

SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER

LOOKING TO THE 2024 ELECTIONS

DIPLOMATIC BRIEFING REPORT

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Acronyms

ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
ACT	African Congress for Transformation
AI	artificial intelligence
ANC	African National Congress
BOSA	Build One South Africa
COPE	Congress of the People
DA	Democratic Alliance
DP	Democratic Party
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
NA	National Assembly
NNP	New National Party
NP	National Party
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SARB	South African Reconciliation Barometer
SARS	South African Revenue Services
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SOE	state-owned enterprise
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
VAP	voting age population

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Introduction

This publication is based on a briefing session co-hosted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) and the Embassy of Sweden in Pretoria on 24 January 2024.

Opening remarks were made by HE Ambassador Mr. Håkan Juholt; Mr. Lorenzo Davids, IJR Board of Directors; and Mr. Jan Hofmeyr, IJR Head of Policy and Research.

The IJR thanks the Embassy, the Swedish Ambassador and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) for their continued support and partnership with the Institute and the South African Reconciliation Barometer. All views expressed are those of the authors and not of the IJR, SIDA or the Embassy of Sweden.



Reconciliation and South African political culture

Presented by Kate Lefko-Everett, Senior Project Leader, South African Reconciliation Barometer

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) has been conducting the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) survey since 2003.

This is a year in which we are confronted with a host of global challenges including societal polarisation and the threat of disinformation, amid the rapid rise of artificial intelligence (AI). More than two billion people will have the opportunity to vote in elections in over 50 countries, with growing numbers of authoritarian-leaning candidates on ballots. [1] The need for robust, independent data has perhaps never been greater.

In the coming months, South Africa will also hold the seventh round of national and provincial elections since the transition to democracy in 1994. These polls appear set to be highly contested and following on the establishment of multi-party councils in a number of major Metros and local municipalities, pre-election analysis has focused on the prospects of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) to retain its national majority – and what possible coalitions might look like if it does not.

With 20 years of representative public opinion data, the Reconciliation Barometer is



More than 2 billion people in over 50 countries will have the opportunity to vote in 2024

uniquely positioned to offer insight into a critical period in South Africa's young democracy. It is important to note that the 2023 round of the survey did yield some positive findings in important areas, such as shared understanding of the past and commitment to reconciliation. There were, however, many concerning findings, and these were most pronounced in the area of Political Culture.

Measuring reconciliation

Before presenting these results, it is important to explain that the IJR defines reconciliation in terms of multiple related concepts or “dimensions”, each with distinct indicators that are tracked through the survey. These dimensions and indicators have been periodically reviewed, confirmed and updated. The six dimensions of reconciliation are: political culture, inclusion, social cohesion, apartheid legacy, racial reconciliation and perceptions of change.

Methodology and sample

The Reconciliation Barometer survey is conducted through face-to-face interviews with South African citizens in all provinces of the country. The survey instrument contains more than two hundred questions and is administered in English, Afrikaans, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Setswana, Sepedi, and Sesotho.

It is a nationally representative survey, meaning that every adult South African has an equal chance of being selected to take part. Through the weighting of data,

we are able to draw conclusions about the entire population of the country. There were 2,006 survey participants in 2023. Consistent with national demographics, the majority of participants were black people, with proportional sampling according to province, gender, and age (Figure 1).

The indicators used for measurement within the Political Culture domain of the Reconciliation Barometer include political and civic participation, internal and external efficacy, trust in leadership and confidence in institutions.


Our changing political landscape

South Africa’s political landscape has changed considerably since the first democratic elections were held in 1994. Long lines of exuberant voters waiting outside polling stations for hours have become emblematic of the political transition and ushering in of the first majority government.

In the intervening years, however, voter turnout at national and provincial elections has steadily fallen, from a peak of 89% in 1999 to 66% in 2019. [2]

Figure 1

SARB survey sample 2023



Participation is even lower as a proportion of the voting age population (VAP), referring to eligible South Africans over the age of 18 who actually cast a ballot. This declined from an estimated 86% in 1994 to only 49% in 2019 (Figure 2). [3]

The distribution of votes cast has also changed over this 30-year period. The ruling ANC party won close to 70% of votes in the 2004 elections but this share has dropped in each successive poll, reaching only about 57% in 2019.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) was formed in 2000 through a multi-party merge between the Democratic Party (DP), Federal Alliance and the New National Party (NNP). [4] It assumed second-party position, and nearly doubled its support from 12% in 2004 to 22% a decade later in 2014.

South Africa appeared set on a path towards a two-party dominant system, but this trajectory was fundamentally with the founding of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013. The EFF won 6% of the national vote in 2014 and grew this to 11% in 2019 (Figure 3).

The EFF has worked to appeal to young voters, 2024 will be the first national elections in which the so-called "Born Free" generation outnumbers those with a lived memory of South Africa before the 1994 transition to democracy.

Political culture findings

The 2023 Reconciliation Barometer provides timely insights into South African political culture in the run-up to elections, starting with citizen perceptions of governance in the country.

Low confidence in key institutions

One of the most dramatic results of last year's survey was the decline in public confidence in key institutions. The Barometer has collected time series data on citizen perceptions of the three spheres of government, representative institutions, and the legal system – among others – since 2007. These are critical to both the functioning and legitimacy of the democratic government.

Early rounds found that more than half of all South Africans were confident in Parliament,

Figure 2

National turnout vs. proportion of VAP




Figure 3

Changing shares of the national vote





Figure 4

Confidence in institutions, 2007-2015



Note: In 2017, these items were updated from a 4-point to a 5-point Likert scale.

Figure 5

Confidence in institutions, 2023





Figure 6

Leaders cannot be trusted



national government, and the Constitutional Court. Reported confidence, however, began falling by 2013 (Figure 4). In 2023, less than 40% of South Africans expressed confidence in most institutions included in the survey – excepting only the national Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and Revenue Services (SARS) (Figure 5).

Little trust in leaders

A further area of significant concern in the 2023 Reconciliation Barometer results is the extent to which trust in national leadership has dropped since the first survey rounds were conducted in the early 2000s.

In 2003, just over half of all South Africans (57%) of South Africans – already a high percentage – agreed that national leaders are not really concerned about what happens to ordinary people. By 2023, this had increased to 81%. Over the same period, agreement that leaders cannot be trusted to do what is right increased dramatically from 18% in 2003 and 21% in 2013, to 79% in 2023 (Figure 6).

These profound changes gave me pause as a researcher, and indeed warrant collective reflection and concern.

Public concern about corruption

Following on the release of former Public Protector’s Thuli Madonsela’s report and the subsequent work of the Zondo Commission of Inquiry, there has been periodic reference to the “lost” and “wasted” years of state capture – during which time there was widespread corruption within the South African government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), involving Cabinet members, senior officials, and the wealthy Gupta family.

Amid promises of a “new dawn” by then-ANC presidential candidate Cyril Ramaphosa, citizens were highly concerned about corruption, and in 2019 more than three-quarters believed that officials involved in wrongdoing often get away with it, political will is lacking and ordinary people most often bear its consequences. Five years later and heading into the next elections, these levels of agreement remain consistently high (Figure 7). Further, citizens are largely pessimistic about the future, with only 19% expecting levels corruption to improve in the next 2-3 years.

Low levels of political efficacy

Internal political efficacy is a measure of people’s belief in their own ability to understand and take part in politics. [6] As of 2023 internal efficacy levels are low, and half of all South Africans feel they don’t understand important issues affecting the country, are less informed than others and are unqualified to participate in politics (Figure 8).

External efficacy measures people’s belief that they can influence the government and is often linked to satisfaction with democracy and trust in public institutions. [7] Despite feeling unqualified, increasing percentages of South Africans agree that leaders should follow the will of the people, and that citizens should make important political and policy decisions (Figure 9).

Shifting perceptions of political parties

Political parties in general have traditionally garnered low levels of confidence among citizens in the Reconciliation Barometer and other peer surveys. Between 2006 and 2013, the Barometer measured confidence in

Figure 7
Perceptions of corruption




Figure 8
Internal political efficacy




Figure 9
External political efficacy





Figure 10

Confidence in political parties




political parties in general, in comparison with other institutions and without naming any specific organisations. Confidence fluctuated with lows of 34-35% in 2008 and 2009, to highs of 46-47% in 2006, 2012 and 2013.

In more recent rounds, the Barometer has asked citizens about their levels of confidence in the three largest parties in the country. In 2019, the last year in which national elections were held, 47% of South Africans expressed confidence in the ruling ANC, but this dropped to 37% by 2023. About one in four South Africans consistently expressed confidence in the DA between 2017 and 2023. Comparatively, confidence in the EFF increased over the same period, from 20% to 32% (Figure 10).

Figure 11


Top three preferred political parties



Recent survey rounds have also shown changes in the political parties that South Africans identify with. In 2023, 18% of South Africans answered that they felt closer to the EFF than any other political party – up from 11% in 2021. Those who reported feeling closest to the ANC dropped from 43% to 37%, while the DA remained unchanged at 13% (Figure 11).

Figure 12

Likelihood of voting in 2024



Likelihood of voting in 2024

Finally, there has been considerable speculation about how many people are likely to turn out at the polls in May. Distrust, concern about corruption and low levels of political efficacy could potentially motivate voter participation – but could also lead to deepening disenfranchisement and the tendency to stay at home on election day. Seven in ten South Africans say that they are likely to vote in 2024, however, and if this interest translates into action, we may in fact see an increase in turnout at this year’s polls (Figure 12).

Reflections on the South African paradox

Response from Dr. Fanie du Toit, Senior Associate and former Executive Director of the IJR

In reflecting on the findings of the South African Reconciliation Barometer and in anticipation of the upcoming elections, I found myself grappling with a paradox which goes to the heart of our nation's experience. Despite the bleak landscape shaped by political and economic challenges, there exists an unexpectedly positive social climate. This reality is both surprising and counterintuitive, prompting me to question the essence of our South African identity and the relatively harmonious racial dynamics that prevail. Why do we remain proudly South African? Why do race groups not view one another with more suspicion? Why do people desire more racial reconciliation?

I have come to speculate that the resilience we witness today is deeply rooted in the legacy of our transition to democracy—a period marked by an unprecedented inclusivity that managed to bring together citizens and a broad spectrum of political actors, including those on the fringes, in meaningful and ultimately constructive ways. This transition was not merely about ending political violence; it was about laying down the foundational blocks for a consensus on our past and crafting a widely accepted vision for our future.

Given the Barometer's finding on widespread, continued agreement that apartheid as a crime against humanity, it appears that the participatory search "for truth" through the Truth and Reconciliation



Despite the bleak landscape shaped by political and economic challenges, there exists an unexpectedly positive social climate

Commission (TRC) had a unifying effect and effectively countered revisionism. Moreover, as a society with a functioning (albeit poorly) democracy, there seems to be enough capacity to mitigate conflict and frustration within the system.

In my view, the transition achieved several critical outcomes, starting with ushering in an effective end to political violence. In addition, it provided:

- crucial building blocks towards a consensus on the past;
- a very broadly accepted framework for the future;
- a racial reconciliation of sorts to the point that the majority of citizens prefer racial harmony above ongoing racial contestation;
- a positive national identity; and,
- a credible political system.

However, I also recognise the dangers of complacency. The growing distrust in our political system and the fading hope for improved living conditions are significant threats that, if left unaddressed, could erode the social capital we've built since our transitional period. I believe that we are not a society devoid of hope, but we are certainly risking the depletion of a rare reserve of social capital. Any sense of South African exceptionalism, if not tempered with realism and action, will only hasten our slide towards anarchy.

So, as I reflect on our current state and the path forward, I am struck by the delicate balance we must strike. We possess a unique legacy of unity and reconciliation that is both a source of strength and vulnerability. It is imperative that we address the underlying issues of political distrust and economic despair to ensure that the legacy of our transition to democracy is not only preserved but also strengthened for the generations to come.



A country in ideological crisis

Response from Ebrahim Fakir, Elections Analyst, EISA

South African national context

It is important to start with context. On 29 May 2024, South Africa will hold the seventh round of national and provincial elections since the end of apartheid. The fifth round of local government elections took place more recently, in 2021.

Samuel Huntington's two turnover test theory posits a consolidated democracy as one in which power has been peacefully transferred between different political parties at least twice. [8] Through this lens, South Africa has actually been very successful, albeit that the alternation of power has been at the local government level – to a limited extent through the 2016 polls and thereafter more broadly in 2021. Leadership within KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province changed from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to the African National Congress (ANC). The Western Cape saw a change from the National Party (NP)/New National Party (NNP) to an NNP-ANC alliance, and eventually to the Democratic Alliance (DA).

While Huntington's model suggest that South African democracy is entrenched, this is a limited perspective. The real and serious political and governance problems in the country indicate clearly that democracy has not in fact been consolidated, nor have its gains. Rather, we appear to have normalised politics in the form of abnormal competition for power at any cost. One outcome of this shift is political stagnation.



Democracy has not in fact been consolidated, nor have its gains

Other results, as have occurred in different contexts, may include:

- combustive and conflictual situations such as those in Nigeria, Lesotho or Kenya, in which the balance between peaceable accommodation and violence is based solely on calculations of proximity to power;
- constant shifts in alliances between leaders and parties, evidencing rootless politics that are unhinged to principle or fidelity to values; or,

- instrumentalising identity as a mobilisation tool, in which politicians and parties use societal fault lines and social cleavages – including race, inequality, unemployment and poverty – to justify capricious policy and processes, and ultimately institutional manipulation and debasement.

The beneficiaries of these scenarios are predatory elites.

Crises of politics and representation

South Africa is experiencing a crisis of representation and responsiveness accompanied by an ideological vacuum, as evidenced by Reconciliation Barometer data on distrust towards leadership.

Political alliances are constantly shifting and parties across the spectrum tend towards fragmentation and fracture, factionalism and fractionalism. This is particularly clear in the dynamics of minority governments and “coalitions” within municipalities. It has become commonplace for parties to shift their identities and ideologies, and even descend into projects of accumulation enacted through disruptive and destabilising practices. South African politics at present can be characterised as rootless and shifty. At least five parties have been constituted from ANC breakaway groups, and around four from the DA. The majority of the parties are formed after either disciplining, suspension or expulsion from the main party, or the risk of it, and few can provide discernible differentiating features from the party they splintered or broke-away from.

The problem of trust in institutions and between people

The 2023 Reconciliation Barometer data show interesting findings in response to questions on trust in institutions. In some areas, such as support for victims of apartheid crimes, there is relatively strong agreement between South Africans of different races – with some variation. On questions of reparations, white and Indian people appear more attitudinally similar than black South Africans. There is fluctuation in the percentages of South Africans who identify race as a leading source of division, but more consistency in the identification of socioeconomic class – which seems more marked in these difficult times.

This data suggest that in some respects, we may be moving towards a more cosmopolitan South African identity. This is also borne out to some extent in analyses of voting patterns. Results from mixed and majority white suburban voting stations tend to be relatively homogenous, with most ballots cast for only one or two parties. Comparatively, in predominantly black townships there is far greater diversity in terms of the spread of support across multiple parties.

Changes to the electoral system

The passing of the Electoral Amendment Act of 2023 has introduced a number of changes that will be implemented in the upcoming elections, including enabling contestation by independent candidates as well as a new formula for calculating seat allocation within the National Assembly (NA). [9]

Where independent candidates win seat(s) or smaller parties garner sufficient support to gain representation of even a few seats, it fragments the institutional configuration especially in instances where no party gets a majority sufficient to form a government. Here small, parties and independent candidates can play a game of malicious brinkmanship in which larger parties are reliant and dependent on the support of small political parties to form a minority government to pass budgets, law and policy, or form a coalition altogether. Using a variety of provocative political manoeuvring and machinations to undermine the larger parties and the larger voting bloc in the body politic, small parties can use their leverage in favour of particular special or predatory interests. Smaller parties and independents may be able to extract concessions on positions in the executive, exercise influence over budget allocations, procurement, state contracting, tenders and decision making in general, out of all proportion relative to their size. This may undermine the principle and spirit of proportionality and the idea central to democracy – that of majority rule. It also leads to a situation where independents or small(er) parties are incentivised to avail themselves to larger parties, who in turn may use them as proxies or manipulate them.

Such dynamics have been evident in the City of Johannesburg's coalition council, which has been plagued by ongoing power struggles which see small opposition parties becoming much more politically significant than they ought to be.

These changes may usher in some diversity in representation but it's unclear whether or not this will actually shift institutional politics sufficiently away from the (ab)use of majority

to protect a party and the impunity with which it behaves in the manipulation of institutional rules and procedures.

Implications of the trust deficit

At present, South African politics is characterised by impunity in the exercise of power and authority; informality in decision making and governance, without accountability or responsiveness; and gaping underdevelopment and inequality in the economy.

Continuous declines in trust and confidence in public institutions lead to a concomitant decline in voter participation and turnout, which consequently results in uneven representation and responsiveness from those in elected office. This can engender an institutional crisis of credibility, and if prolonged may raise the spectre of a legitimisation crisis at the local level, leading to “politicised uncertainty” and “institutional ambiguity”.

What this means for the IEC

In contra-distinction to the period coming into the 2021 local government elections, historically the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) enjoyed unparalleled high levels of trust and confidence and a solid (even stellar) domestic and international reputation. It consistently received healthy approval ratings, with majority support from more than two-thirds (60%) of the adult population since 2001 until at least 2016, as shown by the Afrobarometer.

Worryingly, the Afrobarometer shows that by 2021 only about one in three citizens (36%) trusted the South African IEC. [10]

It is worthwhile posing questions as to whether this decline can be attributable to the consistent denigration of the IEC by political party leaders, party supporters and on social media – or if there are other underlying problems as well. Political Party leaders have systematically undermined the IEC. Some to scapegoat, some to explain away poor performance, others to play the role of spoilers.

With respect to the tracking the loss of trust and confidence in the IEC and government institutions more generally, there is a major contagion effect. But there have also been an increased number of complaints, disputes, objections and court cases – including a rise in allegations of maladministration and irregularities involving electoral officials from voting station level up towards provincial and national head office.

Nature of complaints against the IEC

The voter's roll was maintained and remained open for inspection and objection by all interested parties in 2019 and 2021. However problems with voter management devices meant that there were irregularities reported in relation to both registration and the capturing of personal information.

The IEC is constitutionally and legally independent and its composition and appointment is safeguarded through legislative and regulatory provision. This is bolstered by the extensive process of public nomination, but equally opens loopholes through which political pressure is brought to bear on nominations and appointment processes. These are nominally and notionally independent, but can allow for party-aligned commissioners - who are not merely

sympathetic, but even enthusiastic political party supporters but not office-bearers. Such appointees may act as proxies for party interests in the commission and ultimately compromise its independence.

Past complaints have been lodged against the IEC related to [11]:

- planning, logistics and balloting materials – some malicious
- objections to counts and process irregularities
- bogus voters on the voters roll, as well as legitimate voters excluded from the roll – disenfranchising voters
- malicious complaints against staff
- malicious complaints on location of voting stations
- complaints about outreach, voter registration
- issues around candidate and party representation
- issues about deposits and thresholds for electoral participation
- possible issues about demarcation
- training and resourcing of party and candidate agents
- accreditation, training and resource support for observers and monitors
- multi-party liaison committees, and there is now a political liaison committee to accommodate independents.


Determinants of potential voter turnout

Voter turnout is unpredictable and is not determined solely by apathy or a lack of options or choice between parties, as important as these factors are. In times of crisis, voters may feel inclined to punish or reward leadership. Turnout is also influenced by trust and confidence in institutions – or the lack thereof. People do not believe that institutions will do what they are supposed to, nor – as the SARB data shows – do they trust that politics and politicians will help to resolve their problems.

The 2021 Afrobarometer results also suggest that South African political parties are viewed as insular, parochial and self-interested. Only 27% of people reported trusting a lot/somewhat in the ruling party, whereas 71% answered not a lot/not at all. Analysis of time series data shows a clear drop from 62% trust in the ruling party in 2006. Trust in the opposition dropped from 29% to 24% over this same period (Figure 13). These declines also coincide with important turning points in the economy and well-being of people, with unemployment rates rising since 2009 and poverty on the increase between 2011 – 2015.

Figure 13

Afrobarometer: Trust in political parties



Electoral scenarios

The ongoing trend of declining voter participation and turnout has been evident in national and provincial – as well as local government elections. Whereas recorded turnout was 58% in the 2016 local government elections, this dropped to 46% in 2021. On this basis, looking to turnout in 2024, the low possible scenario is a turnout of 53% - 60%. A high scenario would be turnout of 63% or above.











Outcomes are difficult to anticipate with respect to independents and new political formations such as Rise Mzansi, Build One South Africa (BOSA), the African Congress for Transformation (ACT), the Patriotic Alliance, etc. (Figure 14).

Prospects for the “Moon Shot” coalition

In reality, the so-called moonshot pact (now called the multi-party charter) is more a case of “pie in the sky”.

Figure 14







Possible turnout and results scenarios

	Low Turnout (53%-60%)	High Turnout (63% +)
 ANC	48.5%	51.5%
 DA	22%	21%
 EFF	12%	11%
 ACTIONS SA	3%	2.5%
 IFP	2.5%	2.5%
 VF	3.5%	3.5%
 RISE MZANSI	3.5%	3.5%
 DAKHOATO WESIZWE MK	2%	2%
Ensemble of small parties	2.5%	2%
Independents	0.5%	0.5%

Data analysis suggests that in the best possible outcome, the coalition would win just over 46% of votes and 195 NA seats: six short of a parliamentary majority (Figure 15). This would require both parties and independents to perform optimally and takes for granted support from the Congress of the People (COPE) and other small parties, which is obviously not guaranteed, and some of the constituent parties, such as COPE may be obliterated altogether. It is possible that new entrants and “independents” – against whom the electoral odds are stacked anyway – could be persuaded to throw their lots in with the coalition. However, collectively they would need to garner at least 6% of votes and commit all 30 plus seats to the multi-party charter coalition, for it to succeed.

Figure 15

Minimum results for a “moon shot” majority

 DA	25% and 100 seats
 IFP	5% and 20 seats
 ACTIONS SA	10% and 40 seats
 ACDP	2% and 10 seats
 COPE	1% and 10 seats
 VF	3.5% and 15 seats

What happens if the ANC loses its 50% majority


Nationally, data confirms that the trajectory of ANC decline has been consistent, cumulative and compounded. Since 1999, the ANC's electoral outcomes have changed from 3.79% between 2004 and 2009, 3.75% between 2009 and 2014 and 4.65% between 2014 and 2019 (Figure 16).

[12] Based on these figures there should be scepticism of the ANC losing its majority - even on a liberal projection - that the ANC drops by 7% it would still settle at 50.5% of the national vote and attain a majority.

Nevertheless, there has been considerable speculation about the possibility that the ANC may lose its 50% majority, and ultimately this would mean that it must join forces with others and work within a c/hobbled coalition. This would likely be with either very small parties and "independents"; or through coalescing with either the EFF or the DA.

Figure 16

ANC national election results



Coalition politics versus coalition government

Unfortunately, we have seen that the ANC can be sore losers and may well focus on doing everything to regain this majority – even at the detriment of governance and institutions. Thus far and in contexts in which the ANC has lost power, these “claw-backs” have remained within institutional processes and procedures. However the extent of public sector and political involvement in state capture demonstrates that party members are not beyond acting with impunity, manipulating institutions and even directly targeting political opponents and whistle-blowers.

Ultimately, the era of coalitions may be good for “politics” in terms of managing and balancing the acquisition of power and – to return to Huntington’s two turnover test – democratic consolidation.

However at the local government level thus far coalitions have performed badly in terms of actual governing and administration.

They have become mired in predation and parties pursuing their own self-referential policies, unresponsive to societal and citizen needs. Discouraged voters who withdraw from political and public life leave behind unhinged parties that work solely to shore up their own support or align with others who share mutual interests.

Some of the consequences in terms of governance and policy-making may include:

- contradictory and inappropriate policy configuration
 - under- and over- bureaucratisation applied inappropriately
 - state fragmentation
 - state restructuring, further privatisation and outsourcing dependant on the political principal in office, and the relative factional strengths within a governing coalition that would also determine appointments, portfolios and the like
- heading towards a fiscal cliff through indiscriminate public spending , including arguments for quantitative easing
 - inappropriate competition policy
 - arguments that the informal sector is too small relative to the size of the economy
 - BEE as a redistributive instrument, whereby preferential procurement is up for capture and asymmetrical to development outcomes in the most basic developmental areas
 - failures of institutional oversight and supervisory management, resulting in failures of responsiveness and accountability, including in relation to:
 - maintenance, repair and expansion of infrastructure; and,
 - imprudent accommodations and policy directed through influential, opaque donors and special interests leading to further corrupt state capture and predatory politics and policy.



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