decades’.\(^1\) According to this view, ‘the end of the Cold War not only removed a significant source of conflict from the international system, it also led to the emergence of a new form of global security governance’.\(^2\)

The general thesis is that interstate war has declined in line with the entrenchment of global norms against war between states, except in self-defence or with the authority of the UN Security Council. Similarly, intrastate war is also declining. The latter makes sense, as we know that the risk of civil war declines as national incomes rise and as government and other institutional capacity increases over time.\(^3\)

On the other hand, low-intensity armed conflicts and political violence that emerge from transitions to democracy, inequality and deprivation appear to have increased in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia in recent years. Some regions (Central America in particular) have also seen sharp increases in fatalities from organised crime. The rise of social media and the 24-hour news cycle

**Summary**

This paper gives a snapshot of Africa’s conflict burden within a global context based on various prominent data providers. The analysis finds that armed conflict in Africa follows the general global pattern of declining levels if measured in relation to population size and population growth. The impact of the Cold War temporarily disrupted this pattern, leading to higher levels of armed violence than could be expected during the 1970s and 1980s. Recent trends point to an increase in armed violence from around 2010, potentially reversing the gains made immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Different to other regions, Africa shows a high level of so-called ‘non-state conflict’: conflict between various armed groups and factions that are fighting one another, and not the government. This is almost certainly due to weak and unconsolidated governance in many African countries. The Middle East, not Africa, is the region with the fastest growth in terrorism.
reinforce the impression of a world in turmoil, since the ever-present camera ensures
the global circulation of graphic images of war and conflict. Social media accentuate
this view by conveying intense personal views, emotions and observations that are
recycled globally.

So, where does this leave Africa?

This paper gives a summary picture of Africa’s conflict burden within a global context.
The analysis draws on various prominent data providers – the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP), the reports from the Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV), the
Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), the Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Although UCPD and
PITF include some datasets that track conflict from the end of the Second World War,
the data presented here is either from 1960 to 2013, or from 1989 to 2013, largely
coinciding with the post-colonial and post-bipolar world order.4

How to measure fatalities?

The standard approach when measuring the burden of armed conflict is to look at the
number of fatalities per country per calendar year. This is the approach adopted by
the UCDP,5 which has recorded violent armed conflict for several decades.6 Without
wanting to diminish the tragedy of each life lost, this approach does not, however,
account for the fact that countries have very different population sizes, and this focus
on absolute numbers assumes that the social, economic and political impact of these
losses is the same for each country.

The rise of social media and the 24-hour news cycle
reinforce the impression of a world in turmoil

Compare, for example, the impact of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (a country with a
population of six million) with the much higher numbers of deaths in the neighbouring
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) shortly afterwards. At the time of the
genocide in Rwanda, the DRC had a population eight times larger than Rwanda’s.
Therefore, although the DRC experienced at least twice the number of deaths, the
fatalities in the DRC are not proportionate to the levels experienced in Rwanda.

Many other factors influenced the measurement of fatality during the genocide in
Rwanda, including population density, regional complicity, UN failure, poor
leadership and global politics. However, the comparison given above should make
it evident that a key consideration in reviewing the social, economic and political
impact of war in a world of states must be to measure fatalities relative to the size of a
country’s population.7

One also needs to take into account the nature and cause of violent deaths – whether
they are the result of political armed conflict or crime. There is an increasingly blurred
distinction between these categories. The 2011 edition of the GBAV found that warfare
is responsible for fewer than 1 in 10 violent deaths in the modern world – the majority
being homicides. This means that 9 out of 10 violent deaths do not occur in organised
political conflict settings, but are largely the result of individual crimes. Nevertheless,
Increases in the state’s capacity to police and maintain law and order translate into increased levels of security

there are important exceptions, such as the scale and political impact of the drug wars in Mexico. According to the associated press release:

The average annual violent death rate [in Mexico] between 2004 and 2009 was 7.9 per 100,000 population. At least 58 countries exhibit violent death rates above 10.0 per 100,000, accounting for almost two-thirds of all violent deaths – or 285,000 individuals killed annually.

Although wars dominate media headlines, the levels of armed violence in some non-conflict countries resemble those of conflict zones. In an average year between 2004 and 2009, more people per capita were killed in El Salvador than in Iraq.

Lethal violence is unevenly distributed not only across countries, but also within them. In Mexico, the national violent death rate in 2009 stood at 18.4 per 100,000. In contrast, Ciudad Juárez in the northern part of the country experienced a rate of 170.4 per 100,000 in the same year – more than 20 times the global rate.8

In a world where war between countries is seldom officially declared and where the nature of organised violence has changed, the need to distinguish between the categories of traditional war,9 or armed conflict, violent organised crime, banditry and individual crime presents analysts with serious data problems. For example, at what point does the number of fatalities from organised crime become high enough to make it warrant the description of armed conflict or war? Is there some type of fatality line that needs to be crossed for armed conflict to be classified as a war, and is the dividing line between armed conflict or war and organised crime a function of control of territory or populace, whereby criminals have sufficient control over sections of the population to effectively present a subnational political challenge to the central government? And, similarly, what is the level of organisation or number of fatalities required for homicide to be re-categorised as organised crime?

These distinctions frame the approaches of political scientists, sociologists and criminologists, who all study violence, but with a different purpose and from different perspectives. There is no common definitional standard among the various data providers that are used in this paper; the categories used here are those of organisations such as the UCDP and PITF. 

GBAV links lethal violence to underdevelopment and finds that countries with high levels of violence struggle to meet the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. And, by contrast, ‘countries with low levels of income inequality and unemployment experience lower levels of homicide’.10 At a national level of analysis, medium- and high-income countries have substantially lower homicide rates than low- and low-to-medium-income countries. Increases in the state’s capacity to police and maintain law and order therefore translate into increased levels of security. As income levels rise and states develop greater capacity to enforce law, order and justice, including the ability to establish a working criminal-justice system that offers a structured setting for conflict mediation, average national homicide rates tend to fall. These trends do not apply at sub-state or city level: homicide rates often vary widely from one place to another within a country as evidenced in the example of Mexico and Ciudad Juárez.11

Conflict datasets and trends

Fatalities incurred during political armed conflict do not occur in isolation. Instead, they are part of a process or cycle whereby non-violent disputes become violent, sometimes intensifying into armed conflict, and then de-escalate over time.

This is the approach adopted by the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer.12 Produced by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, this annual analysis seeks to measure this process – the conflict cycle – rather than focus on the number of fatalities alone. The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer distinguishes between low-, medium- and high-intensity political conflict. Only the two final categories include fatalities. The Heidelberg Institute’s methodology also captures the intensity of violent conflict by measuring the means (e.g. weapons and personnel) and the consequences (e.g. fatalities, refugees, internally displaced persons and destruction).13 In their view, ‘such a process-orientated approach gives the analysis of political conflicts, especially regarding intensities, a broader and more detailed empirical foundation’.14 With this approach, the ‘number of conflict-related deaths constitutes just one indicator among several others’.15

Fatalities incurred during political armed conflict do not occur in isolation. Instead, they are part of a process or cycle.
At a macro level the dataset on so-called ‘major episodes of political violence’ compiled and maintained by the PITF in the United States (US) adopts a similar approach by broadening its focus beyond fatalities to include the social impact of armed political violence.\textsuperscript{16}

The PITF codes the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organised groups that results in at least 500 annual directly related deaths – which is how the PITF categorises war. The PITF coding also goes beyond fatality levels, however. It also measures the societal effects of warfare, such as population dislocation, damage to infrastructure and the like. Each event year that is coded by the PITF is then given a magnitude score from 1 (sporadic or expressive political violence) to 10 (extermination or annihilation).\textsuperscript{17}

The results of the PITF methodology are shown in Figure 1, which depicts the magnitude of armed violence globally from 1960 to 2013.

Figure 1: World magnitude of armed violence by type

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{World magnitude of armed violence by type}
\end{figure}


A number of academics have argued that it is not possible to understand contemporary conflict dynamics by relying on traditional approaches – especially those that focus on measuring fatality levels. This approach is largely to explain political violence first and, then explaining why violence takes different forms.\textsuperscript{18} The result is the development of disaggregated datasets. These include ACLED, which is hosted by the University of Sussex, and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) hosted at the University of Texas at Austin.\textsuperscript{19} Both these systems rely on the data available from the information explosion to capture a much broader spectrum of armed conflict, organised crime, and various types of social conflict and turbulence.

Whereas the PITF treats a war with annual direct fatalities of at least 500 as a single occurrence or event and accords it a scaling based on the societal impact of that war, ACLED goes to the other extreme and presents a complete disaggregated dataset. Hence, each event coded in the dataset is atomic, ‘in that actors participate in a single type of event on a specific day in an exact location’.\textsuperscript{20} Such an approach, ACLED argues, allows for much more detailed analysis and explanation of the local context of violence. It casts a wide net that captures all incidents – not only those that form...
As tension between the East and the West mounted from 1960, the burden of global armed conflict increased and then plateaued.

part of the central storyline, such as a rebel advance, but also smaller numbers of fatalities (or none) – incidents that might otherwise be ignored. Whereas the PITF would extensively analyse and then code a particular war as a single event for each year that it occurred, the ACLED data for the same war would consist of numerous individual day-by-day events, from single fatalities to large numbers of fatalities each at discrete geo-referenced locations.

The approach adopted by ACLED is not yet global, and its data analysis is largely enabled by the explosion in computing power, communication and data available in recent years. It has also adopted an expansive definition of the events that it codes when seeking to capture instances of political violence (and not only fatalities that result from political violence). Proponents of the ACLED type of geo-referenced datasets argue that ‘the use of disaggregated data will lead to new empirical findings, help our understanding of internal conflict dynamics, and may force us to revise some of the assumptions underlying conflict research’.

With the level of detail this system provides, the challenge is discerning whether an individual death or event is the result of homicide, organised crime or politics. These two approaches, using the PITF and ACLED as examples, are extremes in macro- and micro-analysis. Over time, increased computing power may allow an analyst using micro-data to either zoom in to get a detailed understanding of specific events, such as an individual fatality or incident, or zoom out to view a particular sequence of occurrences, such as a battle or massacre, and even further out to view an operation or conflict in a country over one or more years. We are not there yet, however, and one of the current challenges is that data sources are expanding exponentially, complicating data comparisons over time. Furthermore, the sheer volume of data available complicates meaningful data extraction given the amount of data cleaning that may be required. Currently, the PITF readily allows big-picture analysis at national and regional levels, while ACLED is much better suited for local and sub-state analysis.

The UCDP, which maintains the most widely used conflict dataset at a national level, has as a coding requirement that armed violence must involve a state and stipulates that events must either concern a government and/or territory, and it must result in at least 25 fatalities a year. The UCDP also separately codes events where the annual death rate exceeds 1,000 and/or when battle deaths over successive years have reached 1,000. It has also introduced geo-referenced event datasets comparable to those of ACLED.

Figure 2 presents a summary of the four types of conflict events recorded and coded by the UCDP from 1960 to 2013. These consist of events that have incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and where a government is one of the parties to the event. These types of conflict events are defined as follows:

- Extra-systemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.
- Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states.
- Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states.
- Internationalised internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups with intervention from other states on one or both sides.

The general picture evident from Figures 1 and 2, which use very different parameters for event inclusion but present a broadly similar pattern of rising levels of armed conflict up to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, is well known. As tension between the East and the West mounted from 1960, the burden of global armed conflict increased and then plateaued at globally unprecedented high levels with peaks in 1982, 1987 and 1991. After that, there was a very steep decline, reaching its lowest levels from 2002 to 2005 before the decline reversed. More concerning is that both datasets indicate a levelling-off in the declines. In recent years, particularly since 2009 and 2010, armed conflict has increased again, including in Africa. This is a period roughly coinciding with the great global recession and the latter years of the War on Terror, during which armed conflict has, in particular, spread to Africa.

Both data sources also reflect the declining levels of interstate conflict and the fact that most armed conflicts today are fought within rather than between states. As noted, the decline in interstate war is a major cause of the declining levels of fatalities. This is because wars between countries generally have higher casualty levels than armed conflicts within countries.
One of the factors that has led to the development of these additional datasets is the increased number of conflict actors in recent years. The traditional pattern of governments fighting rebels has given way to a complex tapestry within which rebel movements split and fight one another, and sometimes also the government.

One way to quantify this trend is to turn to the measurement of the number of armed groupings involved in conflicts, or so-called ‘conflict dyads’. Figure 3 combines data from two UCDP datasets, and plots the number of dyads against the number of armed conflicts globally and in Africa. As expected, the number of dyads slowly outpaces the number of conflicts over time despite the restrictive UCDP requirement that one of the two conflicting parties must be the government of a state. In Somalia and South Sudan, for example, a substantial proportion of conflict actors have local, regional and opportunistic goals that may fall outside the UCDP coding requirements.

Comparing the conflict burden

The stacked-area graph in Figure 4 is often used by the UCDP to present the extent of armed conflict by region, namely Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and the Americas. It indicates that Asia and Africa generally experienced the largest number of armed conflicts.28

Figure 4: Global conflict or war by region: number of armed violent events

Although Figure 4 is an accurate depiction of the absolute number of armed violent events, these five regions have vastly different population sizes (see Figure 5). Because Asia (including India and China) has more than half of the world’s population, it would necessarily have the largest proportion of armed violent events.29

Figure 5: Population size by region

Source: Data from UNPD 2012 medium-fertility variant total population by country, annually 1960–2010, as presented in IFs version 7.5
Therefore, a much more accurate comparison of the armed-conflict burden by region can be obtained by viewing the UCDP data on the basis of events per million people for each region over time (see Figure 6). The picture that now emerges tells a different story. Africa retains its relatively high proportion of armed conflict; the Middle East emerges as much more unstable; the Americas and Europe are both very stable. The big difference is observed in Asia. Whereas the numbers in Figure 4 saw Asia rival Africa in its conflict burden, once one weighs recorded incidents by population size, Asia has a much more modest conflict burden than previously presented. The regions that carry the largest burden of armed conflict when weighed by population size over time are Africa and the Middle East.

The final decades of the Cold War had the effect of reversing the long-term decline in armed violence.

Reading Figures 5 and 6 together, two general trends become evident. The first is that the global level of armed violence has not kept pace with population growth, reinforcing an earlier point that was made, namely that armed violence has declined over time when compared with population size. The second conclusion is that the final decades of the Cold War had the effect of reversing the long-term decline in armed violence, which would otherwise have been expected. During this period, armed violence in Africa and the Middle East were sustained at higher levels than one would otherwise have expected. The impact of what can be described as a pent-up peace dividend is evident in Figure 6 in the sharp decline in global armed conflict after 1990.

Figure 6: Global conflict/war burden per million people

The largest increase in instability globally (generally from 2009/10) has furthermore not been experienced in Africa, but in the Middle East, which, on top of its large democratic deficit, has borne the brunt of the fallout from the War on Terror.
in Africa’s population from 285 million in 1960 to 1,1 billion in 2013. According to the numbers shown in Figure 7, conflict within African countries (i.e. internal and internationalised internal armed conflicts) have increased, as have, more recently, external involvement in Africa’s internal conflicts – evidenced by events in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and the Central African Republic, during which French forces intervened.

**Figure 7: Burden of armed conflicts in Africa by type per million people**

Deaths in Africa by type of armed conflict

To place Africa’s fatality levels from different types of armed conflict in context, Figure 8 combines the fatalities from three UCDP datasets on, firstly, civilian and military battle deaths; secondly, fatalities from one-sided armed violence; and, thirdly, fatalities from non-state armed violence, from 1989 to 2013. The UCDP defines one-sided violence as the use of armed force (and this includes all types of arms) by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians that results in at least 25 deaths per year and per actor.

Figure 8 indicates that fatalities from non-state conflict and one-sided violence are relatively small compared with fatalities from battle-related deaths. This is largely due to the coding practice adopted by the UCDP, which ties deaths to violent events and therefore does not capture deaths caused indirectly by conflict, such as from starvation or lack of healthcare. For example, the Second Congo War, also known as the Great War of Africa, which began in 1998, directly involved nine African countries and at least 20 armed groups. Fatality figures vary greatly between sources, but by 2008, the war and its aftermath had resulted in between 2,4 and 5,4 million deaths, mostly from disease and starvation. It is important therefore to emphasise that the UCDP, in its datasets, captures direct battle-related deaths, but not those that may be indirectly associated with conflict.

Two peaks in one-sided violence are evident in Figure 8. The first, in 1994, represents the genocide in Rwanda, which the UCDP coded at 500 000 deaths as its ‘best
estimate.\textsuperscript{36} In 1996 shown by the second peak, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo and the government of the DRC are recorded to have been responsible for most one-sided violence coded by the UCDP.

The sharp peaks in Africa in battle-related fatalities in 1989/1990 and again 1999/2000 are largely the result of the Ethiopian civil war, which culminated in the installation of a transitional government by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front in 1991. A decade later there is another peak – representing the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the town of Badme.\textsuperscript{36} During and in the aftermath of the conflict, the two governments supported dissident and armed opposition groups against each other, broadening the scale of deaths well as drawing in neighbouring countries, such as Somalia and, to a lesser extent, Sudan, as part of a proxy war, which at times appeared as if it would engulf the entire Horn of Africa.

Other peaks in battle-related deaths evident in Figure 8 indicate the war between the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (1993) and the actions of the Cobra militias in the DRC in 1997, on top of ongoing conflict in Sudan as the war between the government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army escalated. This struggle saw the division of Sudan after the signing of the Naivasha peace agreement in 2005, followed by the secession referendum in South Sudan in 2011 and South Sudan’s independence, only for war in South Sudan to resume in 2014 among opposing factions in the ruling party.\textsuperscript{37}

**Africa’s high levels of non-state conflict**

An important characteristic of armed conflict in Africa, which distinguishes it from other regions globally, is the consistent high levels of so-called non-state conflict and its associated fatalities. The UCDP defines non-state conflict as “the use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year”.\textsuperscript{38} The number of such events (see Figure 9) and the number of resulting deaths (see Figure 10) are consistently higher for Africa than for any other region globally. (Note that both figures reflect absolute

**Figure 8: Fatalities in Africa due to armed violence per million people**

numbers and are not adjusted for population size, hence they over-represent the extent of non-state conflict in Asia and underestimate the extent of non-state conflict in the Middle East.)

Even the impact of the drug wars in Mexico and elsewhere in the Americas since 2009, as well as the surge in the number of fatalities the Middle East do not offset the high levels of this type of conflict in Africa, while that in the Middle East is more irregular but also very high.39

**Figure 9: Number of non-state conflicts per million people**

![Graph showing the number of non-state conflicts per million people from 1989 to 2013 for Africa, Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Americas.](source)

**Figure 10: Fatalities from non-state conflicts (not adjusted for population size or growth)**

![Graph showing the number of fatalities from non-state conflicts from 1989 to 2013 for Africa, Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Americas.](source)


It is evident from Figures 9 and 10 that the intensity of non-state conflict in Africa has peaked twice in recent history, from 1991 to 1993 and from 1998 to 2004.\textsuperscript{40}

The most likely explanation for this particularly African phenomenon is the absence of effective state control over national territory. Weak governance and ineffective or small security agencies that are unable to ensure stability across large areas with poor infrastructure and difficult terrain are the most likely explanations for the high levels of non-state conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. History plays a role here too, with the drawing of boundaries that do not necessarily correspond with forms of loyalties on the ground, as does the apparent inability of successive African governments since independence to address this issue.

Once adjusted for the average population size for each country for the period 1989 to 2013, the ranking of countries whose populations are most at risk of death because of non-state armed conflict (see Figure 11) has Somalia far ahead, followed by Liberia, Sudan and the DRC.\textsuperscript{41} The potential of being caught up in non-state violence in Somalia during the last 25 years is vastly higher than elsewhere on the continent.\textsuperscript{42}

South Africa features quite high on these rankings largely due to the surge in violence that accompanied the national state of emergency and the final years of the South African settlement process from 1986 to 1994, which partly overlap with this period.

\textbf{Figure 11: Non-state violence: Incidence of deaths by population size, 1989 – 2013}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure11}
\caption{Non-state violence: Incidence of deaths by population size, 1989 – 2013}
\end{figure}


\textbf{Terrorism – is Africa the next frontier?}

Definitions of terrorism have always been contentious, particularly in Africa, where certain so-called terrorist movements later became liberation movements. Global interest in terrorism was rekindled by the 9/11 attacks in the US and the subsequent development of what some consider a global jihadist movement composed of groups affiliated with or inspired by al-Qaeda.

Postcolonial Africa has historically been exposed to much terrorism, from the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda to the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Although the data and analysis in much of
the Western media is largely concerned with terrorism directed at Western assets, the threat continues to evolve and there is little indication that the current momentum behind the growth of terror in Africa or elsewhere has run its course.

At the 11th Conference of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa in Kenya, which brought together African heads of intelligence and security services from 51 countries, the special representative of the chairperson of the African Union Commission for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, Francisco Madeira, said: ‘We advise the politicians to create jobs, give counter narratives to these groups, share intelligence in time, create laws that can help and allocate enough resources to address the menace.’ Madeira noted that although al-Shabaab represented the greatest threat in East Africa and Boko Haram in West Africa, the entire continent was threatened by the increasing influence of al-Qaeda and other radical groups in Iraq and Syria. The challenge is that the War on Terror is exploited by governing elites and their security apparatuses to strengthen their coercive abilities, and that governments crack down on legitimate opposition by labelling them ‘terrorists’.

Coding terrorism is fraught with political and practical challenges. The Global Terrorism Database, maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is one of the more comprehensive datasets. It defines terrorism as the ‘threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation’. Coding terrorism is fraught with political and practical challenges. The Global Terrorism Database, maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is one of the more comprehensive datasets. It defines terrorism as the ‘threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation’. Coding terrorism is fraught with political and practical challenges. The Global Terrorism Database, maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is one of the more comprehensive datasets. It defines terrorism as the ‘threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation’. Coding terrorism is fraught with political and practical challenges. The Global Terrorism Database, maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is one of the more comprehensive datasets. It defines terrorism as the ‘threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation’.

Figure 12 shows a sharp rise in the global occurrence of terrorism since 2004, which appeared to then plateau from 2008 to 2011 but accelerated sharply from 2011 to 2012. The terrorism increase in Africa only occurred in 2011 and has subsequently tracked the global upturn – if at a slower rate. Much as Africans fear the continent to be the next frontier in the global war, in reality Africa is not there yet.

**Figure 12: Terrorist incidents globally and in Africa from, 1989 – 2012**
In broad terms, there are two schools of thought on the rise in terrorism and the nature of the threat. The first, perhaps best reflected in the most recent *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013*, published by the US Department of State in 2014, holds the view that there is a global network of terrorist organisations, with al-Qaeda (or perhaps now the Islamic State) at its centre. The State Department refers to an accelerated decentralisation of the movement with ‘affiliates in the AQ [al-Qaeda] network becoming more operationally autonomous from core AQ and increasingly focused on local and regional objectives’. This is essentially a picture of a globally networked movement that instigates and coordinates its activities, however loosely, and has the US most prominently in its sights.

One school of thought is that terrorism is highly localised and that all terrorists are deeply rooted in their own localities

The second school of thought is that terrorism is highly localised and that all terrorists, including Osama bin Laden, are deeply rooted in their own localities, although some have managed to transcend local grievances, often targeting Western countries. ACLED – as mentioned, a data provider that uses geographic event data to map and analyse violence in Africa – is a strong proponent of this latter view. It contends that violent Islamist groups emerge in and are shaped by distinct domestic contexts and issues, a feature that is obscured by a narrative of global Islamic terrorism. According to Dowd and Raleigh: ‘Leaders seek to cast opposition threats as extreme and associated with al-Qaeda in order to locate the blame for violence elsewhere, away from poor records of governance, state capacity, and representation.’ The same authors put the following argument: ‘Using empirical evidence of activity within the Sahel and Maghreb, we dismiss the notion that all violent Islamist groups are operating towards a regional or globally coordinated jihad, and instead find that groups – even those formally affiliated with al-Qaeda – operate within the local and national contexts of their origins.’ Recent field research by Anneli Botha at the ISS on terrorist recruitment in Kenya and Somalia would largely support this view.

Whichever approach one adopts, three factors appear to play a significant role in the current rise in terrorism globally. The first is the demonstration effect of mass media, which presents potential local radicals with ready-made and packaged examples of terrorism – the beheading of journalists being the most gruesome example of this copycat trend.

The second is the ready supply of desperate and poor people to the extent that regions such as Africa have a potentially limitless supply of ‘conflict labour’ prepared to offer their lives for stipends paid to their families.

Finally, the stream of oil money (and its associated influence) has allowed countries such as Saudi Arabia to escape sanction despite their large role in funding religious extremism globally. Although there are signs that many terrorist movements are splintering and turning against one another, Africa, with its large populations of
Christian and Muslim people, many of whom live in extreme poverty, and its deeply held views on religion, has much potential to increase its relative share of the terrorism scourge.

**Conclusion**

This paper has provided a snapshot of Africa’s conflict burden within a global context, relying for its analysis on a number of widely used datasets that track and code armed violence. It notes that the dividing line between armed conflict, terrorism and organised criminal violence has become blurred in recent years – a trend that is expected to continue. It has hinted at the challenges that this presents to the academic community assessing complex phenomena that no longer seem to fit into previously established categories.

Efforts to capture data on certain types of violence that extend beyond war have recently given rise to the creation of datasets that look at one-sided violence (i.e. unarmed civilians killed by state organisations, non-state armed groups or criminal organisations) and so-called non-state fatalities that result from clashes between rival groups, neither of which include a government. In line with the huge increase in the availability of information, the use of event data has also become more prominent. The analysis presented in this paper drew from some of these new types of datasets and methodologies.

The summary finding is that armed conflict in Africa follows the general pattern of declining levels if measured in relation to population size and population growth. The impact of the Cold War temporarily disrupted this pattern, leading to higher levels of armed violence than would have been expected from the 1970s and 1980s. Recent trends point to another increase in armed violence from around 2010, potentially reversing the gains made immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Unlike other regions, Africa is burdened with a high level of so-called non-state conflict. This type of conflict involves armed groups and factions that are fighting one another and not the state. This is almost certainly due to weak, unconsolidated governance characteristic of many African countries.

For several years, the War on Terror created the impression that international terrorism, largely aimed at the US and its allies, but mostly affecting Muslim societies, presented a threat to all countries, despite the limited nature of the attacks and generally small number of fatalities suffered. The Middle East, and not Africa, is the region experiencing the fastest growth in terrorism.

States are generally created through violence. But once the dominant elite have established control in a given territory, and others recognise their legal right to rule, there are generally reduced levels of large-scale violence – although not always resulting in improvements in the livelihoods of the population. When the League of Nations and later the United Nations were established, their primary focus was to reduce wars between countries, the dominant type of instability at the time. Since then, the nature of conflict has changed and internal armed conflicts now dominate globally. And Africa is no different.

Since interstate war – characterised by high-intensity battles between formally organised armed forces – is generally more deadly than civil war, the decline in war between countries since the middle of the 20th century has led to a sharp decline in so-called battle deaths.49 Today, armed political violence is still widespread, however. This manifests itself in various forms – from terrorism to efforts at violent secession and warlords fighting for control over tradable resources, such as coffee, cocoa, coltan and charcoal. Increased competition for water, food, energy and land among Africa’s rapidly increasing population will increase local conflict over livelihoods. This trend will be accentuated in southern and northern Africa because of the impact of climate change and its associated increases in temperature and declines in rainfall in these two regions. It is less clear whether these local trends will escalate into more widespread interstate conflicts.

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**The nature of conflict has changed and internal armed conflicts now dominate globally. And Africa is no different**

In fact, conflict in Africa rose much faster than the global average prior to 1989 and fell more sharply thereafter – before its more recent uptick. The levels of armed conflict in Africa therefore appear to be quite sensitive to global developments, possibly because of the marginal position that it occupies politically and economically, and also the possible multiplier effect that limited governance has in many African countries.
The summary view is both reassuring and concerning. Africa is on average a safer place to live for its communities than at any time since the end of colonialism and most probably since recorded history. In a more connected and more populous world, our greater connectedness obscures the essential truth that we are, today, generally safer and more at peace than ever before – even as the great global realignment of power between the West and the rest of the world allows various suppressed fault lines to find violent expression. This is the view of the authors of the 2013 edition of the Human Security Report, who write: ‘As the world has become more interdependent, the costs of interstate war have risen, while its economic benefits have declined. Under such conditions, the economic self-interest of states is to trade, not invade – and the incentives for interstate war are reduced.'

Earlier work by the ISS has identified many of the structural drivers of conflict, including a youthful population, rapid urbanisation and changes in regime type. All these phenomena are evident in Africa and explain its relatively high conflict burden:

Violent armed conflict and resource insecurity will continue to occur mainly in poor countries where the following variables are present: weak governance, previous experience of conflict, spillover from being located in a bad ‘neighbourhood’ and/or widespread youth unemployment and exclusion co-existing alongside a median age of below 25 years.

More recent considerations surrounding the rise in conflict (not discussed in this paper) include global flux (the move from bipolarity to multipolarity); increases in both global and national inequality; the impact of the global recession since 2008; and the large rise in instability that ensued following the War on Terror (the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies has disturbed the repressive old order without being able to impose a new system). Needless to say, events in the Middle East have great potential to unsettle events globally and in Africa.

An important argument for Africa, with its weak states, poor governance and porous borders, is that territories with a single government, defined borders and a common, central administration experience only a quarter of the average death rate of states without a national government.

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Ironically, as pre-eminent sociologist Charles Tilly noted three decades ago: ‘If protection rackets represent organised crime at its smoothest, then war risking and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organised crime.’
Notes

Special thanks to Professor Rita Abrahamse, University of Ottawa, Prof Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex, and Dr Julia Schünemann from the ISS for helpful comments on earlier drafts.


12 Ibid., 2.

13 Ibid., 48.

4 Since the most recent data from the venerable Correlates of War dataset is to 2011, it was not included. See www.correlatesofwar.org.

5 The UCDP is an initiative of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden. See www.pcr.uu.se.

6 The UCDP dataset on armed conflict (from 1946 to 2013) is perhaps the best known of its kind. It is a joint endeavour between the UCDP and the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Various datasets at UCDP (all freely available) code particular aspects of conflict, including one-sided violence, battle-related deaths, conflict actors, peace agreements and external support. The most recent addition is the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (www.ucdpgeo.net), which now allows the spatial imaging of conflict incidents on Google Earth or similar programs and covers the period 1999 to 2010.

7 The standard metric used by most statistical efforts is deaths per 100,000 of the population per year. See Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Human security report 2013 – The decline in global violence: evidence, explanation, and contestation, 5, www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2013/text.aspx (accessed 6 August 2014).

8 Global burden of armed violence 2011, www.genevaclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GBAV2/GBA2011-PRESS-RELEASE-EN.pdf (accessed 12 June 2014). According to the Human security report 2013, the number of drug-related deaths in Mexico (which account for about 46% to 60% of all homicides there) have since 2008 exceeded the deaths from war in Afghanistan, Sudan and Iraq, the three countries worst affected by armed conflict and violence globally (Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Human security report 2013 – The decline in global violence: evidence, explanation, and contestation, www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2013/text.aspx, 52, [accessed 6 August 2014]). However, these numbers need to be placed in relationship to the size of the respective populations: Mexico at that time had a larger population than all three other countries combined.

9 Somewhat arbitrarily defined as those causing 1,000 or more battle deaths in a year by the UCDP and more than 500 deaths by the PITF.


14 Ibid., 8.

15 Ibid., 10. In the 2013 issue of the Conflict barometer, the institute lists 12 active wars and 11 active limited wars in Africa in that year out of a global total of 20 and 25, respectively (ibid., 14). This data would indicate that sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the highest number of limited and full-scale wars globally but data inconsistencies and revisions in the associated public data do not allow for a meaningful comparison over time, since much of the Heidelberg Institute’s underlying data is not publicly available (ibid., 15).

16 The PITF is funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The associated data is now housed with the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) in Virginia, US. The PITF datasets, including the associated codebooks, are available for public download on the CSP website, www.systemicpeace.org. The PITF consists of a panel of scholars working for the intelligence community, originally established in 1994 as the State Failure Task Force. The PITF and its work have gone through various evolutions, originated by Ted Robert Gurr and, since 1998, it has been managed by Monty G Marshall. Although the organisation is funded by the CIA, the PITF’s work does not rely on intelligence reporting or classified material and the associated datasets are compiled from open-source material. Material associated with the PITF includes the various versions of the Polity Project (latest version IV) and the State Failure Problem set on internal wars and failures of governance. Like those of the UCDP, some of the PITF datasets code events from 1946, although the Polity IV project on political regime characteristics codes country data from as far back as 1800.

17 Ibid. The magnitude score is set out in detail in pages 10 to 11. The highest score allocated thus far in the historical period from 1946 to 2013 is 7 (described as ‘pervasive warfare’).

18 This would be in line with N Sambanis, What is Civil War?: Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition, Journal of Conflict Resolution, SAGE Publications, 2004, 819


21 Ibid., 652.


24 See www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio Armed-conflict_dataset_v4. The version used here is the UCDP/PRIORI Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2014, 1946–2013, accessed on 13 July 2014. The UCDP measures events at two levels of intensity (25 fatalities and 1,000 fatalities per event or within a succession of events that occur within a single calendar year).

25 The UCDP global conflict dataset used for Figure 2 treats events with very different death rates largely similarly. Annual events with 25 battle deaths (the basic threshold for an event to be captured by the UCDP) count for 1 and annual events with more than 1,000 battle deaths count for 2 (which it defines as wars). Whereas the latter is some 40 times larger than the former, the average deaths coded per event recorded could be anything from 26 to 999.


29 The Americans accounted for 14% of the global population in 1960 and this proportion was the same in 2013. The proportion of the world’s
population in Asia increased from 54% in 1960 to 57% in 2013. Africa’s proportion increased from 8% to 14% in the same period.

30 Asia had 16 times more people than the Middle East in 1960, for example. The total population for the five regions increased from 3 billion in 1960 to 7.2 billion in 2013.

31 The UCDP data uses a value of 1 for each incident with more than 25 fatalities and a value of 2 for events with more than 1,000 fatalities in a year. The use of the country-year as the unit of analysis is important because conflict episodes may straddle different years and include more than one country, requiring careful research and allocation of conflict components to the actors involved, the particular year and the country. Therefore, the burden of conflict remains largely static through the 1960s until the end of the 1990s, even as the Cold War intensified violence in the developing world, without which Africa would most probably have seen substantial decreases in levels of armed conflict.


34 The UCDP also codes for a low and a high fatality estimate. Other major incidents recorded in 1994 include violence by the government of Rwanda in the DRC, by the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the Liberia Peace Council and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia, Kromah faction, in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. This violence continued through 1995 and until 1996, when the killings in West Africa declined, while those in the eastern DRC, Burundi and elsewhere continued.

35 Eritrean and Ethiopian popular forces had as a common objective the overthrow of dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in Addis Ababa in 1991. Once Eritrea achieved independence from Ethiopia in 1993, however, it was not long before differences, particularly over the border delimitation, became an acute source of tension between the former allies. Eventually a bitter war between Eritrea and Ethiopia broke out in May 1998, which lasted two years until June 2000 when Eritrea invaded Ethiopia, only to be forced steadily back. By the end of the war, Ethiopia had occupied all of the disputed territory that had been at the heart of the conflict in the first place.

36 Other events with a measurable impact on fatality levels were the ongoing conflicts in Somalia and Algeria, as well as conflict in the eastern DRC between the government of Rwanda and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. War in the DRC continued throughout this period, and the UCDP dataset captured more than 1,000 battle deaths each year in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2003, and smaller numbers in most other years. For a brief period from 2002 to 2005, annual reported battle deaths fell below 25 per year.


39 In the UCDP groupings, Iraq, Iran and Kuwait are all part of the Middle East, while Afghanistan is part of Asia.

40 The reasons for the spike in non-state conflict in Africa from 1991 to 1993 can be found in the conflict in the DRC between the Banyarwanda and the Hunde/Nyanga, and to a lesser extent between the Hunde and the Hutu.

In Sudan the reasons can be found in conflict between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), between the Jikany Nuer and the Lou Nuer, between the Toposa and the Turkana, and other factions within the SPLM/A.

In Somalia – between the ‘government’ in the Republic of Somaliland (since Somaliland is not a recognised state, the UCDP classified conflict there as non-state) and the Somali National Movement Calan-Cas; between the Al Ittihad Al Islami and the SSDF; between the SSDF and the Somali National Congress/Alliance; between the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and SPM Absame or SPM/SNA.

In South Africa, as the momentum towards a final political settlement increased, large-scale violence between supporters of the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party would see several hundred deaths per year from 1992 to 1994. In the UCDP dataset on one-sided violence, South Africa is one of the most violent states in Africa.

In Nigeria large numbers of deaths occurred in conflict between the Atyap and the Hausa, the Adoni and the Oguni, and in fighting between Christians and Muslims from 1992 to 1994. In Ghana, in 1994, there was conflict between the Gonja, and between the Konkomba and Nawuri.
During the next peak, from 1998 to 2004, non-state conflicts in the DRC, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Chad and Somalia dominate. In the DRC the largest number of fatalities occurred in fighting between the Hem and the Lendu ethnic groups; the Front Nationalist et Intégrationist (FNI) and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC); the Mayi-Mayi and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD); the FNI and the UPC; the RCD-Kisangani Movement for Liberation and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo and RCD-Nationale – and between a host of other organisations. In Nigeria most fighting was between Christians and Muslims, but also between Afisare, Anaguta, Birom and Fulani Hausa, as well as between a number of other ethnic groups. In Ethiopia most fatalities came from clashes between the Gedeo and the Guj, the Ogaden clan and the Sheikhal clan, as well as between a range of groups, including within the Darod clan, and between the Anuak Highlanders, and Amhara vs Oromo.

41 The actual number of deaths are highest, in declining order, in Nigeria, Ethiopia, DRC, South Africa, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Ghana, Somalia and Liberia.

42 The burden of non-state fatalities is not evenly spread across the continent. For the period 1989 to 2013, the UCDP captured numbers in excess of 25 deaths a year in 27 countries in Africa. The 10 countries that have cumulatively suffered the most deaths from non-state armed conflict from 1989 to 2013 are Sudan (17 345), Nigeria (15 329), the DRC (12 173) and Somalia (10 702), followed by Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Liberia and Uganda.

43 Ethiopian foreign ministry, A week in the Horn, 29 August 2014, 12.


47 Ibid., 501.


50 Ibid., 32.


53 C Tilly, War making and state making as organized crime, in P Evans, D Rueschemeyer and T Skocpol (eds), Bringing the state back, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
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